October–December 1979

Military Intelligence

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Into the 1980's

Military Intelligence

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Promoting Professionalism in Military Intelligence

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Authors

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

LTC Collins holds a BA in English from the University of Richmond and an MA in Soviet Studies from the University of Kansas. He is a graduate of the Defense Language Institute (Korean and Russian), the National Cryptologic Course sponsored by NSA, the MIOAC, the USA Russian Institute and the USA Command and General Staff College. He has served as a commander, operations officer, staff officer and briefer and is currently an instructor at the Command and Staff College.

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

Major Collard enlisted in the Signal Corps in 1963 and was commissioned through ROTC at the University of Washington with a bachelors degree in communications. He has attended the Field Artillery advanced course, Command and General Staff College and Electronic Warfare course at Fort Leavenworth. In addition to commanding a signal company and field artillery battery, he has some seven years experience as a Brigade and Battalion Signal Officer in the Far East, CONUS and Europe. Major Collard currently is serving as Assistant Professor of Military Science at Wofford College in Spartanburg, SC.

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Mr. Grau is currently a security specialist employed by the Counterintelligence Directorate, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, HQDA. He holds a BA degree from Duquesne University and has done graduate work in English at Monmouth College and Jacksonville State University. He is a former captain in the Military Police Corps, having served at Fort Knox, KY and Qui Nhon Army Depot, Republic of Vietnam, and as Provost Marshal, Letterkenny Army Depot, PA. Since returning to the Department of the Army as a civilian employee, Mr. Grau has worked at the US Army Electronics Command, Fort Monmouth, NJ and at Anniston Army Depot, AL. His last assignment before joining OACSI was as the Security Classification Management Officer, US Army Communications and Electronics Materiel Readiness Command, Fort Monmouth, NJ.

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LTC Gordon is attending the National War College in Washington, DC. He was previously assigned in such positions as EW officer, 18th Airborne Corps, EW and Cryptologic officer with the 101st Airborne Division, the 173rd Airborne Brigade (Sep), and the 5th and 10th Special Forces Groups. LTC Gordon was also the commander of the 313th CEWI Battalion (Abn), 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC. A frequent contributor to *Military Intelligence*, LTC Gordon authored "Soldier or Linguist?" (April–June 1979), "Another View of the Battle of Stalingrad," (July–September 1978) and "Winning on the Electronic Warfare Battlefield," (October–December 1977).

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CPT Beumer is a 1972 graduate of West Point. He has attended Infantry Officer Basic, the EW/Cryptologic Officer Course and the MI Officer Advance Course and has completed Airborne and Ranger training. He was a platoon leader and executive officer with the 4th Infantry Division, platoon leader, operations officer, S3 and company commander at the US Army Field Station Augsburg, and is currently the operations officer of the 265th EW Company, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, KY. CPT Beumer holds a Master of Science degree in Business Administration from Boston University.

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WO1 Hofer holds a BA in Spanish from the College of St. Thomas, St. Paul, MN. He has done graduate work in foreign languages at the University of San Diego and the University of Minnesota. Prior to entry into the service he taught Spanish and French at the high school level for six years. A graduate of the DLI Russian course and most recently the Czech Basic Course (where he was honor graduate) WO1 Hofer is currently the Language Training Officer for the Interrogation Section, 452nd Military Intelligence Detachment, 172d Infantry Brigade (AK), Fort Richardson, Alaska.

from the Commander

The Way I See It



The intelligence community changed dramatically during the 70s. Doctrine changed, organizations merged and new equipment was developed. These changes were necessary to keep pace with the modern Army's need to provide commanders with timely and accurate intelligence. In order for combat power to be correctly applied at a precise time and place to stop and defeat a numerically superior enemy commanders must be able to see the battlefield.

Changes will continue into the 80s. One key area is fine tuning the structuring of intelligence efforts to better meet Army requirements. To this end, certain criteria must be met:

1) Design for war. The intelligence organization/systems must be designed for a wartime environment and modified for crisis or peacetime application. Intelligence support provided in peacetime must be available and functional when thrust into the more stringent wartime environment.

2) Design for the worst war. The intelligence organizations/systems must be designed for the worst case situation. In this regard, the system must accommodate the short-warning attack on NATO by Warsaw Pact forces in Europe. This attack will be characterized by continually shifting axes of attack, high levels of mobility and lethality, and a target-rich environment.

3) ADP is essential. The volume of potential targets in the European environment demands the use of automatic data processing for efficient management of intelligence collection resources and to assist in the subsequent analysis and filtering of the intelligence data provided. Intelligence summaries, periodic intelligence reports, and schedule driven briefings alone cannot serve the commander of the 80s. He must have intelligence keyed to events in a rapidly changing situation. The commander requires automation of the intelligence process to expedite reports/information management, provide dynamic and current situation displays, and support decision-making with man-machine interactive situation assessment and intelligence mission management software.

4) Focus on critical nodes. Limited intelligence collection assets as well as operational strike assets dictate that we expend our effort on those organizational, geographic or functional elements, the timely destruction or disruption of which will seriously impede conduct of the enemy's operations or plans. Detailed all-source analysis of the enemy's battlefield systems identifies these critical nodes. This data will be used in the development of integrated weapons/intelligence allocations and tactics.

5) System design must be enemy independent. New collection and processing strategies will be developed which are enemy independent. They will provide the necessary all-source intelligence regardless of the enemy's attempts to hide or obscure his true posture.

6) Design a single intelligence plan. Methodology for tactical intelligence concepts must be applicable throughout all command echelons from the FEBA to the National Command Authority (NCA); the only main variables being data timeliness and areas of responsibility. Although collection and analysis systems at corps and below belong to various command echelons, they must be an integral part of the overall intelligence structure to give all commanders the timely, integrated and corroborated intelligence necessary to perform their mission.

Another key area is training. The Army of the 80's will continue to experience budgetary constraints, reductions in the training base, and increased responsibilities for the soldier.

Training our EM. Emphasis on proper training is paramount if we are to stand ready to accomplish our primary mission—victory in battle. The individual soldier will have to be trained to understand intelligence methodology and to effectively operate new and technically complex equipment.

Training our trainers.

1) NCO's. The NCO will be better

(continued on page 49)

Feedback

Editor,

Congratulations to you and to LTC Don E. Gordon for the article "Soldier or Linguist?" which appeared in the April–June 79 issue of MI Magazine. Having been part of the "linguist problem" since 1962, I have never seen a clearer exposition of this problem nor a better list of recommendations for its solution.

I am well aware that the 98G MOS enjoys the dubious, but sometimes well earned, reputation of being a "prima donna" MOS. I also know that members of this field can, given the motivation, perform in a way that would meet anyone's criteria of what constitutes a soldier. In many units, E-4 "acting jacks" routinely fill E6 positions, running ECM teams, supervising maintenance, teaching equipment operation, and coordinating directly with S-3s and C-E Officers of supported units during ARTEPs and manuevers. And they do it in a manner which would reflect credit on an E6 or E7.

The ratio of personnel to major end items of 1.5:1 cited by LTC Gordon, although awesome enough, is often the ideal, rather than reality. It is by no means unusual to see motor/signal stables during which one man is attempting, in the allotted time, to perform meaningful maintenance on a vehicle, the EW system which it carries and the generator and trailer which it pulls. Meditations on the swamp and the alligators are frequent, to say the least.

On only one point do I find any grounds for disagreeing with LTC Gordon's recommendations. I grant that the 98G MOS is perhaps the most poorly-structured MOS in the inventory, but I question whether having jammers operated by holders of another MOS is feasible, at least at this point in time. Two justifications are often given for the conduct of ECM by 98Gs. The first, a vain hope that effective ICD missions can somehow be performed by linguists whose speaking ability is woefully short of the native speaker level, can be dismissed. However, at least some degree of linguistic ability would seem to be required for the conduct of jamming.

Thanks again for publishing LTC Gordon's penetrating analysis.

SFC David S. Rogers
Munich, Germany

Editor,

COL Andrew Rutherford's article on the Reserves, "Come As You Are," was excellent and points to a need for more emphasis on reserve training. I would like to see more articles on the reserves and National Guard in *MI Magazine*.

M. H. Owens
Seattle, Washington

Our January–March 1980 issue will present a look at the Reserves in MI.
Editor

(from the Readership Survey)

Editor,

I would suggest making individual articles a bit longer.

I am most pleased with the evolution of *MI Magazine*. We have a branch journal to be proud of. Drive on!

MAJ David L. Watkins
Louisville, Ohio

Editor,

Military Intelligence involves far more than tactical operations. Many thousands of civilians contribute to the overall MI effort (USA DARCOM, DLA, DIA etc.). Include more articles of interest to this large group of readers.

Charles W. O'Neal
Criminal Investigator
Defense Logistics Agency

Editor,

Keep encouraging articles by junior officers. Stick to strictly intelligence-related articles. Print more articles on leadership in MI units.

LTC Roland W. Stahl
Fairfax, VA

Correction

In "Soldier or Linguist" (MI Magazine April–June 1979) it was erroneously reported on page 47 that "current incentives cannot provide even 20 percent of the linguists authorized." The correct figure is 50 percent. The paragraph should have read:

"Overfill tactical MOS 98G TOE positions by 20 percent to permit participation in peacetime utilization programs without detracting from unit readiness. Admittedly, this is difficult when current incentives cannot provide even 50 percent of the linguists now authorized."

In CPT William C. Spracher's article *"The 'Lawfulness' of Intelligence Operations,"* (July–September 1979), President Carter's statement on page 13, column 3 should have read:

"You almost are in the position of being like Caesar's wife; you have to be even more pure and clean and more decent and more honest than almost any persons who serve in government, because the slightest mistake on your part is highly publicized and greatly magnified, whereas your great achievements and successes quite often are not publicized and are not recognized, and they certainly are never exaggerated ... There have been too many shocks, too many rapid changes in the past, but the policies that have now been established by Executive order, by sound decisions, by cooperation, and in the future by law, will give you a much surer sense of what the future will bring, will liberate you individually, in effect, to make your own beneficial impact in our country be even greater. I know how serious uncertainty is in a person's life."

Applications for ROTC Scholarships

Applications for ROTC scholarships for active duty enlisted soldiers will be available after October 1. The program provides financial assistance to selected soldiers for education and training in pursuit of a bachelor's degree and a commission in the Army following graduation. To be eligible for enrollment in the program, enlisted soldiers must have completed at least one year of active duty as of date of discharge. They must have completed between two and two and one half years of college and scored at least 115 on their General Technical Aptitude test. Applications will be accepted between January 15 and April 15, 1980 for the 1980–1981 school year. AR 145-1 has complete details, or call Autovon 680-3071.

The Editorial Staff of MI Magazine

As one who has been familiar with MI Magazine since its inception, I

was pleased to learn that as the Director of Training Developments (assigned June 1979) one of my responsibilities was the publication of the magazine.

The letter to the editor in the July–September 1979 issue from Colonel Ross Mayfield, Jr., a former Director of Training Developments, was right on target when it stated "you have come a long way baby." As I read Colonel Mayfield's comments, I wondered how many readers of MI Magazine know that the efforts on which they comment, (a preponderance of those comments favorable) are basically accomplished by three people.

The MI Magazine team is headed by 1LT Joe Loughran, a graduate of Princeton and a young man possessing a uniquely positive attitude about his job. Ms. Dee Jones, the magazine's graphics designer, is a master at layout and editorial work. The interesting cover on the July–September 1979 issue was her work. She provides the necessary continuity on the staff and has proved a valuable advisor in all matters pertaining to the magazine. SSG Larry Harmon rounds out the team as assistant editor and distribution manager.

MI Magazine Staff, left to right, 1LT Joe Loughran, Ms. Dee Jones and SSG Larry Harmon.

If it were up to the magazine staff this article would not see print; however, as the person for whom they work, I can make it happen.

The MI Magazine staff is a truly remarkable team and you, the reader, should be aware of this. The staff deserves your plaudits.

GEORGE J. WALKER
Colonel, MI
Director, Training Developments

407th ASA Co. Reactivated

The 407th Army Security Agency Company Regimental Support Armored Cavalry was reactivated on 17 September 1979, at Fort Bliss, Texas to provide SIGINT and EW support for the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment. The 407th ASA had been active from 1965–72 in support of the 5th DIV in the Republic of Vietnam. The unit participated in eleven campaigns in Vietnam and holds the Meritorious Unit Commendation with three streamers and the Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm also with three streamers. The 407th ASA is commanded by CPT Frederick T. Curry. The First Sergeant is SSG Michael J. Deloney. Anyone previously serving with the 407th ASA who wishes to contact the unit may do so by writing the Commander, 407th ASA Company, Fort Bliss, TX 79916.

CPT Frederick Curry, Commander, 407th ASA Company, receives the unit colors from LTC Thomas Hofferts, Support Squadron Commander.

Military Intelligence

by
LTC Robert F. Collins

In the past, we have generally been willing to pay lip service to "effective utilization of funds." We are now faced with a situation that demands more than lip service. Funds for intelligence will most likely decrease rather than remain at the current level.

Military intelligence has changed markedly in the past ten years. One of the major problems confronting MI analysts is how to cope with these changes. This article will point out major reasons for this evolution, discuss its effects on the intelligence process, and make recommendations on approaches/methods that should be considered to provide an effective product. My comments, personal opinions and conclusions based on various tours served in military intelligence positions, are directed almost exclusively toward Army intelligence, but the general principles apply also to the intelligence arms of the other services.

Many factors, both tangible and intangible, have contributed to changing some of our long-held ideas and practices in MI. It could be convincingly argued that public attitudes toward intelligence formed by Watergate disclosures, Central Intelligence Agency revelations, and the documented abuses of intelligence, as well as the critical spotlight focused on the intelligence process in the aftermath of Vietnam, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, and the Cyprus dispute forced changes in MI. Granted, these are contributory factors; however, the main factors that have brought about change are resources and technology.

Our resources and available funds have been severely reduced. In the past, we have generally been willing to pay lip service to "effective utilization of funds." We are now faced with a situation that demands more than lip service. Additionally, funds for intelligence will most likely decrease rather than remain at the current level. It is substantially a matter of priorities, and with the pendulum now firmly on the side of cutting expenses wherever possible, it is difficult to imagine increased funding. This change in attitude is well-illustrated by an incident in which I was involved less that 10 years ago. While working at a technological intelligence organization in the Pacific, our section was asked for ideas on what we would like to see developed to assist us in accomplishing our mission—***price no object!*** We were to recommend any type of "black box" research and development (R&D) project that might assist us in our work. It is easy to imagine that, with the sky the limit, we proposed a multitude of ideas for new projects. I relate this example to contrast it with the present-day budgetary constraints under which we operate. The days in which "price is no object" are gone forever. Money is usually an overriding consideration in every facet of MI operations. This means that we must identify what returns are expected for every expenditure in money, time, talent, or resources, and then make the tough decisions on whether or not to expend the needed resources.

Technology has provided us with many blessings in intelligence, but it has also caused problems which we have to learn to solve. There is no doubt that technology has improved intelligence operations in timeliness, expanded our intelligence base, provided information (primarily photography) previously unavailable, and facilitated confirmation of related bits of information.

The impact of computers on intelligence operations is far-ranging, and although the impact is complex and many-faceted, I think we generally have a handle on computer contributions to intelligence. However, we do not have a handle on some other less obvious technological problems. Technology has provided us with ***more*** information than we can effectively handle at the present time. Technology has far outstripped human resources in the ability to scan, identify, differentiate, collate, integrate, and change information into usable intelligence. Technological developments have not proceeded gradually along a known path but rather have taken quantum jumps at unpredictable times at unpredictable stages.

Military intelligence has not capitalized effectively on this windfall. We just have not had any experience factor to deal with the technological revolution. Our only solution has been to adjust old proven techniques to the new situation; this is only a stop-gap measure. Technology demands development of new techniques, new priorities, and new solutions.

The paradox of the technological breakthrough is that the role of the individual analyst in the intelligence process has been upgraded and has become more critical, rather than downgraded. It means that intelligence analysts have to recognize that selection of information becomes the most critical phase in the intelligence process. It means personnel should be classified as "intelligence-dedicated" and fill intelligence assignments exclusively. Previous policies which called for temporary assignment of officers to one or two year "familiarization" tours in strategic intelligence positions should be curtailed. Technology and resources force us to reexamine many of our current policies, make changes as required, and provide a

Into the 1980's

new prism through which to view MI efforts.

One of the primary areas to change, and at the same time one of the hardest to articulate, is that of attitudes toward intelligence. Many intelligence attitudes are longstanding, seldom subject to serious questioning, and based on a situation-set which is no longer realistic. We have long operated under the premise that the best way to satisfy intelligence requirements is the "shotgun" approach. Intelligence collectors and users, if asked what they want to know about a particular country, enemy, armed force, political/military decision, new weapon, new R & D development, etc., are almost sure to respond "we want to know ***everything***." It is a generally accepted attitude that this is a proper response: collectors and users ideally should know everything about a particular subject. However, is this a realistic, productive attitude? What return is obtained on money and effort expended to gather and process intelligence that does not apply directly or indirectly to the Army mission? What is the benefit of obtaining intelligence that, once obtained, is only filed away in a safe or a collective group's mind or even in an individual's mind? The chain is broken. The argument that the information ***may*** be useful at a later date can no longer justify such enormous expenditures of resources. The main purpose of intelligence is to provide decision-makers with facts and best estimates upon which they can make the "right" decisions. No purpose is served by expending resources on projects for which, even if all intelligence requirements are filled, there is no method, group, or channel to capitalize on the effort. I can cite two examples to illustrate the above points. During the Vietnam War, a report is received that states that Kim Il-song, Premier of North Korea, is ill; a possible successor is named in the report. Someone in a position of authority in Army channels looks at the report and speculates: suppose Kim dies and is succeeded by someone who is more overtly hostile to US interests, someone who will introduce North Korean troops into Vietnam? This could have significant implications. After all, North Korea did launch an unexpected attack in the '50s, it could do so again. I am going to direct my intelligence people to find out all they can about this situation in North Korea. So directives are issued to find out "everything" about Kim's illness and his probable successor. Unfortunately, this does sound like a logical, feasible, and valid request; however, in today's environment, it is an unnecessary expenditure of time and resources at Army level. It is wasted because, no matter what results are obtained, there is no one in the Army who can make decisions or even recommendations on the information obtained. Certainly the purpose of obtaining information regarding a possible successor to Kim is a legitimate request, but the Army cannot involve itself in self-generated tasks that are basically State Department and CIA functions. The example may be extreme to illustrate the point, but examples in which the Army commits its resources to discover "nice-to-know" information are frequent. Effective utilization of resources demands that senior officials recognize legitimate as well as illegitimate Army areas of concern.

We have long operated under the premise that the best way to satisfy intelligence requirements is the "shotgun" approach. Intelligence collectors and users, if asked what they want to know about a particular country, enemy, armed force, etc., are almost sure to respond, "We want to know everything." Is this a realistic, productive and cost-effective attitude?

A second example, one confined to strictly military matters rather than one with political considerations, is cited. A report is received which states the US Navy has lost an F-15 aircraft equipped with missiles off one of its 6th Fleet ships in the Mediterranean. The Navy will begin search operations shortly. An unconfirmed report indicates the USSR may be interested in attempting to recover the aircraft and its missiles. The Mediterranean is a high-interest area to US policy makers. The USSR's continuing development of a "blue water" Navy is a vital concern. The possibility of the Soviet Union's capturing a US missile could have serious security implications by providing it with advanced technology. Consequently, the Army decides to try to find out everything about the recovery operation and possible Soviet attempts to recover the missile. A legitimate reaction for the Army? Again, we must ask what purpose will be served if the Army obtains this information, what "bottom-line" result benefits the Army? No tangible or intangible benefit will be accrued; the intelligence, if obtained, is a duplicate effort. This particular situation comes under the proper purview of the Navy, both operations and intelligence. The Army simply cannot afford to involve itself in other services' areas of responsibility.

This is not to say that the Army, Navy, or Air Force intelligence operations are conducted in a vacuum; obviously, they are not. Military services must be aware of targets, efforts, and results of other collection and intelligence-producing agencies. Liaison and coordination are considerations

at all working levels of intelligence. Duplication of effort, up to a point, is not necessarily detrimental to the intelligence effort. Because of the nature of intelligence itself, it is possible for two analysts to examine the same data and derive different conclusions. This, ironically, can assist the decision-maker. It provides him with a wider perspective, a broader-based range of options and, hopefully, a clearer understanding of some of the implications of his decisions. Each service's responsibility is to present the decision-maker with its best recommendation based on the best interpretation of available data; differing recommendations and analyses force a closer examination of the issues. The days of looking at events or developments in black and white are gone; differing analyses, views, and recommendations must be perceived as strengths of the system rather than weaknesses. The prime consideration remains, however, the effective utilization of resources. Intelligence analysts and intelligence directing authorities must be aware that resources are limited, that in most cases one intelligence service has primary responsibility and interest, and that selection of tasks that are vital and not merely cosmetic is a never-ending, inviolable requirement.

How can we improve our intelligence effort while operating under tighter and tighter financial restraints? How do we provide decision makers a better-researched, more professionally analysed, and higher confidence product? Unfortunately, there are no easy answers to these questions. The following suggestions are, at least to me, steps in the right direction. Some represent a departure from existing policies; nevertheless, changes are required — both in our attitudes and in current policies. For a long time, the prevailing theory in the Army has been that most officers in the combat arms and combat support branches should be generalists receiving adequate training, education, and experience to allow them to fill various posts in personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, communications, civil affairs, etc. Their broad work background will ultimately make them better leaders and better commanders. In theory, a qualified officer would be able to move from one assignment to an entirely different assignment and, after only minimum orientation and training on the new job, perform effectively. What is lost in expertise, theoretically, is more than compensated for by developing officers as outstanding managers able to cope with and solve differing problems of varying complexities. As the officer's career develops, he will be able to assume positions of greater and greater responsibility up to the general officer level and serve as the coordinator, manager, and guidance-giver for the missions assigned to him in any particular position. The increasing complexities of today's space age could be left to the "technicians;" the general principles and basic knowledge of scientific methods are all that the generalist really needs to know to perform effectively. Basically, in simplified form, these are the generalist's arguments when explaining why the Army should produce generalists in its officer corps rather than specialists. I do not think this rationale is appropriate to today's Army.

Specialists, not generalists, are needed in today's world. Specialists are needed in all disciplines, especially intelligence. The overriding justifications for this are resources and technology. It is not realistic to believe that any officer, no matter how competent or dedicated, is able to master the numerous different tasks that require varying complex skills, technical expertise, and actual job experience.

On the basis of sheer percentages, it must be pointed out that a very small number of officers fill high-level leadership positions; it is not logical to train all to fill positions that will only be filled by a few. Specialists — not generalists — are needed in today's world. Specialists are needed in all disciplines, especially intelligence. Specialists are required if the Army is to progress and not atrophy. I stated earlier that we need intelligence-dedicated officers, ones that would enter the intelligence field for their Army careers to stay on the same intelligence jobs for extended periods of time rather than switching assignments every year or two and duty stations every three or four years. The overriding justifications as to why we need specialists are, again, resources and technology. The individual, the Army, and the intelligence effort are the big losers under present policies. It is not realistic to believe that any officer, no matter how competent or dedicated, is able to master numerous different tasks that require varying complex skills, technical expertise, and actual job experience. The nuclear age has necessitated changes in our military doctrine on the conduct of war, created new concepts of nuclear deterrence, and made us "rethink" many long held ideas. It has also given rise to fields of nuclear energy, missile and laser developments, and disciplines that were unknown as little as 25 years ago.

The one constant in this rapidly changing "balance of forces" is the individual whose importance paradoxically, has increased in this automated era. The individual must still make the basic decisions upon which the entire intelligence process depends. We must develop specialists in the intelligence field; designate intelligence officers and design career patterns for them. We can then provide decision-makers with the best possible recommendations based on an enlightened analysis and understanding of the facts by intelligence-dedicated officers.

Another area that must be considered in the interest of saving taxpayer dollars is the use of civilian contractor/private firms by the US Army for performance of intelligence studies, war gaming problems, intelligence reorganization, developmental intelligence research, etc. No one can convincingly argue that these firms do not fill a valid requirement for the military; however, I contend that we rely excessively upon these firms in light of today's realities. More attention must be paid to evaluation projects when applications are received by DA from firms requesting to do studies on various subjects. We must ask ourselves:

• Will we realize an adequate return on our investment? What exactly will be the benefits of the study. What exactly is the applicability of the study? Could the money be better spent in other areas? Too many studies are produced, paid for, and then simply filed away. And often, should the

subject come up again, a new study is contracted for with another firm and the old study goes unused.

• Has this study been conducted before? Many approved studies are, in fact, basically repackaged from material previously published in various sources (previous studies, monographs, articles, military manuals and journals, and published works or various symposia). The new study is little more than a slick, updated version of someone else's work. The contract-granting authority must make the effort to determine that every study breaks new ground.

• Can the Army conduct a better, more effective study with its own resources? Does the civilian firm have certain resources that the Army lacks? Do we automatically assume an outside agency can provide a more objective product? If so, we need to restructure our *modus operandi.* In many instances, the Army is better able to initiate the requirement, research existing material, form appropriate guidelines for the study, and accomplish the mission. For some reason, we have generally accepted the myth that civilian firms somehow have a more "objective" outlook, and can produce a superior product, that the Army cannot do as good a job because it suffers from the "can't-see-the-forest-for-the-trees" syndrome. The truth, in most cases, is just the opposite. The Army knows what information it needs and where to find it and the Army has the professional expertise needed for most tasks. We must utilize these talents to best advantage.

One more area crying for policy change is effective utilization of linguists. Everyone agrees that these valuable resources should not be wasted. Current policies and programs call for their identification, and efforts are being made to identify positions requiring language capabilities. Much more should be done. Speaking ability is quick to erode and this area requires a concentration of efforts. Establish programs to enable linguists to extensively practice their language as part of their duties. These programs, one-on-one conversations with instructors, group discussions (in the language), tape laboratory, attendance at functions requiring language—attache/embassy visits, trips to target country, debriefs of natives of target countries, etc.—should be mandatory for qualified individuals. Such programs should become part of regular duties, not voluntary off-duty "obligations." Retention of reading and writing skills also should be included in any program. A separate incentive program to provide extra pay based on language proficiency should be established. Let's not waste the time, money, and effort spent on language training and then misutilize these talents. Language is a skill that requires constant practice; the Army and the individual will come out ahead if we will recognize the importance of these personnel resources.

It is becoming increasingly difficult to attract talented people to the military as the disparity between civilian and military benefits widens. In a nutshell, the military must remain competitive with the civilian sector job market. But more important factors influencing the decision to serve 30 years are a sense of purpose and the importance of the work; a feeling of individual and professional accomplishment; and job satisfaction. These needs must be recognized.

In line with personnel resources conservation, the following remarks are made. Retention of trained and experienced intelligence personnel is a most serious problem. Ideally, the Army would train, develop, and utilize intelligence personnel in a variety of personally rewarding assignments for at least a 30 year period. Realistically, this is not the case.

What incentives or new policies are needed to persuade intelligence personnel to plan for and then stay in the military for 30 years? Required incentives are adequate pay, a reasonable degree of job security; adequate facilities for families, i.e., schools, hospitals, entertainment opportunities, etc.; an equitable chance for promotions compared with all other branches; a voice in assignment selection; and an opportunity to be able to save money if desired. It must be realized that these incentives for military personnel must compare favorably with the same incentives in the civilian sector.

It is becoming increasingly difficult to attract talented people to the military as the disparity between civilian and military benefits widens. Workers entering the job market each year are becoming more sophisticated and better educated; they expect, rightfully, to be shown concrete advantages to pursuit of a military career. In a nutshell, the military must remain competitive with the civilian sector job market.

The incentives mentioned above are, in a sense, only secondary factors in the choice of a military career. More important factors influencing the decision to serve 30 years are a sense of purpose and the importance of the work; a feeling of individual and professional accomplishment; and job satisfaction. For intelligence personnel, these needs should be recognized. Programs must fulfill these needs. The following suggestions would assist in retaining intelligence personnel:

- longer assignments in intelligence positions
- assignment to intelligence or intelligence-related positions guaranteed except under extreme conditions
- a planned and publicized career development program for 30 years
- an opportunity to see results of one's efforts by allowing the analyst to participate at the decision-making level
- recognition of the necessity of professional intelligence operations

Certainly, retention is a complex problem requiring our best efforts; it cannot be shunted aside. Innovative ideas and approaches are needed; changing situations demand changing policies.

There are many other areas that could be included under such a broad subject as the future of military intelligence. I have touched briefly on what seem to me to be the vital issues. The impact of budget constraints and technological advances must be recognized. An evaluation and reevaluation of our efforts must be continuous. New approaches and techniques are not in themselves better than old ones, but change is surely the one constant in an inconsistent world. Military intelligence must grow and change to survive.

The Challenge of MI Leadership in the '80s

by Major General Edmund R. Thompson

Major General Edmund R. Thompson is a 1952 graduate of the US Military Academy, West Point. He holds an MA and a PhD in geography from Syracuse University. His military education includes the Artillery Basic and Advance Courses, the US Army Command and General Staff College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

General Thompson has served in such positions as Commander, US Army Field Detachment O, OACSI; Assistant Chief of Staff G2 with the 25th Infantry Division in Vietnam; Assistant for Vietnam, Vietnam Task Force, Office of the Secretary of Defense; Commander, 116th MI Group, US Army Intelligence Command; Chief, Plans and Systems Division, Directorate of Plans, Programs and Budget, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel; and Director of Intelligence Operations, OACSI. General Thompson has been the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence since August 1977.

General Thompson's awards include the Legion of Merit with Oak Leaf Cluster; the Bronze Star Medal with 2 OLC; the Meritorious Service Medal; the Air Medal (three awards); and the Army Commendation Medal with OLC.

Leadership in the '80s is no different from leadership in the '70s, '60s or even the 1880s. It is traditional moral values and common sense applied to ever new and changing situations by courageous men and women. The '80s certainly will be marked by accelerated change and the demands for strong leadership through the Army will increase correspondingly.

To set the tone for a discussion of leadership, I would like to offer two quotations; one is taken from a recent speech by the Chief of Staff and the other from a well-known figure who soldiered 203 years ago. First, from General Meyer:

"The profession of arms is a noble profession. The great task of each professional officer is to preserve our institutions through his teaching and example, and to pass on to those who follow his dedication to the profession of arms. The soldiers' duties and the scope of our responsibilities set us apart from all other walks of life. In the words of General John Winthrop Hackett, the soldiers' contract is an 'unlimited liability contract.' Our duty continues until the fight is over. Leadership, trust, self-sacrifice, and professional example draw our units together and allow soldiers to accept the duties of their profession. They make ours a noble profession and enable soldiers to accept the 'unlimited liability contract.'

"My concern is that our preoccupation with administrative detail may mask these fundamentals. We have engineered a useful system of personnel management; however, when allowed to function simply as a management system fueled by personal ambition our endeavors become self-serving and our profession appears less than noble. When we recognize the need to ensure that ours remains a truly noble profession and we set our personal priorities in their proper order, all else falls into place."

The second quote comes from Captain Nathan Hale of the 7th Connecticut Regiment and Knowlton's Rangers. Although he is better remembered for a more dramatic statement, I believe this one captures the spirit of leadership which should serve as a professional compass to guide us all. He made the statement after becoming the only volunteer, in a unit of volunteers, willing to take on an onerous mission requested by the Commander in Chief: "I am not influenced by the expectation of promotion or pecuniary reward; I wish to be useful; and every kind of service necessary for the public good becomes honorable by being necessary. If the exigencies of my country demand a peculiar service, its claims to the performance of that service are imperious."

In addressing our leadership challenge, we find inspiration in our model forebearers in the profession of arms. As MI professionals we can devote our full energies enthusiastically to a task that is essential for the public good, and the performance of which is both urgent and honorable.

We must understand that our mission is the first task of any army—before which and without which all else fails. That mission is to find, know and never lose the enemy.

The nature of our mission dictates that the two hallmarks of the MI soldier be integrity and a sense of urgency. Over 200 years ago, Major Robert Rogers issued his Rules for the Ranging Service in which he stated: "Don't never lie to an officer or to another ranger." This dictum demanded then and now that we seek accuracy in our facts and truth in our estimates. Our reports must be undistorted by what our audience may prefer to hear, irrespective of the nature of that audience.

Intelligence must drive the action. If not, we are historians rather than intelligence officers. Maintaining a sense of urgency was my most persistent leadership problem as a Division G2 in Vietnam. Especially when we are intelligence leaders in combat, we must minimize the need for carefully massaged reports and emphasize the need to speed intelligence to the decision makers. There is a natural tendency among specialists, which most of our troops are, to strive for perfection, to seek

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"So in the Libyan fable it is told that once an eagle, stricken with a dart, said, when he saw the fashion of the shaft, 'With our own feathers, not by others' hands, are we now smitten.'"

AEschylus

MI in the 1980s

by Major General William I. Rolya

Introduction

The form of MI in the 1980s was cast by Army leaders in the early and mid 1970s. The forward-thinking decisions resulting from the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study (IOSS) have created deep and lasting changes in both the structure and operating philosophy of Army intelligence. As intended, the Army has achieved better control of its intelligence resources through organizational restructuring; has realized the potential for synergistic interactions among the previously fragmented collection disciplines of signals, imagery, and human intelligence; and as a spinoff benefit, has begun to develop a better ability to assess the total performance of the system in accomplishing its primary mission—supporting Army decision-makers.

Yet those of us who have participated in this renaissance recognize that the new system is still imperfect. While we have been successful in changing the form of MI, we have not been as successful in changing the substance of MI. Some of the imperfections we see are failures to totally achieve IOSS goals; others we recognize because our perspectives have changed and we perceive problems which were not previously apparent. Similarly, as we move into the future, we should consider that our perspectives will again change and the "perfect" system we conceive today will be the imperfect system we operate with tomorrow. Constant objective reassessment is the key.

Principles

The Army's ability to complete the implementation of IOSS and successfully manage the new shape of Army intelligence depends upon continued adherence to the fundamental principles of IOSS and a shift of focus from internal issues to external support. In order to achieve this we must embrace tenets which establish:

Clear differentiation between staff and line functions in the Army intelligence community. We must continually remind ourselves that lines of authority and responsibility in the Army run from commander to commander. Although it may seem to be trivially obvious, this principle has historically been ignored in Army intelligence and the failure to follow it has caused much confusion. **Intelligence staff officers are not commanders.** Their function is to advise and assist commanders in decision-making. They are consumers, but not originators of intelligence. They translate the commander's requirements for intelligence inputs to decisions into tasks for the intelligence system. And they assist the commander in evaluating the impact of intelligence, but they neither collect nor produce intelligence. **They must learn to think like commanders and stop being technicians. Commanders of intelligence organizations lead and manage the intelligence system.** Their responsibility is to the commander they support. Their job is to supply the intelligence information requirements of decision-makers as articulated by the staff intelligence officer.

The statutory bounds of the US intelligence community prescribe the specific intelligence activities of and constraints upon DOD. The Intelligence and Security missions and responsibilities for the military departments are delineated within the DOD regulatory structure. Responsibilities and authorities for the conduct of the Intelligence and Security mission flow along departmental command and control channels, thus the rationale for the Army Intelligence and Security system organized for support of the Army C^2 structure, the Army decision-makers. Satisfaction of the requirements of Army decision-makers from either organic or superordinate capabilities of the US intelligence community is the philosophical purpose of the Army Intelligence

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Major General William I. Rolya received his commission through OCS at Fort Riley, Kansas. He is a graduate of the Signal Advance Course, the Command and General Staff College, Army Language School and the National War College and holds degrees from Illinois Benedictine College (AB), Northeastern University (MBA) and George Washington University (MS–International Affairs).

General Rolya has served foreign service tours in Korea, Alaska, Germany and Vietnam. He has served with the 440th Signal Battalion, 16th Signal Battalion, 24th Signal Battalion (24th Infantry Division), 124th Signal Battalion (4th Infantry Division), and the 22d Signal Group. Other assignments include ROTC; Alaska General Depot; Electronics Proving Ground; HQ USAREUR; Office of Personnel Operations; Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Signal Security and Electronic Warfare Manager, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Headquarters, Department of the Army; and Deputy Commander, US Army Security Agency, Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, Virginia. On 1 September 1975, MG Rolya assumed the position of Commander, US Army Security Agency. On 1 January 1977 the Army Security Agency was redesignated the US Army Intelligence and Security Command.

Military decorations include the Army Commendation Medal with three Oak Leaf Clusters, Joint Commendation Medal, Air Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster, Purple Heart, Bronze Star with V device with one Oak Leaf Cluster and the Legion of Merit with one Oak Leaf Cluster.

MI in the 1980s

by Brigadier General
Dallas C. Brown, Jr.

General Brown is the Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence, United States Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, GA. He is a tactical/strategic intelligence officer and a Foreign Area Officer (Russian). General Brown came to his FORSCOM assignment from Germany where he was the Commander, USA Field Station, Berlin. General Brown was commissioned an RA Second Lieutenant in 1954. He holds a BA degree in History and Political Science from West Virginia State College and an MA degree in Government (Russian Area Studies) from Indiana University. His military education includes the Infantry Basic Course, the Artillery Advanced Course, US Army Command and General Staff College, USA Russian Institute, United States Naval War College (Distinguished Graduate) and the Defense Language Institute (Russian and German) as well as the National Senior Cryptologic Officer's Course. General Brown's awards include the Meritorious Service Medal (2 OLC), Joint Service Commendation Medal and the Army Commendation Medal.

As the 1980s approach they have a special significance for most people. This is a time to look back over the past decade—perhaps to reflect upon where we failed to measure up to our expectations—and to look ahead and pledge ourselves to do better.

It is also a time for taking stock. Military intelligence is at a crossroads in many vital sectors as we approach the 1980s.

Challenges facing military intelligence in the next decade are great; with solutions demanding imagination and hard work. Evolving intelligence doctrine, changing organizational structures, commander's requirements and the complexity of future intelligence systems require officers experienced and trained in multiple intelligence disciplines. The future of MI rests with the all-source intelligence system manager who is capable of supporting the combat commander. It is up to all of us to continue the emphasis on improving the effectiveness of intelligence support to commanders and troops serving in tactical units.

As the pace of modern warfare grows faster and more lethal, victory depends more than ever on timely and accurate intelligence at all levels. Prior to addressing MI in the future, I would like to digress a moment and reflect on where we are today. In my view we've come a long way. To quote Dr. M. L. King on civil rights, "Today we are not where we should be, we are not where we are going and Lord knows the way is hard, but thank God we are not where we were." I firmly believe that our Active Component units and their military intelligence support are better today than those of any peacetime Army I have known.

It wasn't too long ago that an MI Branch was just an idea. No fully coherent intelligence doctrine existed and combat arms officers filled our key intelligence positions by default. The improvements have been staggering—not only in the development of a viable, professional branch, but more significantly in the quality of intelligence support to the tactical commanders. Evolving doctrine has seen the often inadequate G2 of yesteryear become the highly skilled intelligence manager of today. MI now has trained competent officers in intelligence positions from battalion to DOD. We have quality intelligence schools, ample doctrinal material, and an impressive data base on the Soviets and other potential enemies.

The future of Military Intelligence for the 80s is extremely bright. Under the current Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence (CEWI) organizational concept, all tactical intelligence/EW systems are being consolidated under one combat commander. It provides the combat commander far greater control of intelligence/EW assets than was previously experienced when they were fragmented in bits and pieces around the division responding to a variety of vertical chains of command. I believe this fusion of intelligence disciplines will be the margin of victory on future battlefields.[1]

There are some growing pains with us that continue to loom on the 1980 horizon. Our problems are essentially with personnel and equipment shortages and funding. Attitude is a key to success regarding these shortfalls. There is no reason for dismay or finger pointing. A cursory reading of military history shows that almost no Army ever had what they thought was enough when a war started—certainly not our Army. In any logical scenario that we can foresee, the Army will fight outnumbered.

With the activations of CEWI Battalions/Groups we suffer from critical intelligence personnel shortages. We need improved personnel procedures to insure we get the right men and women into Military Intelligence, train them effectively, employ them productively, and provide them a climate within which they can grow and achieve their personal goals and objectives while satisfying Army requirements.

Materially, we need intelligence systems which operate efficiently as an integral part of the overall Army system. We lack sufficient SIGINT/EW equipment, and that available is often 1950 vintage state-of-the-art. To meet this shortfall, over a half-billion dollars will be expended over the next 3–5 years on new equipment/systems. Off-the-shelf equipment purchases must fill the void until these new systems are fielded.

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Add Survivability to the Command/Control Equation

by
MAJ Nelson B. Collard, Jr.

Envision, for a moment, a well-camouflaged and concealed GP medium tent set up some 800–900 meters from the nearest hilltop. As you approach a small sign to the side of the trail which says "BDE TOC," you are skeptical. There are no M577's or generators roaring and belching smoke. There are no antennas standing above the trees. There are no signs of recovery or refueling activities in the area. You should have seen a well-disciplined security team and, hopefully, a ring of concertina around the perimeter. Entering the tent, you find the commander and his staff working the tactical operation in a much quieter and a much more survivable location. If this doesn't describe your present command post operation—read on.

The command post operation described which effectively removes all communications to a distant hilltop has been established in the European environment at brigade level in less than three hours using equipment which is available in the brigade today and techniques to be described in this article. For many years, doctrine has told the commander that a number of steps must be taken to protect the command post from enemy targeting and destruction. But doctrine has not addressed the specifics or the mechanics of establishing command/control communications in a timely manner which would be acceptable on the modern battlefield.

With this in mind, this article will present an approach to establishing remoted communications for a brigade-size command post. It should be noted that the concept lends itself equally well to a remoted battalion command post or to a remoted division tactical command post.

The Threat:

As combat operations on the modern battlefield become more complex, the electronic signature of the command post expands geometrically. The commander is probably well aware that there are a number of radio nets radiating from his command post. However, he is probably not aware that a significant threat to command/control is presented by this signature.

For many years, doctrine has told the commander that a number of steps must be taken to protect the command post from enemy targeting and destruction. But doctrine has not addressed the specifics or the mechanics of establishing command/control communications in a timely manner which would be acceptable on the modern battlefield.

Figure 1 graphically depicts some 18 easily targetable radiation signals which betray the brigade, 19 signals which betray the division main command post, and 12 signals which betray the battalion command post. As supporting unit liaison teams arrive and link-up for operations, the situation gets worse. Everyone has his own radio net and his own standard of communications discipline. Very little is accomplished if the brigade headquarters enforces strict radio discipline on the command and intelligence nets, while only 25 feet away there is no radio net discipline on other equally revealing nets. When the first volley of 122-mm MRL rounds impacts, it is likely that an interest in radio net discipline and remote installation techniques will rapidly develop. In the meantime, it is absolutely essential that the commander and the staff get out from under that umbrella of signals to which the state-of-the-art tactical antenna ties them and which, in all certainty, will attract effective enemy artillery or air attacks.

No doubt, the commander is already "threatened to death." However, this fact warrants reemphasis: the enemy has, and effectively employs, a capability to locate radiating electromagnetic sources within 30 seconds from a distance of 60 kilometers with an accuracy of one kilometer; from a distance of 30 kilometers with an accuracy of 250 meters. Combine this capability with an expressed objective of eliminating at least 50 percent of Allied command/control communications and the requirement to remote the command post is readily apparent.

The Concept:

Most brigade field headquarters are generally divided into the command post track and liaison officer vehicle complex, a close-in signal support area and an administrative support area. The rationale for the physical separation (which usually exists only at the first position and then deteriorates on subsequent displacements) is that the command post will be more survivable if it is smaller in terms of physical size and associated support activities. This rationale fails to take into account the fact that the greatest threat to command post survivability is, by far, the electronic and infrared signatures presented by the vehicle and radio complex.

In this remoted command post concept, the three areas are distinctly separated and restructured. The tactical command post consists of a GP medium (an available barn, building, shed, or gasthaus may be substituted) which houses the commander and the staff and is equipped with remote sets and telephones. The signal support area on "signal hill," which is linked to the command post by two 26-pair cables, contains all transmitting radio vehicles: M577's of the S3, S2, and Fire Support Officer (FSO); M1521's of the Air Liaison Officer, Engineer, Air Defense Officer, Civil-Military Officer, Liaison Officers, signal shelters (switchboard communications



For years, the US Army has paid lip service to electronic signature reduction of the command post. Most commanders operate within 60 feet of 10–15 radiating and readily targetable antennas. The techniques outlined in this article use current inventory equipment to remote some 40 radios and telephone circuits into the command post from a signal center which is 800–900 meters away. Explore this innovative concept for implementation within your command.

Figure 1.

center, multichannel radio terminals, radio teletype terminals, both organic to the brigade and attached for support from the division signal battalion). The administrative support area consists of HHC activities (maintenance, mess, etc.), and all other signal support vehicles/ equipment not actively involved in direct support of the command post communications mission (jump M577's, spare multichannel radio terminals and radio teletype terminals, etc.).

Command and control during the period in which the cable team is extending communications "down the hill" may be conducted from the M577 complex in the same fashion that it is conducted on a continuous and dangerous basis today. Experience in set-up times on major field training exercises in Europe demonstrated that the entire operation could be set up in less than three hours. The use of pre-cut harnesses for the GP medium test and Track Complex combined with the techniques described later in this article will reduce that time considerably. If this writer were to incorporate the concept into the ARTEP, a realistic time frame to train against would be 60 minutes.

The Payoffs:

Under this remoted command post concept, *all* the command/ control communications means which are available to the commander and his staff in the normal command post configuration are available for full command/control operations in an electronically "quiet" and noise-free environment.

All of the communications assets organic to the brigade and/or attached units in support of the brigade (division signal platoon and liaison teams) must be coordinated and directed toward the goal of providing rapid command/control communications to the commander and his staff in a significantly improved and survivable environment. By remoting the electronic and infrared signatures from the point where command and control is accomplished, enemy direction-finding and targeting activities will be forced to consider an area many times larger than that which is represented by the radiating source in order to target the decisionmakers. The techniques described by this article depict remoted command post operations of only 800–900 meters due primarily to current MTOE deficiencies in multiple pair cable. With the addition of 26-pair cable to the MTOE (18–20 sections could be used along with four to six junction boxes), the area which enemy direction-finding and targeting activities must search could be expanded even more. Doctrinally remoting communications can create an uncertainty on the part of enemy direction-finding and targeting activities that the simple location of a high-density radiating source may no longer pinpoint the commander and his staff to within 50 meters of accuracy. The resulting lower probability of "command/ control kill" could result in adjusted target attack priorities by the enemy during *his* periods of critical ammunition control.

Positioning the track/liaison vehicle complex in the signal support area of "signal hill" will permit the use of directional antennas which further reduce the electronic signa-



Figure 2. Cable Distribution Plan ... Signal Hill

ture. Under current concepts, the tracks are arranged in such a manner so as to accommodate the setup of the track-extensions and other canvas shelter to provide a working area for the commander and his staff. This severely limits the number of locations in which the command post can be established and severely restricts the set up of expedient directional antennas which may be used to establish communications with higher headquarters. The use of directional antennas accompanied by a reduction in power could reduce the probability of intercept on some of these nets significantly.

Once the CP is remoted from the track/liaison vehicle complex, a "quiet CP" environment is extremely easy to establish. There is no requirement for any generator set in the immediate vicinity of the CP to support communications. Consideration should be given to the use of battery-powered or gasoline lanterns and a gas-fired coffee pot as trade-offs for the noise a motor generator creates to keep electric

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Common Sense and the Classification of our Intelligence Product

by Joseph A. Grau

The views and opinions expressed in this article, unless a specific official source is cited, are solely those of the author, and must not be construed as reflecting official positions of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or any other US Government agency.

The Problem

In a statement issued at the time he signed Executive Order 12065, National Security Information, President Carter said:

"While some material must be classified, the government classifies too much information, classifies it too highly, and for too long. These practices violate the public's right to know, impose unnecessary costs, and weaken protection for truly sensitive information by undermining respect for all classification."[1]

In my opinion, this criticism may be applied quite accurately and appropriately to the American intelligence community.

The horror stories concerning unnecessary and arbitrary classification of intelligence are legion and need not be repeated here. As recently as February 17, 1979, the ***Washington Post*** reported that $75 million was wasted in a satellite communications program because the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was unable to release to one of its contractors information which had been "super-classified" by "US intelligence services."[2] I have no knowledge of whether this story is accurate or not, but it is all too believable. It is believable to those of us who have seen intelligence agencies classify foreign weapons system information which could have been lifted verbatim from a volume of the ***Jane's*** book series and foreign order of battle data which one could easily find in the pages of ***Military Balance.***

The issue of compartmentation is one which is currently receiving a good deal of attention within the intelligence community. Executive Order 12065 specifically requires the review and justification of all special access programs within the Executive Branch, and prescribes specific criteria for their continuance. This concern with compartmentation is a welcome development. Compartmentation, though, is not the concern of this article. I intend to focus on a much more basic issue: the **classification** of intelligence and the impact which Executive Order 12065, if conscientiously applied, will have on our current practices in this regard.

"Intelligence agencies are particularly reluctant to put out papers with no classification stamp on them.... It is hard to convince a newsman that he should respect a classification stamp if he has seen it too often on trivia."

LTG Daniel Graham
former Deputy Director, CIA
former Director, DIA

In the confusion of hurriedly trying to implement the new executive order—to figure out new marketing requirements, justify our needs for original classification authority, and make sense of new provisions for duration of classification—many have overlooked one provision of the order which should have a profound impact on our classification policies and practices, particularly within the intelligence agencies.

Subsection 1-1 of the order defines the three categories in which information may be classified. TOP SECRET information is that information whose unauthorized disclosure "could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security." For SECRET information, the criterion is that its disclosure "could reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to the national security." So far, there is little change from the provisions of the superseded Executive Order 11652. In defining CONFIDENTIAL information, though, a very important difference is noted. CONFIDENTIAL information is described as that information whose unauthorized disclosure "could reasonably be expected to cause **identifiable** damage to the national security" [emphasis added]. An original classification authority, before applying a CONFIDENTIAL classification to an item of information, must first be able to identify the damage to the national security which disclosure of the information could be expected to cause. The specific implications of this requirement in the decision-making process will be discussed later; first, let us consider a logical extension of the principle.

If, to designate information as CONFIDENTIAL—the least restrictive security classification—a classifier must be able to specifically identify the damage its disclosure could cause, it is inescapably logical that the same principle would apply in the case of SECRET and TOP SECRET classifications. The "exceptionally grave damage" and "serious damage" must also be "identifiable" in these cases.

This requirement to specifically identify probable damage is going to require substantially more serious thought than has heretofore been devoted to classification decisions in the intelligence community. We can no longer accept the easy, "stock" reasons for classifying intelligence: "This sort of thing is always SECRET," or "We've got to make it

"While some material must be classified, the government classifies too much information, classifies it too highly, and for too long. These practices violate the public's right to know, impose unnecessary costs, and weaken protection for truly sensitive information by undermining respect for all classification."[1]
President Jimmy Carter

at least CONFIDENTIAL—we don't want the Russians to know about it," or "This intelligence stuff is always classified."

This is the kind of explanation that the intelligence community has been all too prone to offer in support of its classification decisions—and which the rest of us have been all too likely to accept. The intelligence community, rightly concerned with safeguarding the many sensitive operations and activities with which it is involved, has espoused a better-safe-than-sorry logic: "when in doubt, classify it." Those of us in the security business who are not professionals in intelligence have too often assumed the possession of some sort of arcane and mystical knowledge on the part of intelligence professionals and have been hesitant to challenge their classification decisions.

Conscientious implementation of Executive Order 12065 will not allow this situation to continue. The better-safe-than-sorry policy is specifically prohibited by Subsection 1-1 of the order, which states: "If there is a reasonable doubt which designation is appropriate, or whether the information should be classified at all, the less restrictive designation should be used, or the information should not be classified." The requirement to identify damage presumes the initial presence of "reasonable doubt"; "automatic" decision-making will not suffice. As paragraph 1-302 of the Executive Order provides, "information...may not be classified unless an original classification authority...determines that its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause at least identifiable damage to the national security."

Making these determinations will require knowledge, experience, and—above all—common sense. The process must be essentially skeptical in nature: the original classification authority must question each proposed classification. To me, the secret of making sound classification decisions is asking the right questions. Later in this article we will examine some questions which must be asked when considering the classification of intelligence. First, however, we must recognize that this decision-making process is not an easy one. It is difficult and time-consuming, and is the sort of thing that is likely to be hurried or treated cavalierly unless its importance is clearly recognized. A few words about motivation are thus in order.

"(Intelligence) must develop the distinctions between protecting the secrecy of its sources and techniques and making available the substance of its information and its conclusions...Photographs must be declassified, backgrounders attributed, publications edited to protect the sources but allow the substance of the reports and assessments to circulate to Congress and the public...Out of the process will come a better understanding of the role and value of modern intelligence, as well as better intelligence itself."

William Colby
former Director, CIA

Motivation

Possibly the most difficult task facing those striving to promote more reasonable and effective classification of intelligence is to convince the members of the intelligence community that good classification management is worth their time and attention. Not only is overclassification an occupational hazard for the intelligence professional, but the very nature of his occupation makes him particularly cognizant of the need for secrecy and security in his work. Better-safe-than-sorry seems a most logical attitude to him.

To counter this penchant for secrecy, the classification manager has traditionally presented sound, well-meant, but only minimally effective arguments. The classification manager preaches that the American people and their elected leadership demand maximum openness in the operations of government; the intelligence professional replies that the people do not sufficiently appreciate the vital need for secrecy in the intelligence arena. The security specialist complains that overclassification of information causes the costs of retaining and transmitting that information to be unnecessarily high; the intelligence officer answers that it is better to waste a dollar or two than to take chances with the national security. The classification management specialist accuses the intelligence community of damming up the flow of intelligence to those who should have access to it; the members of the community reply that the information is made available—the prospective users simply do not make the effort necessary to gain access to it in a classified mode. And the argument continues.

Unfortunately, the most important and most telling argument against overclassification is seldom advanced: overclassification poses a serious threat to the security of properly classified information and, by logical extension, to the security of our nation.

The danger that overclassification poses to the integrity of the security classification system has been noted several times, but the warning has largely gone unheeded. William G. Phillips made the point quite forcefully:

> The efficiency and integrity of a security classification system rests in large part on proper use of clearly defined gradations of secrecy. Unnecessary classification of marginal information and overclassification must be strictly avoided. When the mass of currently used classified information aggregates many millions of pages—much of which is overclassified—there can no longer be the degree of respect or selectivity upon which classification markings depend for their integrity.[3]

Lieutenant General Daniel Graham, a former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and a former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, while condemning the disrespect for security classification shown by some members of the press, admitted that

"Intelligence agencies are particularly reluctant to put out papers with no classification stamp on them.... It is hard to convince a newsman that he should respect a classification stamp if he has seen it too often on trivia."[4]

Former Director of Central Intelligence William Colby also recognized the contribution that effective classification management can make in the intelligence field: "(Intelligence) must develop the distinctions between protecting the secrecy of its sources and techniques and making available the substance of its information and its conclusions... Photographs must be declassified, backgrounders attributed, publications edited to protect the sources but allow the substance of the reports and assessments to circulate to Congress and the public... Out of the process will come a better understanding of the role and value of modern intelligence, as well as better intelligence itself.

Out of this better understanding must come a better appreciation that the real secrets of American intelligence need protection, and better protection than they have today."[5]

I believe that few of us within the government safeguard classified information out of fear of administrative sanctions or criminal penalties. We protect it because it is our duty to do so—we believe that its disclosure would damage the security of our country and that we have a moral obligation to prevent such disclosure. Anything that undermines this basic belief in the need to protect classified information undermines the quality of the protection provided; overclassification poses the greatest threat to the maintenance of that belief. Every time we encounter classified information which we know is readily available in open sources, or which our common sense tells us is undeserving of classification, our respect for security classification is diminished—and the protection of classified information seems a bit less important.

"In the 19 months that I have been director of the CIA, I have come into the habit of screening the press clips first thing every morning. I almost hold my breath until I know if today's intelligence disclosures include some of our sensitive sources of intelligence."

Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director, CIA

As far as the press and the broadcast media are concerned, I believe that overclassification has made a significant contribution to the rise of an attitude that most of us in the security profession view as extremely dangerous. Repeated encounters with classified information that in no way merited classification have apparently led many journalists—the editors of ***Armed Forces Journal, Aviation Week and Space Technology,*** and ***The Progressive*** may be good examples—to set themselves up as the sole judges of what classified information should and should not be protected. They have lost respect for the judgment of classifiers within the government, and substitute their own judgment in its stead. Admiral Stansfield Turner recently said: "In the 19 months that I have been director of the CIA, I have come into the habit of screening the press clips first thing every morning. I almost hold my breath until I know if today's intelligence disclosures include some of our sensitive sources of intelligence."[6]

One must wonder whether more rational classification of intelligence—leading to a heightened respect in the journalistic profession for classification decisions—would not make an important contribution to eliminating the cause of Admiral Turner's anxiety.

In extreme cases, loss of respect for security classification can be a factor in the deliberate leaking of information. Dr. Daniel Ellsberg stated that a "loss of awe" for security classification contributed to his decision to leak the ***Pentagon Papers.***[7]

I suggest that the maintenance of respect for our security classification system is a vitally important factor in the protection of classified information—probably much more important than the standard and shopworn rituals (personnel security investigations, document accountability, double-checking procedures, etc.) which we have come to regard as the core of an effective security program. This respect can only be established and maintained by ensuring that each classification decision we make—particularly in the intelligence arena—is sound, logical, well-informed, necessary, and firmly grounded on common sense.

The First Question

Moving on to the classification decision-making process itself, we find that it may be viewed as basically a matter of asking and answering two questions.

The first and most basic question is one which is often asked by one of my colleagues when questioning classification decisions: "Just **what** are we trying to protect?" This is a deceptively simple question which has some remarkably complex ramifications and which often uncovers some extremely fuzzy thinking on the part of classifiers. The need to ask this question was recognized by the Department of Defense in its implementation of Executive Order 12065. Their recently issued ***Information Security Program Regulation*** requires that, "before a classification decision is made, each item of information that may require protection shall be identified exactly."[8] In the intelligence arena, we need to carry this just a bit further. We need to determine just what aspect of the information deserves protection: the information itself, the fact of our possession of the information (or possession in a

certain degree of accuracy), or information about the source from which we obtained the data.

In the ***Washington Post*** story mentioned earlier, the information in question concerned the operating frequencies of certain Soviet radars. Did we need to protect the information itself? Obviously not, since we can assume that the Russians are well aware of their own radar operating frequencies. Did we need to protect the fact of our possession of the information? Possibly, but I doubt it. Anyone familiar with the activities of the USS Pueblo or the Russian fleet of fishing trawlers knows that radar signals are a prime target for electronic intelligence collectors. Most probably, the information was "super-classified" to protect information about the source of the data. One cannot help but wonder, if this was the case, whether the information could not have been suitably sanitized of source-revealing data and then released by NASA to its contractor.

Careful attention to the determination of sensitivity of the various aspects of intelligence would go a long way toward eliminating overclassification. We must take care to clearly identify each piece of information being considered for classification—especially to distinguish source-revealing data from other intelligence products—**before** attempting to make judgments about the need to protect the information.

The Second Question

Once the information being considered for classification has been precisely identified, we must then determine whether it meets the basic criterion that its unauthorized disclosure could be expected to cause at least "identifiable damage" to the national security. The classifier must question—and again, his attitude must be essentially skeptical—exactly how the release of this particular information might damage our national security. There are basically five ways in which disclosure of intelligence information could damage our national security:

It would enable a hostile foreign power to eliminate or diminish the effectiveness of an intelligence source or method. The protection of the usefulness of our intelligence sources and methods is probably most often cited for classifying intelligence data. It is often a very valid reason. Protection of the identity—even the fact of the existence—of a clandestine agent is vital to the agent's safety and continued productivity. Another excellent example is in the area of communications intelligence. Had the Germans, for instance, learned of the World War II British project code-named Ultra, which succeeded in breaking an important German cryptological system, they could easily have denied the British this extremely productive source of intelligence by changing their codes. We must scrupulously avoid revealing information which would enable a hostile counterintelligence force to deny us sources of intelligence or eliminate vulnerabilities in their information security program, and proper classification is an important means of doing so.

Unfortunately, the most important and most telling argument against overclassification is seldom advanced: overclassification poses a serious threat to the security of properly classified information and, by logical extension, to the security of the nation.

In the late 16th century, the English had developed a very effective spy network in the Spanish shipyards where the Armada was being readied for action. Their spies provided much useful intelligence concerning the fleet... Had the Spanish been forewarned that the English were aware of defects in the armaments, they might well have devised tactics to counter the English intelligence.

Unfortunately, this classification rationale is routinely abused. We find vast quantities of processed or finished intelligence—descriptions of Communist Bloc weapons systems come first to mind—classified because it supposedly, somehow, reveals intelligence sources. In all too many cases, this is sheerest nonsense. Many of us have seen classified photographs of Soviet fishing trawlers, any of which could have been taken with a decent telephoto lens from the boardwalk at Asbury Park, New Jersey!

It is vitally important to the integrity of our security classification system that we avoid the classification of intelligence because it purportedly—in some unexplained and **unexplainable** manner—could reveal intelligence sources or methods. To qualify for classification under this criterion, information must pass three simple but meaningful tests:

1.) It must **not** be in the public domain. If, for example, weapons system data can be found in ***Jane's*** or ***International Defense Review,*** it is totally illogical to state that disclosure of the information or the fact of our possession of it would reveal intelligence sources or methods.

2.) The source must be reasonably identifiable **from the information being classified.** Raw intelligence data may very well, from its nature and scope or format, reveal its source; processed intelligence seldom will unless the source is explicitly identified. Common sense is a vital requirement here. If processed intelligence has been effectively sanitized of source-revealing data, it should in no way be classified simply because it comes from a classified source. One must determine whether the information in itself is of such a nature that, given the known background of information available to it, a hostile counter-intelligence service could deduce with reasonable certainty the source involved.

3.) The source must be deniable. If a source is to be protected, it must be of such a nature that the targeted country can take steps to reduce or eliminate its usefulness to us. If no countermeasures are available to reduce the productivity of the source, revealing its identity would not cause any damage to the national security and, unless other good reasons are present, classification of information about it would be a violation of Executive Order 12065.

It would reveal a unique or novel intelligence technique or method which could be used against the US. Here again, we are considering intelligence sources and methods, but in quite a different light. We are concerned here with

protecting our own national secrets by denying to an adversary some useful new intelligence method or technique we have developed. The use of the microdot during World War II is a good example. This was a novel and very effective technique, and information concerning it would have been quite properly classified. In this instance also, however, we must be very careful to make sound judgments as to just what information would reveal the method or technique, and be quite judicious in classifying intelligence products resulting from its use.

It would enable our adversaries to nullify the advantage gained through our possession of the information. As far as weapons systems are concerned, this situation would apply in cases where we gain knowledge of certain weaknesses or vulnerabilities in a system and plan to take advantage of these weaknesses. If the enemy knows of our intelligence on the subject, he could develop tactics or modify the equipment to nullify or reduce our advantage. Reaching back into history, we find an excellent example in the defeat of the Spanish Armada. In the late 16th century, the English had developed a very effective spy network in the Spanish shipyards where the Armada was being readied for action. Their spies provided much useful intelligence concerning the fleet. One extremely important piece of information was that the design of the Spanish ships and guns was such that the guns had a very poor angle of depression, limiting their effectiveness for close-in fighting. When the English admirals sailed out to confront the Armada, "they had worked out beforehand the tactics they would employ, and they knew exactly how close in to the galleons they must sail, both to put themselves out of range of the Spanish guns ... and to make their own fire, under these conditions, most effective."[9] Had the Spanish been forewarned that the English were aware of this defect in their armaments, they might well have devised tactics to counter the English plans.

Much of our intelligence activity is devoted to discovering exploitable weaknesses in our adversaries' weapons, communications, and intelligence systems. We must properly safeguard our knowledge of these vulnerabilities so that our enemies will not be forewarned of our plans to exploit them.

Conversely, we may also need to protect our knowledge of strengths in an adversary's new weapons or other systems so that our development of countermeasures may proceed unnoticed and the adversary will develop a false sense of security. An example from World War I may be cited. The first use of poison gas by the Germans in April 1915 was totally unsuccessful, since the gas was simply released from cylinders and dispersed by the wind (which blew a good deal of it back over the German lines). The Allies were convinced that poison gas was not a viable weapon.

Much of our intelligence activity is devoted to discovering exploitable weaknesses in our adversaries' weapons, communications, and intelligence systems. We must properly safeguard our knowledge of these vulnerabilities so that our enemies will not be forewarned of our plans to exploit them.

American intelligence agencies make a vital contribution to the security of the nation. It is important for them to supplement this contribution by protecting the integrity of our security classification system through careful, effective classification management, firmly grounded on common sense.

A French spy, Charles Lucieto, developed information which quickly changed that opinion. He noted that the Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik, a producer of the gas, was still working at a high intensity, and that their tank trucks were traveling to the Krupp munitions works. He managed to learn that the Germans were developing artillery delivery systems for the gas, observe actual firings of the new shells, and report his observations to French army headquarters. "Before the Germans had produced the gas shells in sufficient quantities to put them in the field, the Allies had been able to supply their troops with efficient gas masks and had begun to make gas shells themselves."[10] We can easily imagine that Lucieto's information not only enabled the Allies to take effective countermeasures against this new weapon and gave them a valuable clue for their own research, it also gave them a valuable tactical advantage when the Germans, unaware of the Allies' increased ability to withstand gas attacks, first fired their new shells. This last advantage would have been lost had the Germans known of Lucieto's activities.

We must also protect our knowledge of an enemy's plans and strategic and tactical intentions. During the Battle of Britain, the Ultra project developed intelligence that one important goal of the massive Luftwaffe bombing raids was to lure the RAF into pitched battle so that their limited resources would be reduced to the point that a German invasion of Britain could proceed with the advantage of certain air superiority. Thus forewarned, the British Air Staff refused to rise to the bait, Goering's intentions were frustrated, and the invasion of Britain never took place. Had Goering been aware that the British had been tipped off to his plans, he might have employed the considerable resources of the Luftwaffe in other, more effective ways.

The concern with preventing an enemy from nullifying the advantages provided by our intelligence activities is a very valid reason for classifying intelligence data, but it is also, unfortunately, often abused. The test must be whether the intelligence actually does provide an advantage and, if so, whether the advantage could be reduced if the intelligence was disclosed.

It would degrade the US position in diplomatic negotiations. In sensitive diplomatic negotiations, our perception of the other party's posture, strengths, weaknesses, and intentions is an important factor in developing our country's position. Knowledge of this perception and its accuracy could be a substantial advantage to the other side. In the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, (SALT), for instance, Soviet knowledge of our intelligence community's precise estimates concerning verifiability of the agreement could have been quite

advantageous to them in developing their position. In nuclear test ban negotiations, other nations would have a decided advantage if they were aware of our estimates concerning the state-of-the-art of their nuclear weaponry. Such intelligence could and should be classified.

It would have an adverse impact on foreign relations. Probably the most famous example that could be cited here is the disruption of the Eisenhower-Khrushchev summit negotiations by the U-2 incident. There are other possibilities, however. Disclosure of unflattering intelligence estimates concerning foreign peoples, their governments, or their leaders could make relations with these nations difficult. Another interesting possibility was raised by James Kronfeld:

"Government agencies say that release of classified information might allow a foreign power or potential enemy to learn something it did not know. But in many cases, the foreign power already knows the information ... This information is classified so as not to force the other party involved in the dispute to take an action which it does not want or have to take so long as the general public does not know what was going on."[11]

It would be presumptuous of me to declare that these five types of damage are the only reasons for classifying intelligence. I am well aware that there may be something I have missed, and am equally well aware that most of the real-world situations faced by classifiers will involve more-or-less complex combinations of the types of situation I have listed. I do think, however, that these possible reasons for classification are stated in sufficiently broad terms that they provide a solid conceptual framework for classification decisions concerning the types of information encountered in the intelligence field. The bottom line is this: if, after careful consideration of all the possibilities discussed here and others that may occur to you, you can identify damage to the national security that would be caused by disclosure of a piece of information, it should be classified. If not, the interests of the national security **demand** that it remain unclassified.

More Questions

It would be nice if our job were finished at this point. However, if the information under consideration is to be classified, two more questions remain to be considered: at what level and for how long is the information to be classified? Here again, knowledge, experience, and common sense come into play.

In the matter of level of classification, the decision must, of necessity, be a matter of personal judgment. After carefully considering the descriptions of the levels of classification set forth in Executive Order 12065, the classifier must make an informed, reasoned judgment about the information at hand. Unfortunately, there are no standard yardsticks for measuring the degree of damage that disclosure could cause.

As far as duration of classification is concerned, there are again no easy guidelines. The letter and spirit of Executive Order 12065 require information to be declassified as soon as possible, consistent with the interests of the national security. Classifiers should avoid at all costs the temptation to classify information for a maximum duration because it is an "easy way out." Duration of classification must be determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the nature of the information itself. Current intelligence, for example, is a very perishable commodity, and might remain classified for a correspondingly short time. The identify of human sources, on the other hand, must often be protected for the lifetime of the source, his immediate family, and, possibly, even his close associates. Common sense must be used to determine, for each item of classified information, the event or amount of time that will diminish its sensitivity to the point where it may be declassified.

Conclusion

Knowledgeable readers may charge—with some justification—that this article has oversimplified the classification process. Admittedly, other factors—particularly legal and regulatory requirements—will have impact upon classification decisions. My purpose, though, was not to write a textbook for classifiers. My purpose was, rather, to suggest the kind of informed, logical, skeptical reasoning that must precede the decision to classify any item of intelligence information, and to point out the contribution that such a careful approach will make to the preservation of our national security. It is a contribution that can be made, not only by those who have the authority to make final classification decisions, but also by all those who have occasion to recommend or influence these decisions.

American intelligence agencies make a vital contribution to the security of our nation. It is important for them to supplement this contribution by protecting the integrity of our security classification system through careful, effective classification management, firmly grounded on common sense.

Footnotes

[1]President James E. Carter. Jr., statement to accompany the issuance of Executive Order 12065, 27 June 1978, as published in ***Bulletin of the National Classification Management Society,*** special edition, 13 (July 1978), 1.

[2]Thomas O'Toole, "NASA Withholding of Classified Data Costs U.S. $75 Million," ***Washington Post,*** 17 February 1979, p. A9.

[3]William G. Phillips, "The Classification System," in ***None of Your Business,*** ed. Norman Dorsen and Stephen Gillers (New York: Viking Press, 1973), p. 80.

[4]Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, ***US Intelligence at the Crossroads,*** USSI Report No. 76-1 (Washington: United States Strategic Institute, 1976), p. 6.

[5]William Colby, ***Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA*** (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), pp. 465–66.

[6]James Coates, "US Spies Are in a Can of Worms," ***Chicago Tribune,*** 15 February 1979, p. 8.

[7]Daniel Ellsberg, interviewed in Charles Peters and Taylor Branch, ***Blowing the Whistle*** (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 274.

[8]US Department of Defense, ***Information Security Program Regulation,*** DOD 5200.1-R, November 1978, para. 2-201.

[9]Ronald Seth, ***Anatomy of Spying*** (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1963), p. 24.

[10]Seth, pp. 62–64.

[11]James Kronfeld, 18 May 1973, quoted in ***None of Your Business,*** ed. Norman Dorsen and Stephen Gillers (New York: Viking Press, 1973), p. 89.

CEWI Battalion

Intelligence and Electronic Warfare on the Battlefield

by LTC Don Gordon

Introduction

Editor,

Prior to 1962, Military Intelligence was a reserve corps, not a branch, of the US Army. Battalion and battle group S2 officers were frequently selected from among those who were unsuitable for other duties and were usually combat arms officers. There were exceptions, of course.

The US Army is again becoming too small and too expensive for MI to continue to exist as more than a military occupational specialty unless it can demonstrate that it can provide meaningful tactical intelligence to brigades and divisions. Can MI multiply combat power? That is the test and that is the issue in the Division 86 Study.

A 1975 Army study referred to as IOSS reported that this could best be done by consolidating intelligence and EW into integrated units and commands. As an interim measure the term CEWI was used. The term stuck and is now familiar throughout the Army and Congress.

There are those within MI who did not like IOSS. There are more who do not like the term CEWI; many prefer the term "MI battalions" to reflect the affiliation with our branch.

The point is, however, that these are not MI battalions. These are divisional battalions. As a matter of interest, non-MI personnel outnumber MI personnel in CEWI battalions by a ratio of 3:1. Effective Nov. 1979, the Army has elected to call these units CEWI battalions and to organize them under TOE series number 34, not 30 or 32. I can personally recall General DuPuy in 1976 (then-commander of TRADOC) emphasizing that the term CEWI would not be changed to MI in order that the flexibility, versatility and mission of these special units be very clear to all.

CEWI Battalions are not military intelligence battalions. They are military intelligence and electronic warfare battalions!

CEWI means that electronic warfare, not ASA, has been integrated, not consolidated, with intelligence to support tactical units in combat and not back in the corps area.

For the past five years, the Army has waited for CEWI TOE. It has probably cost twice as much to maintain, operate and train the existing collection of MI, ASA and provisional CEWI units without functional TOE during this period. In the meantime, we have continued the controversy over its title and TRADOC has used its resources for yet another study, Division 86, in which most intelligence collection would be transferred to Artillery target acquisition units and radars returned to the Infantry. CEWI has not yet been given a chance to work except in the 2d Armored and 82d Airborne Divisions. TRADOC has demonstrated more of a penchant for things foreign than domestic. In 1974 there was the effort to mirror-image Soviet intelligence; in 1975, it was Israeli intelligence; today, it is German intelligence. Target acquisition intelligence collection failed the Germans in World War II and will fail us on the modern battlefield. The US Army doesn't have enough guns, aircraft or ammunition to fire at targets provided by artillery target acquisition units. The Army needs cost-effective targets provided by intelligence collection and analysis working together every step of the way—that is the design criterion for CEWI. If only a portion of this effort were directed to moving CEWI forward we would be a lot closer to our goal today.

If there is ever a next war, there will be no doubt as to what CEWI is or how to pronounce it.

Don Gordon
LTC, MI

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CEWI battalions will soon be assigned to every division in the Army. Each word in this new unit's title and concept was carefully selected by the Department of the Army to describe the Army's newest combat support battalion and concept. The title—CEWI—(pronounced "see'wee") was selected to insure that electronic warfare complemented but was not subordinated to intelligence. These are not military intelligence battalions. They are military intelligence *and* electronic warfare battalions! The magazine article, "CEWI Battalion Update" by

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LTC William Harmon, *MI Magazine*, April–June 1978, continues to provide an excellent explanation of the testing of CEWI.

Two CEWI battalions have been operational and tested during the past three years—the 522d, assigned to the 2d Armored Division, and the 313th, assigned to the 82d Airborne Division. Other CEWI battalions are scheduled for activation in the next two years. CEWI units are the very future of the Military Intelligence branch, especially in light of the consideration of available resources.

An analysis of the 1973 Mid-East War and inspection and audit reports from the same period revealed that a revival of both Army tactical intelligence and electronic warfare was badly needed. The Army's military intelligence and electronic warfare in 1973 was judged to be lacking in equipment and training needed to fight on a modern battlefield. After the Vietnam War, military intelligence and EW units of all types were left understrength and with antiquated equipment. Giant strides had been made in electronic and optical technology during this period, but tactical military intelligence and EW units were left with equipment designed from 1950 technology. It was this analysis that prompted the CEWI concept.

CEWI is the result of the Army's 1975 Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study. After the 1973 revelations the Army realized that it could no longer afford the expense and duplication of several different intelligence commands and the corresponding intelligence infrastructure which it had created. Some referred to military intelligence and the Army Security Agency as armies within an Army because of the unique vertical command structure which existed.

In 1973, the Army's military intelligence and electronic warfare was judged lacking in equipment and training needed to fight on a modern battlefield. After the Vietnam War, military intelligence and EW units of all types were understrength and with antiquated equipment. While giant strides had been made in electronic and optical technology during this period, tactical military intelligence and electronic warfare units were left with equipment designed from 1950 technology.

Whereas tactical doctrine had changed drastically since World War II with the advent of modern weapons, intelligence organization still largely reflected its World War II model. Commanders fighting the battle had only limited operational control of tactical intelligence under the older concept. CEWI by contrast was predicated on the logic that commanders fighting the battle should direct tactical intelligence requirements rather than an intelligence infrastructure several echelons above the corps. CEWI is intended to be cost-effective and responsive; it is the integration of all forms of combat intelligence and electronic warfare at the division level into a single battalion (see Figure 1).

313th CEWI Battalion personnel and ▲ equipment, Sicily Drop Zone, Fort Bragg, NC, September 1978 after deployment by parachute, air assault and air land; 37 vehicles deployed elsewhere.

CEWI's intention is for the division to have the best intelligence equipment and not be dependent only upon observation and intuition to provide intelligence. The Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study, referred to as IOSS, provides the roadmap for the redesign of military intelligence and electronic warfare throughout the Army. Consolidation of all military intelligence and electronic warfare functions was one recommendation of IOSS. The formation of CEWI battalions at division and of CEWI groups at Corps was a second chief recommendation of that study.

In general, the study also resulted in the consolidation of Military Intelligence and Army Security Agency commands, training and combat developments and management at every echelon.

It was intended that the most important advantage of CEWI would be that the division commander would gain control of all divisional intelligence. Secondly, all divisional intelligence personnel except those assigned to S2 and G2 sections would be assigned to the same battalion instead of to oversized and difficult-to-manage separate intelligence companies and detachments as was the situation before CEWI. CEWI also provides an excellent catalyst for both cross-training and cross-utilization of all similar intelligence skills found within an Army division while at the same time eliminating duplication of intelligence functions among different intelligence units.



Figure 1. CEWI Organization 1977–79, 313th CEWI Bn, 82d Airborne Division

After the Army formed the 522d CEWI Battalion with the 2d Armored Division as the test unit in late 1976, the XVIII Airborne Corps and 82d Airborne Division together formed the provisional 313th Airborne CEWI Battalion in June 1977 (see Figure 2).

The 82d Airborne Division's CEWI battalion differs from CEWI battalions designed for other type Army divisions. While all CEWI battalions will have the same general capability, the airborne and presumably the airmobile battalions will be smaller, lighter and more mobile as fitting their missions. The airborne version is designed to support light infantry on a high tempo battlefield under austere conditions. All of its equipment can be delivered by parachute or air landed using C-130 aircraft.



Figure 2. Proposed CEWI Organization, 313th CEWI Bn, 82d Airborne Division

The Army placed all electronic warfare and intelligence collection systems, the intelligence analysis and communications systems, and the combat service and support for the systems into a single battalion (see Figure 3). CEWI provides centralized management of the most complex combat support system within the division. CEWI helps to eliminate duplication of effort, and CEWI integrates all sources of intelligence so that they complement rather than compete with one another. CEWI provides a more cost-effective method of managing intelligence and electronic warfare on the battlefield and in garrison. CEWI provides more and better intelligence and EW.

Though all CEWI battalion TOE will remain similar, the airborne CEWI battalion will put additional emphasis on placing direct support CEWI teams with infantry battalions. The 82d Airborne Division also recommends the consolidation of resources to provide a CEWI company for each brigade (a total of three CEWI companies) in place of the electronic warfare and ground surveillance companies which now support each brigade with DS platoons.

Experience within the 313th CEWI Battalion indicates that the CEWI concept certainly attains its goals. It is estimated that overall CEWI operating costs are probably 20 percent less than the cost of operating separate intelligence companies. This cannot be measured in all areas, but it can be measured in the use of spare parts, facilities, administration and the "down-time" of tactical equipment. When measured in dollars CEWI has proven a good investment. But low-bid items don't always work under stress! Can CEWI fight?

There is no way to thoroughly simulate combat, but the performance of CEWI during several major training exercises has provided strong indications that CEWI is a real fighter. CEWI is certainly a considerable improvement over the previous method of providing military intelligence. CEWI is *combat intelligence*. Strategic intelligence interfaces but does not control CEWI.

The overall performance of CEWI was probably best summarized by the commanding general of the 24th Infantry Division after the 313th CEWI Battalion had been attached during JRX Gallant Eagle 79. He



Figure 3. CEWI consolidation of all intelligence collection and analysis

simply announced at the end of the exercise briefing, "No division can afford to be without a CEWI battalion." The 313th knew where the opposing force (an airmobile brigade) was located, its capabilities and its intentions in plenty of time to enable the execution of winning plans and orders. CEWI was everywhere as the eyes of the commander. Its intercept, radars, electronic sensors, jammers and reconnaissance teams provided combat intelligence. The division commander of the 82d Airborne Division has reported to both General Rogers, then Chief of Staff of the Army, and to the ACSI that the CEWI concept is worth every cent it costs. The 313th is a combat multiplier.

CEWI does this without resembling the cumbersome Soviet model and without falling in line behind the West German model of target acquisition battalions, a model now achieving popularity.

CEWI is also good at deception. During another major JRX, the 2/505 Infantry and the 313th CEWI Battalion jointly conducted a deception effort. A reconnaissance platoon from the 313th simulated the entire 2/505 by using aggressive patrolling in the 2/505 area of the FEBA to feign infantry-battalion activity. The platoon also used manipulative communications deception to simulate the infantry battalion's callsigns and frequencies for two days. A two battalion "enemy" mechanized task force and coordinated air assault was wasted attacking the deception platoon which melted into the wooded maneuver area of Egland Air Force Base. Meanwhile the 2/505 conducted an air assault of their own into the "enemy's" DISCOM area. Jammers from the 313th were sling-loaded to accompany the 2/505 and disrupted the "enemy" response to the battalion-size combat raid in their rear area.

During all this the "enemy" was using every jammer in its division and a supporting airborne (aircraft) EW company to jam that deception platoon using the 2/505 frequencies. In effect a single CEWI platoon emasculated a multibattalion mechanized task force while a light airborne infantry battalion decimated and destroyed the mechanized division's vital fuel and repair facilities. EW of the US Army model, CEWI, is indeed an element of combat power.

To understand CEWI requires an understanding of the important distinction between the integration of electronic warfare with combat intelligence of the US Army model and radioelectronic combat of the type used by our most likely enemy. The distinction transcends a subtle semantical difference between the acronyms of EW and REC. The US Army has integrated SIGINT with EW since the 1950's, but the integration of all other types of intelligence with SIGINT and EW at the tactical level is mostly a recent practice. The enemy as a matter of course does

not routinely integrate jamming with intelligence. It is necessary to understand the reason for this difference.

The purpose of electronic warfare and specifically jamming in the US Army is to develop communication intelligence and to confuse or to delay the enemy which further increases his plain-text revelations, his compromises, and hence provides communications intelligence. The US Army uses the surgical application of spot jamming against key parts of an enemy message or against secure communications. We use jamming to deny the use of either *secure* communication or proforma messages. There are few valid missions which require us to block communication with overwhelming barrage noise; though we can do this if necessary. If we do turn on the noise for a long time to prevent enemy communication, we endanger our very expensive jammer by increasing its vulnerability to enemy direction finding followed by suppressive fires.

Our jamming is like an electronic piranha, short and vicious; we attack the guts of the message to cause the enemy radio operator to repeat it over and over again. Jamming gives our linguists, who also operate jammers, a better chance to listen selectively. Jamming of the US Army model is an integral part of but is not subordinate to intelligence. Intensive jamming can be used for brief periods on single channels, as before our attack, to knock out key enemy command and control nets. We also use jamming to screen friendly communication. We do this by using very directional antennas to jam on the same frequency used by friendly stations but in such a manner as to not interfere in friendly communication. This tactic prevents the enemy from intercepting the friendly communication; instead he intercepts our jamming. This technique, to be certain, requires the careful placement of jammers and good infantry or armor radio operators. Jammers can also be used to communicate through enemy jammers in an emergency. A jammer is after all a 1500 to 3000 watt, very sophisticated radio transmitter which can *ram* communication through most interference with its high power and directional antenna. But, principally, jammers are used to increase intelligence. The exceptional expense of US Army jammers can only be justified in that primary role.

By contrast, our most likely enemy on an European battlefield attempts to prevent communications by the use of overwhelming barrage jamming across large portions of the radio band. This is effective at short distances, about 10 to 20 kms from the FEBA. The enemy also uses intensive jamming on single channels against selected command and control nets at longer distances. Jammers in these armies and in armies of our allies are assigned to signal or special electronic warfare units and are separate and distinct from military intelligence units. The purpose of barrage jamming, better described as garbage jamming, is to make the electronic spectrum so dirty that a numerically inferior force like the US Army or Marine Corps is unable to coordinate its technologically superior weapons and command and control systems. We have found jamming is more effective against digital communications, as an example, than against analog (voice) communications. This type of jamming is totally suitable and complementary of the tactics used by a numerically superior force conducting a mass attack with mass fires. The enemy, though technologically inept, can do this because he has large numbers of cheap, rugged, high power jammers that are simple to operate. When barrage jamming is combined and coordinated with direction finding and massive suppressive fires against friendly communication centers, the effect can be devastating. The enemy refers to this capability as radioelectronic combat or REC.

CEWI certainly has its antagonists and detractors. They provide three major criticisms of the CEWI concept. First, some contend that the previous vertical command tactical intelligence infrastructure was more responsive to Army-wide intelligence needs. Second, some contend that soldiers with intelligence skills now spend too much time training in soldier skills at the expense of training in intelligence and electronic warfare skills. Third, there are those who argue that radars, direction-finding equipment and low level intercept should be controlled by target acquisition battalions while military intelligence units should be used only to analyze. The latter is a concept practiced by our West German allies and may be suitable for their needs; it is not suitable for the needs of the US Army. Are combat developments in the US Army so deficient that we can no longer improve upon our own tactical models but must increasingly look to foreign models (with a historic record of failure) to come to grips with the 1980s?

Within the Army there is apprehension among some G2 officers about CEWI. This occurs principally in those divisions not yet having their own CEWI battalion. Some G2s question the function of CEWI under a separate battalion commander, a situation which places two senior intelligence officers responsible for the intelligence cycle in the same division. The CEWI battalion comman-



Display of electronic sensors.

der works directly for the division commander as befits any battalion commander. He works with but not for the G2. The CEWI commander also works with the G3 to fulfill offensive electronic warfare responsibilities and with the Divison Communications and Electronics Officer to fulfill defensive electronic warfare. Being a Battalion Commander is a full-time job. The G2 is a principal staff officer. The role of G2, a lieutenant colonel, is also a full-time job. The troops deserve nothing less than full-time commander, and the commander deserves nothing less than a full-time G2. Some argue that since the Division CE officer is also the signal battalion commander that the G2 could also command the CEWI battalion. There is no comparison of the roles of G2 and the Division CE officer. The latter is a special staff officer, he is not a principal staff officer.

The present arrangement has worked well in both the 2d Armored Division and the 82d Airborne Division for more than three years. The G2 and G3 task the CEWI battalion in the same manner that they task other divisional units for the commander. The G2 and G3 cooperate and coordinate when tasking CEWI. Decisions are made by the G2 and G3, referred by the Chief of Staff, on whether to listen, fire on, or do nothing to an electronic target. The CEWI battalion has about 600 troops and 165 to 180 vehicles spread over an area of about 1,000 square kilometers. The CEWI battalion commander makes it work. He uses command channels to solve problems exactly the way the army is designed to work. The G2 makes the intelligence system work; the G3 makes electronic warfare work.

Spare the argument that the G2 is more effective with electronic warfare than is the G3. Unfortunately, that observation is too often true, but it is true because combat arms officers from which G3 are traditionally selected do not like EW, don't want to learn about EW, and avoid EW. A comment to that effect on a single G3 Officer Efficiency Report would change that entire attitude overnight.

The selection of lieutenants by the Military Intelligence branch for CEWI has been excellent. Military Intelligence lieutenants serving in either the 313th CEWI Battalion or the 82d Airborne Division intelligence system are, in my opinion, among the most dynamic, aggressive, and professional junior officers in the division. I have been told so by my combat arms contemporaries, other battalion commanders and by brigade commanders. Nine from the CEWI Battalion were selected for the Division's Outstanding Junior Officer Program during 1978, more than all other battalions combined.

Nevertheless, most of our lieutenants report that they want more appropriate training to perform CEWI and combat battalion level duties. They want to go to the infantry, armor, artillery, or signal basic course because the MI basic course does not prepare them to operate at battalion level. They want to be able to go to Ranger School, but they do not want to serve tours of duty as combat arms officers. They want to command CEWI platoons and serve as combat battalion S2 officers and scout and reconnaissance platoon leaders. Actually, an MI Lieutenant in the 313th CEWI Battalion spends more time with his platoon in the field than does his combat arms counterpart. There is no post support cycle for CEWI and never a lack of opportunity to accompany combat battalions in the jungle, arctic, desert or elsewhere. CEWI participates in every division exercise.

The problem is that the division and the CEWI battalion spend too much time training lieutenants when the lieutenants should be training their troops. This is further complicated by the consideration that many CEWI NCOs have never before been assigned to a tactical unit.

In my opinion, a CEWI battalion is the place to be for company grade officers and NCOs. *It is the Army!* CEWI is troops and equipment, field duty, adventure, responsibility and an opportunity for leadership. Leading a CEWI platoon, whether an EW platoon, a ground surveillance platoon or any of the other fourteen CEWI platoons, is the very best training available for junior officers and NCOs. Sleeping under a poncho liner, eating rations and washing with cold water sounds very much like the antithesis of military intelligence explained by the recruiter, but it is the military intelligence that brings the satisfaction of actually being in the Army. It is tactical radio and radar intercept, reconnaissance and electronic sensors; it is solving tactical problems. The systems may be primitive by comparison to the sophisticated systems used at the national level, but brain cells are used instead of pushbuttons.

When the infantry battalion S2 and the four men from the CEWI battalion direct support team parachute to provide combat intelligence to the infantry battalion, and do it well, there is true satisfaction.

Lieutenants need to experience an infantry brigade commander standing them at a brace while he speaks at 110 decibels demanding an explanation of their conclusion of the enemy threat which differs from his proposed course of action. You need to sense the satisfaction of your platoon that ran out of rations days ago but doesn't care because it's sitting 500 meters from the OPFOR division TOC and reporting,

PPS-5 radar operating. Night vision device in foreground.

by radio, information scoped directly from the OPFOR G3's maps. Experience your entire EW platoon, 20 kms behind the enemy side of the FEBA, operating undetected while the OPFOR signal officer scratches his head observing first-hand the total disruption of most of his communication systems. As an MI lieutenant, watch as your men are rated the best M60 machine-gun crews in the division, or as they obtain the highest divisional scores with LAW.

Critics of CEWI contend that MI doesn't have any business doing those things. Some within MI argue that only infantry should perform reconnaissance, that MI belongs at least 20 kms on the friendly side of the FEBA. There is an agricultural colloquialism that fully expresses the contempt of the paratrooper for that attitude. MI belongs wherever it can best support tactical intelligence. The modern battlefield is not going to part like the Red Sea to allow MI units to find sanction on a rapidly moving battlefield. Since the S2 is frequently the senior officer remaining in the battalion TOC when the infantry battalion is heavily committed, the MI lieutenant or junior captain found that he had better know how to fight not only with a CEWI platoon but with an infantry battalion as well.

MI can't afford just good officers; we need the best officers and NCOs. We need officers and NCOs willing to accept risk based on judgment and responsibility. Cringe as you

PPS-5 radar operator, 313th CEWI Battalion.

tip-over a 5 kw generator after incorrectly mounting it in the wrong size trailer. Cringe when you've mixed the wrong decontaminating chemicals and you start a parade field on fire. Shudder when the IG arrives to inspect your vehicles, the clutch cable snaps on a M274 1/2 ton carrier, it careens out of control, and snaps a standpipe resulting in a 40-foot high geyser over the motor pool. But, hang your head in shame when you failed to express yourself in a controversy about the best course of action because yours was the minority opinion. Keep it hung when you fail to listen to an NCO or soldier who proposes a better idea but may not do so in terms which are compatible with the "usual way" things are done.

If all this doesn't appeal to you, if you prefer 78 degree summers and 68 degree winters and stale office air, you'll hate CEWI. But, if you want to be a lieutenant, captain, or NCO competitive with your combat arms contemporaries, then beg for assignment to a CEWI battalion. You may not like running as a battalion for 4 miles in boots in less than 32 minutes, but when those teal blue CEWI colors with 22 battle streamers routinely pass slower infantry battalions, you are proud. When the IG awards a rare "commendable" rating for individual soldier combat skills for an entire battalion every captain, lieutenant, and NCO deserves to stand proud.

One of the proudest moments I can recall as the commander of the 313th CEWI Battalion (Airborne) occurred when Major General Meloy, the then newly assigned commander of the 82d Airborne Division, in December 1978, observed a routine demonstration of the battalion's capabilties. After a short conversation he was finally convinced that the battalion had not selected its very best personnel as well as borrowed some from other battalions for the demonstration. In fact every soldier but two was standing with his assigned squad and platoon. As the general prepared to depart, satisfied, he turned and said, "These are undoubtedly the finest noncommissioned officers I have ever seen." That says it all! *

Start A Second Career

Army officers and noncommissioned officers within one year of retirement or retired within the last five years may qualify as instructors in the Army Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps (AJROTC). The offer is open to officers up to the rank of colonel and to noncommissioned officers in ranks from staff sergeant to sergeant major.

The Army JROTC program is offered at over 650 high schools throughout the nation. It stresses youth citizenship development while providing students with an opportunity to learn about the basic elements and requirements of national security and the Army's role in support of national objectives. Instructors teach leadership development, map reading, marksmanship, methods of instruction and military history. Classroom instruction is augmented by military drill, orientation trips, field trips, mini-summer camps held on Army installations and orienteering.

Personnel on active duty and retirees may get further information concerning pay, working hours, benefits, etc., or make application by calling the nearest Reserve Officers' Training Corps Region headquarters.

Off-the-Street Recruiting of MOS 97B

"Off-the-Street" CI Agents are on the way. As of August 79, 28 enlistees had selected MOS 97B as their training-of-choice option. The first of these first-term MOS 97B soldiers should arrive at USAICS for training in the January course. When these first-term CI Agents reach the field, they will be turning to the career Military Intelligence NCO for guidance. The success of the off-the-street recruiting and retention program rests with each NCO. We must all give them our full support and assistance. In addition to the first-term enlistees, the recruiting of in-service applicants for training in MOS 97B has doubled over the previous two years. This significant increase in the number of military intelligence applicants is a direct result of efforts of the members of the intelligence community. I commend these efforts.

DAVID L. BARR
MSG,
MI Branch, DA MILPERCEN

Never Wrong ... Never Right!

by LTC John P. Lang

The young major had just reported to his new job as an S2 in a combat brigade. After welcoming him to the unit and explaining basic policies, the officer's new commander said, "Major, you have a big pair of shoes to fill as the Brigade S2. Your predecessor, Major Doe, was never wrong!"

The commander went to great lengths to lavishly praise the previous S2 who had never made a mistake in assessing the situation during the time he had been with the brigade in combat. "I hope you can do nearly as well," the commander told the new S2 at the conclusion of the interview.

The major went directly from the commander to the S2 shop to see if he could discover why his predecessor had been so successful. He went through files, interviewed personnel, and discussed his problem with other key members of the brigade staff.

The following morning, he returned to the brigade commander and said, "Sir, I've been thinking about how you said that Major Doe was never wrong as an S2. I've studied what he did, and I suggest, Sir, that the reason he was never wrong is that he was never right!"

"What do you mean?" the commander asked.

"I mean, Sir, that he never risked being right. He only reported facts, things that had happened and considering some of the more remarkable sensors we have today, some things that were happening. He was a good reporter; he reported only what he knew to be accurate but he never gave you his projection of what the enemy would be doing."

"If that's what you want, sir," the major continued, "I, too, can limit my reporting to the past and present and I, too, will never err. But I'd prefer to let the S2 staff report the facts, while I serve as an S2 to project, assess, and estimate for you what I think the enemy will be doing tomorrow and the next day," he said. "But if I do that I'll occasionally be wrong," the major added with a pause.

"How often will you be wrong?" the commander asked.

"If I'm doing a good job, I'll be right more than I'm wrong," the major answered.

"Then go ahead and try it!" the commander said.

The new S2 became the best intelligence officer the brigade commander had ever had.

The phenomenon of intelligence officers becoming mere reporters like the "old" brigade S2 is fairly recent in the intelligence business. Two factors have affected its increasing acceptability.

The first is the Cuban missile crisis which popularized the concept of situation assessment at the highest command levels. The White House crisis managers asked for facts and technical assessment from the intelligence community, but reserved for itself the right to judge Soviet intentions. The outstanding success of this kind of high level management in the Cuban missile crisis led to similar control of the Vietnam war and fostered a view that commanders, too, would make the best decisions working directly from the facts rather than from their intelligence officer's assessment of those facts.

The second major factor is the intelligence officer's own preoccupation with facts and sensors. No longer depending on tidbits of information brought him by agents who were unreliable at best, the intelligence officer has become the manager of a multimillion dollar, multisensor system capable of overwhelming him with data. The data management requirements of such a system have added new dimensions to his job. Its products provide the commander with nearly as much information about the enemy's activities as he receives about his own units.

With all this available information and in the absence of a true intelligence assessment of its meaning, the commander has come to serve as his own intelligence officer. Instead of approving, disproving or modifying his intelligence officer's assessment, he makes his own.

Commanders were happy with such a situation, because after all, that's the way the White House did it; the S2 was happy because he was never wrong and his job as a sensor manager was interesting, exciting and important; and the enemy was happy because no one ever seemed to know what he would do.

If we are ever to accurately determine enemy intentions we must insist that our intelligence officers assess as well as manage, and we must train them to be good at both jobs. To be good managers, intelligence officers must understand the sensors they control and the enemy the sensor is seeking. To be good assessors, they must understand how the enemy goes about his job and what the commander needs to know about the enemy's intentions. These needs vary with each situation, but more importantly, they depend on the commander's ability to influence the situation. This means that the intelligence officer needs to know what decisions his commander *can* make to influence the situation and assure that the information and assessment he provides is *relevant* to those decisions.

These considerations require that commanders be provided a fully integrated and coordinated staff assessment. The intelligence officer needs to know what decisions must be made to assure the relevance of his information and assessment. The operations officer needs to know how the intelligence assessment impacts on his recommended course of action. Other members of the staff must also insure that their input to the decision-making process is fully coordinated.

The result is good staff work and sound decisions in an environment where the intelligence officer is usually right and occasionally wrong.

COL Donald W. Blascak assumed command of the US Army Intelligence Center and School's School Brigade on 31 August, accepting the brigade guidon from outgoing commander COL William I. Ames. In his opening address, COL Blascak said, "We have, within the Center and School, of which the brigade is a vital part, the awesome responsibility of preparing soldiers who are men and women arriving at the entry level to go forward in a variety of MOSs to virtually every corner of the earth to work in jobs which are designed to provide intelligence judgments and information to every level of the Army, the Department of Defense and the National Command Authority."

"Beyond these realities is the influence we bring to bear on our young soldiers. Very often their experience here is the criterion against which they weigh options to remain in the Army and commit themselves to a career. The Intelligence Center and School is their branch home. It must be a good one. It is a good one and has the potential to be better. As I see it, the Brigade has a fundamental mission to provide a supportive environment to each aspect of the Intelligence Center and School. This we will do in an atmosphere of high professionalism, motivation, competence and hard work."

COL Blascak received his commission through ROTC at Ohio State University in 1956. He has served overseas in Vietnam, Panama, Thailand and Laos. His assignments have included chief, Operations and Intelligence Branch, Special Forces School, Fort Bragg; assistant chief of staff, G2, 1st Cav Division; commander, 163rd Military Intelligence Battalion, Fort Hood; and chief, Individual Training Division, Directorate of Training Developments, USAICS.

A graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College, COL Blascak holds a masters degree in Public Administration from Shippensburg State College.

1LT David Brown
USAICS Public Affairs Office

School Brigade Commander Gets Defense Award

The Defense Meritorious Service Medal has been awarded to Colonel Alfred E. Spry, Commander, School Brigade, US Army Intelligence School, Fort Devens (USAISD).

COL Spry earned this distinguished medal for his work as the United States Co-Chief, Intelligence Division, United States—Spanish Combined Military Coordination and Planning Staff, Madrid, Spain.

COL Spry was cited for his "sensitivity, sincerity, integrity and ability to work successfully with allied members of the Spanish component."

This is the first time this Department of Defense-level award has been presented to any member of USAISD. Presenting the award was Colonel Donald M. Moreau, Assistant Deputy Commandant, USAISD.

Mrs. Nancy Spry admires the certificate accompanying her husband's Defense Meritorious Service Medal as Colonel Donald M. Moreau (left) looks on.

BG James A. Teal, Jr., presents the certificate accompanying the Defense Meritorious Service Medal to COL Stanley G. Kozlowski, as Mrs. Marti Kozlowski looks on.

Commander, US Army Intelligence School, Fort Devens, Gets Defense Award

The Defense Meritorious Service Medal has been awarded to Colonel Stanley G. Kozlowski, Commander, US Army Intelligence School, Fort Devens (USAISD).

COL Kozlowski earned this distinguished medal for his work as Chief, Current Intelligence Branch, Intelligence Division, Supreme Headquarters Allied Power Europe (SHAPE).

COL Kozlowski was cited for his "extreme tact and insight" while working with representatives of seven North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations. His efforts significantly improved the intelligence-sharing capabilities of the Allied Command Europe and NATO nations.

Presenting the award was Brigadier General James A. Teal, Jr., Commander, US Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, Arizona.

Change of Command Ceremony

Colonel Alfred E. Spry took command of the School Brigade, US Army Intelligence School, Fort Devens (USAISD), on June 29, 1979.

COL Spry comes to the School Brigade, USAISD, from Madrid, Spain, where he served as the United States Co-Chief, Intelligence Division, United States–Spanish Combined Military Coordination and Planning Staff.

COL Spry has held positions as Military Intelligence Staff Officer, Office, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence; Deputy Commander of 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division; Commander, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Division; Chief of Staff, 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division; and US Army Intelligence Agency Chief, China Branch.

COL Spry is a native of Norfolk, Virginia. He graduated from the University of Omaha and entered military service as an infantry officer in 1954.

Colonel Philip J. Stevens, the outgoing commander, retired from active duty on June 29.

COL Stevens served in a number of Armor and Special Forces assignments. In 1968, he transferred to Military Intelligence. His assignments in this field included the command of Region IV and 109th MI Group; Deputy Chief of Counterintelligence, MACV, Republic of Vietnam; G2, 82nd Airborne Division; and Commander, 470th MI Group, Panama Canal Zone. He was the USAISD School Brigade Commander from August 1977 through the June change of command.

Colonel Philip J. Stevens and Colonel Alfred E. Spry observe retirement and change-of-command activities of the School Brigade, US Army Intelligence School, Fort Devens.

Can You Top This?!?

The US Army Intelligence School, Fort Devens (USAISD), thinks it has a record-making student! The challenge goes out to all intel-type students to either top the record, or provide proof positive that someone has done better previously!!

The "super-student" at USAISD is PV2 Richard L. Hammons, an 05-H (Electronic Warfare/Cryptologic Interceptor-Morse) student.

PV2 Hammons completed 05-H training in 8 weeks of actual school time! (The average time is 18 weeks.)

PV2 Hammons completed Morse Code Training in 79 hours—**with no prior code experience!!** (The average time is 450 hours.)

This outstanding soldier comes from Pascagoula, Mississippi. He entered the Army in March 1979 and took basic training at Fort Dix, New Jersey. He was assigned to the Intelligence School at Fort Devens in May and completed his training in August 1979.

PV2 Hammons is heading for Field Station Berlin, where his expertise will certainly be put to the test!

USAISD is proud to have such an outstanding student as PV2 Richard L. Hammons. He has a brilliant future ahead of him, and we wish him the best!

PV2 Richard L. Hammons "copies code" at the Morse Code Trainer (MCT-4) console.

The Strategic Situation In Northern Europe: Improvements vital for NATO

by R.D.M. Furlong

*The main threats facing NATO's Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH, i.e. the forces of Norway, Denmark and the West German Land of Schlewsig-Holstein), were described in a previous article (*IDR *4/79 pp. 517–525). The threat forces are summarized in tabular form in this second article (p. 910), both for recapitulation and for comparison with the AFNORTH units in place and their possible reinforcements, described here.*

NATO's primary objective of deterring a Soviet and Warsaw Pact offensive against Western Europe is largely dependent on the political resolve and military capabilities of the fifteen allied nations to defend themselves and each other, *as perceived in Moscow*. There are, of course, many other factors which the Soviets have to consider, but the angle of inclination of the 'military balance' must be determinant for the Kremlin's decision on whether or not to raise its ideological aggression from the present level into a full-blown military offensive.

NATO strategists generally believe that a Warsaw Pact offensive, once launched, would aim at conquering all of Western Europe. It is considered unlikely that the Northern Flank of NATO would be invaded in isolation but that, in order to allow the increasingly large number of Russian Northern Fleet attack submarines to transit safely into the Atlantic—where they have the key role of severing the European lifeline for heavy reinforcements from the United States—the Soviets must occupy or neutralize all of northern Norway. At the same time, if Northern Fleet units (apart from the SSBNs operating close to home in the Barents Sea) are to sustain blue-water operations, they must have secure access to the key maintenance, repair and resupply facilities which are only available to them in the Baltic.

The Baltic Approaches are also essential to the Soviets for two other reasons: the Jutland Peninsula, if held by NATO, provides a base for counter-attacks into the right flank of a Pact offensive across the North German Plain; and it bars one of the most likely routes for Soviet strategic bombers tasked against the military bases and port installations in the British Isles and along the North Sea and Channel coasts.

This being the case, if a war in Europe does start, AFNORTH will not only be attacked but it will be attacked early on. If warning is short, it will therefore have to bear the initial brunt of the double offensive against North Norway and the Baltic Approaches with the national forces already there in place, and it will then have to compete—in a sense—with the Central Front and Southern Flank for whatever reinforcements SACEUR is prepared to commit in the early stages of the war.

What, then, are the forces available in Northern Europe for this initial holding action and how much of a deterrent are they?

NATO Forces in place

• **North Norway.** From his integrated, tri-service headquarters at Reitan, near Bodo, Lt. Gen. Tønne Huitfeldt, the Norwegian Commander Allied Forces North Norway COMNON), is responsible for the defense of the counties of Finnmark, Troms and Nordland, which have subordinate military headquarters at Alta, Bardufoss and Bodo, respectively. In peacetime, COMNON is responsible to the Chief of Defense (CHOD) Norway, General Sverre Hamre, but when transfer to NATO command is decided by the Norwegian Government (in theory when a state of Reinforced Alert is announced) COMNON becomes a principal subordinate commander to the British Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Northern Europe (CINCNORTH). Operational command of the limited Norwegian air-defense units is already delegated to CINCNORTH in peacetime.

Bearing in mind the huge area of north Norway and its tiny population of 450,000, the standing Norwegian forces there of about 10,000 men have to be positioned with extreme care. The bulk of the Norwegian defense effort is in fact in Troms county opposite the Finnish "wedge," and in the Bodo area. The South Varanger Garrison, beside the Russian border, consists of only a reduced infantry battalion group of 450 men. However, as the *IDR* was able to see for itself, the Garrison's 120-man border company is very much a 'crack' unit, with half of the men being selected volunteers and the remainder being hand-picked. Due to budgetary constraints the battalion is woefully short of modern anti-tank weapons, relying mainly on *Carl Gustafs* and a few TOW missile launchers. One of the unit's most recent innovations is to mount a small number of 81 mm mortars in its Bv 202 oversnow vehicles, providing both mobility and firm baseplate positions. It was suggested to the *IDR* that, as well as more helicopters and the addition of air defense weapons, what is really needed is a squadron of NM116s (Norwegian-modified M24 *Chaffee* tanks re-armed with 90 mm anti-tank guns) and a reconnaissance vehicle squadron.

In our 1979 Readership Survey, many respondents asked for quality reprinted articles from other publications. We feel that *The Strategic Situation in Northern Europe* is just such an article. It is reprinted with permission from *International Defense Review's* 6/1979 issue. It will be continued in the January–March 1980 issue of *Military Intelligence*.

Editor

Given the Norwegian problems of geography, manpower and equipment in the far north, it would appear unrealistic to suppose that the South Varanger Garrison could do much more than harass a strong Soviet invasion force. In the *IDR's* estimation, the Garrison's value is largely as a morale-booster for the local population and as a trip-wire for the Soviets, preventing them from simply walking into Norway unopposed and forcing them to use a degree of violence which will automatically result in a strong Norwegian and NATO reaction. From a purely military point of view, it would appear to make sense to allow the Russians into North Norway as far as can be permitted, and then to cut them off from their bases and support facilities on the Kola Peninsula before engaging them in main force operations. Clearly, this assumes that Finland and Sweden remain more-or-less neutral, and doubts in Moscow on the latter score must be a major factor in Norway's security.

Behind the South Varanger Garrison is a battalion group of about 1,000 men at Porsanger, whilst at Bardufoss, in Troms County, is the headquarters for the 5,000-strong Brigade North, including a squadron of *Leopard 1* tanks and a battery of M109 self-propelled 155 mm howitzers.

HQ Brigade North is co-located with the headquarters of the commander of the Troms area defenses (COMDEFTROMS), who told the *IDR* that readiness is the top priority for his forces. He said that sub-units of Brigade North are out in the field all the time for training, and that the whole Brigade carries out three exercises each year (in winter, midsummer and autumn), for a total of 70–80 days and nights. Every second year, the Brigade participates in a major NATO *Express* exercise, when potential allied reinforcements are brought into the area for manoeuvres. In between these, a number of allied units also come in regularly for mountain and arctic warfare (MAW) training, especially units of Britain's 3 Commando Brigade, Royal Marines, which had two full Commando Groups, a Logistics Regiment, a Close Support Artillery Regiment and the Brigade Headquarters there at the time of the *IDR's* visit and which is stockpiling some of its MAW equipment in the area (notably its new Bv 202s). An encouraging sign is that MAW specialists from the US Marine Corps are also beginning to come over for training although their numbers are still small (up to company-strength). COMDEFTROMS said that Brigade North's "anti-armour capabilities with TOWs and M-72 LAWs are very effective due to the canalizing effect of the terrain," but that he is "very interested in scatter mines to compensate for lack of manpower."

According to published sources, Bardufoss, Andoya and Bodo airfields are each defended by a battery of Bofors L70 40 mm cannon belonging to the Norwegian Air Force. Pending introduction of the 40 *Roland II* SAM systems on order for the Air Force (for delivery in "the early 1980s"), the Army's six Swedish RBS-70 low-level SAMs, bought for evaluation, are likely to be used for airfield defense. From *IDR* talks with the users, however, it seems that the Army itself would rather procure General Dynamics *Stingers* than more RBS-70s. The Army also uses L70s and German Rh202 20 mm cannon on single mounts for low-level air defense.

A *Leopard 1* troop and an artillery battery with M109s are stationed at Andoya and similar units at Bodo air base. Andoya is the main base for the squadron of five recently updated Norwegian P-3B *Orion* long-range maritime patrol aircraft, which also operate out of the Lofoten islands and cover the Norwegian Sea area together with allied aircraft such as British AEW *Shackletons* (to be replaced by AEW *Nimrods*), feeding data into the COMNON command centre as well as back to their home bases.

Published sources quote Bodo as the main base for a squadron of 29 F-104G *Starfighter* interceptors, and for a squadron of 22 CF-104G/Ds bought by the Norwegians from Canada for the anti-ship attack role with *Bullpup* ASMs. The F-104s will be replaced from 1980 onwards by much longer-range and better-performing F-16s. For anti-ship attack, the new aircraft will probably be armed with a new, air-launched version of the Kongsberg *Penguin 3* missile, but American *Harpoon* ASMs may be fitted as an interim or an alternative. A photo-reconnaissance squadron of 13 RF-5As is reported to be permanently stationed at Bardufoss, and a squadron of 16 UH-1B helicopters is deployed throughout North Norway. Other fighter-bomber squadrons (mainly F-5s) deploy to the area irregularly from the south. The three main airfields all have hardened aircraft shelters dug into the rock. Norway has no *Hawk* SAMs, although the Norwegian air defense problem is alleviated somewhat by the efficiency of the Swedish Air Force's air-defense system along its otherwise very exposed landward flank.

Early warning of direct air attack in North Norway is provided principally by mountain-top NADGE radar stations, the antennas of which all suffer from being vulnerably sited. There are plans to fit antennas which can be retracted into hardened silos, but the radars obviously cannot operate when retracted. Low-level coverage is restricted by the terrain and tasking of new British AEW *Nimrod* and possibly NATO E-3A AWACs aircraft into this area seems essential. Meanwhile, a degree of low-level air cover of the maritime approaches is provided by naval coastal surveillance radars, linked both to the naval command cells at Reitan and Olavsvern (near Tromso) and to the air-defense cell at Reitan.

Naval surface warning is provided by the P-3B *Orions*, patrolling out to Bear Island, by the limited number of Norwegian warships and submarines on patrol, by the Coast Guard and recently organized Maritime Home Guard in numerous fishing vessels (which are scheduled to be armed with 20 mm cannon), and by an extensive network of coastal lookout stations.

The heaviest coastal defenses are located in the key area between Tromso and Narvik, from Lyngenfjord in the north to Ofotfjord in the south. Commanded from Olavsvern Naval Base, the defenses include a number of coastal artillery fortresses, mine stations and torpedo batteries, which protect or close off the fjords and inner leads. About half of them are permanently manned and the remainder can be quickly activated. The coastal artillery consists mainly of 105 and 125 mm guns, and is currently being modernized (mainly by Swedish improved sensors and fire control equipment). A number of the mine stations control minefields which are pre-laid and can be activated at the press of a switch, whilst others have one or more minelayers available for instant reactions in case of a threat. Mines can also be laid by air. The Soviets are well aware of these capabilities and have a considerable number of minesweepers with the



Northern Fleet.

Although Olavsvern is the principal naval base in North Norway, carrying out forward-area maintenance of Norwegian fast patrol boats and submarines in caverns dug into the cliffs, as well as providing fuel and general supplies to Norwegian and NATO warships, there are no naval units based there permanently and day-to-day control of such units in the north is exercised directly by the overall naval commander at Reitan. The Norwegian Navy generally has a number of submarines, *Penguin* missile-armed FPBs and one or two missile-armed frigates in the area at all times, together with minelayers, a few minesweepers and landing craft. They spend as little time as possible at Olavsvern since, with the introduction of infra-red sensors by the Soviets, they can be easily spotted against the cliffside quays even through camouflage nets. They are therefore based ingeniously where they are far more difficult to spot.

Due to the shortage of manpower, the Norwegians rely heavily on reinforcement from the south, plus local

mobilization and Home Guard units to boost their strength in North Norway. Using a system of simple but effective siren signals, the equivalent of an extra brigade-plus can be mobilized in Finnmark within 24 hours, and two more brigades in Troms. The village-based Home Guard is especially useful for warning of, and dealing with, Soviet diversionary and special forces units inserted clandestinely ahead of an attack. From South Norway, the first national reinforcements to arrive would be two squadrons of fighter-bombers, within hours; the Chief of Defense's Mobile Force of one battalion group, in less than a day; and a brigade within two to five days. Both these Army units have their equipment prepositioned in the north. Another brigade is earmarked to follow within four to seven days. The Naval contribution from South Norway consists of three squardons of missile FPBs and eight attack submarines, which can arrive within one to three days, and three or four missile-armed destroyers within eight days. This means that, within about a week of mobilization being ordered, the total military manpower in North Norway can be brought up to 80,000 men (including Home Guard). The Army component of this is five brigades which, for so large an area, is clearly insufficient on its own to halt a determined Soviet attack, unless maximum advantage can be made of climate and terrain and the initiative can be taken away from the Soviets by, for example, winning air superiority.

• **South Norway.** In peacetime, the Commander South Norway (COMSONOR) has only a small standing force at his disposal, although it has a greater mobilization potential than that in the north. Standing land forces are reported to consist of 1,200 men divided into a reduced infantry battalion, a *Leopard 1* tank squadron, an artillery battery, an AA gun battery and small armoured units at the major airports. In addition, there are normally 2–3,000 conscripts under training in the south.

Standing naval forces include one to two frigates, a squadron of FPBs, one to two submarines and two to three coastal batteries. Air Force units consist of three fighter-bomber squadrons and limited numbers of transport, reconnaissance and ECM aircraft, plus a helicopter squadron and a squadron of *Nike-Hercules* SAMs defending the Oslo area. There are also a small number of NADGE radar sites and coastal surveillance radars operative in peacetime.

On mobilization, total manpower in the south can be brought up to 160,000 in under 3 days, though the Air Force is excluded since it is manned by regulars. Army strength in the south is thus boosted to nine brigades, with at least two moving north, and naval strength is raised by about five frigates, two corvettes, 40 FPBs, two submarines and ten minelayers. The number of coastal defense batteries is raised considerably.

Since North Norway depends to such an extent on national reinforcements from the south, the Trondelag area around Trondheim (where the overland transport routes converge before running north along the coast) is a vital choke point. As the Acting COMSONOR told *IDR,* "if Trondelag is lost then North Norway is quickly suffocated."

Similarly, if the naval and air support facilities at Bergen and Oslo are lost, it will be extremely difficult, from Norway, to protect the sea lines of communication from across the North Sea, to support allied naval task groups and to provide essential reception facilities for allied reinforcements coming in to the south.

The Soviets are said to have now extended their objective for a naval defense 'line' southwards so that it runs from the Baltic Approaches to the Shetlands and Iceland, and they currently maintain a number of submarines, ELINT vessels, surface warships and amphibious ships permanently in, or moving through, the North Sea. These Soviet naval units come from both the Northern and the Baltic fleets.

The *IDR* was told that the primary threats to South Norway are in fact air and amphibious attacks on the ports and airfields which are used for reception of the main allied reinforcements, since facilities in the north cannot handle the volume required. In-place units are believed to plan on providing a viable defense for up to six weeks, but unless at least all-weather air-defense aircraft are brought in rapidly before then, it appears that the Norwegians will be severely overstretched. The *IDR* had the impression that relatively limited attention is given in Norway to a potential invasion via Denmark.

• **Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein.** In Denmark too, effective defense against a determined attack depends heavily on reinforcements. Standing Army forces consist of regular troops in an infantry battalion on Bornholm and 12 armoured *(Leopard 1)* battalions organized into two brigades in Zealand and two brigades in Jutland. On mobilization, the two brigades in Jutland are augmented to divisional strength with a third (mechanized) brigade with M113 APCs within 24 hours, by the addition of fully trained conscripts, regulars still serving and men recently released from nine months' conscript training. The Bornholm battalion is augmented to reduced brigade strength in the same manner.

On mobilization, a Field Army Reserve of 41,000 men is also called up to add a further mechanized battalion to each brigade and to flesh out the support units. Mobilization also adds a Regional Defense Force of 24,000 men in 21 infantry and seven artillery battalions, anti-tank squadrons, etc., plus an Army Home Guard of 56,100. Just how long this process would take is open to question.

To speed up mobilization and prevent its subversion by Warsaw Pact disinformation, King Frederik IX promulgated a Royal Decree in 1952 (amended in 1961), which reads in part: "If, prior to the attack, the units of the Armed Forces have not attained full strength, any attack launched against Denmark from bases outside Danish territory ... will be considered as an order to mobilize ...

"At the outbreak of hostilities and during a state of war, issue of false orders and information to the people and the mobilized or fighting forces is likely to occur.

"Consequently, any order of non-mobilization, cease resistance, or orders to stop mobilization or fighting already developing, will be disobeyed until it has been duly established that such orders have been issued by an authority competent to do so." In addition, the Royal Decree states that "Orders issued by constitutional or other legal authorities being in a state of captivity, or otherwise deprived by the enemy of their freedom of action, will be disobeyed." (Norway has had similar arrangements for a long time, the most recent Royal Degree on the subject having been promulgated by King Haakon in 1949).

Unlike their Army counterparts, Royal Danish Navy personnel are

mainly regulars. The Navy has two *Peder Skram*-class frigates, currently being modernized with the addition of *Sea Sparrow* and *Harpoon* missiles; has just received the first of three new *Niels Juel*-class corvettes with the same missiles and space for a point-defense missile system; has received eight of ten advanced new *Willemoes* fast attack/minelaying craft armed with *Harpoon;* six fast control boat/minelayers; eight seaward defense craft; six submarines; seven minelayers; eight minesweepers; plus seven WG. 13 *Lynx* helicopters on order with an option on two more. Main bases are at Copenhagen on the Sound, Korsoer on the Great Belt and Frederikshavn at the tip of the Jutland peninsula on the Kattegat. There are also two coastal fortresses, at Stevns (south of Copenhagen) and at Langeland (overlooking the Great Belt and Kiel Bay).

Among the Navy's peacetime missions are two of particular significance: surveillance, including patrolling and reconnaissance activities; and "through its peacetime existence to contribute towards forcing a potential aggressor to take such preparatory measures that his intentions will be revealed in due time." According to official sources, the Navy has five wartime tasks: surveillance and forward reconnaissance; very rapid establishment of defense minefields; participation in defense against invasion, "including thrusts against enemy dominated waters in order to hamper the mobility of enemy forces;" security of the sea lines of communication between the islands and those used to bring in reinforcements and supplies from abroad; and organization of maritime transport for the Army.

The Air Force, too, is mainly composed of regular personnel and has a total of 114 combat aircraft. These are formed into two air-defense squadrons each with 20F-104G *Starfighters,* two fighter-bomber squadrons of 19 F-100D/Fs, one fighter-bomber squadron with 20 F-35XD *Drakens,* and a reconnaissance squadron with 16 RF-35XD *Darkens*. There is also a transport squadron with three C-130H *Hercules* and eight C-47s, and a search-and-rescue helicopter squadron with eight S-61A *Sea Kings*. There are six air bases: Alborg, Karup, Skrydstrup, Tirstrup and Vandel, all on the Jutland peninsula; and Voerloese south of Copenhagen in Zealand. There are also two SAM units each of four squadrons, one unit with 36 *Nike-Hercules,* one with 24 *Improved Hawks*. These are all located in the eastern part of Zealand. Karup is also a combined Air Defense Operations Center/Tactical Air Operations Centre. There is a combined NADGE Sector Operations Centre/Control and Reporting Centre at Vedback, just north of Copenhagen, and a NADGE early-warning radar site has been reported as being located on Bornholm, though this is not confirmed by official sources.

In terms of new equipment, the F-100s are to be replaced by 58 General Dynamics F-16s starting in 1980, while the *Nike-Hercules* are to be phased out. At the time of *IDR's* visit to AFNORTH headquarters, fears were voiced that the *Nike-Hercules* were not to be replaced, but Denmark has subsequently joined the consortium of NATO nations conducting studies for introduction of the new Raytheon *Patriot* SAM system, designed as a follow-on to both the *Hawk* and the *Nike-Hercules*.

The West German contribution to BALTAP is primarily naval, with the Bundes-marine having been allotted a major responsibility in NATO for the Baltic and eastern North Sea, including defense of the coasts of Schleswig-Holstein, Denmark and Southern Norway, in collaboration with the Danish Navy. This role requires the neutralization of Warsaw Pact offensive capabilities in the Baltic, the containment of enemy forces and denial to them of the connection between the Baltic and North Sea. One of the main elements of the German Navy's response to the threat is the Naval Air Arm, with its 85 F-104Gs and 30 RF-104Gs about to be replaced by 110 *Tornados*. These will provide a powerful anti-ship strike capability with their *Kormoran* ASMs, in conjunction with similar hit-and-run operations by the Navy's ten Type 143 and 20 Type 148 missile FPBs, which together with the Danish *Willemoes* class, now form the backbone of BALTAP's naval forces. The German Navy also deploys six Type 205 and 18 Type 206 sophisticated coastal submarines in the Baltic, armed with long-range wire-guided torpedoes. Another major component is the German Navy's large flotilla of minelaying vessels, which are deployed close to

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their operating areas in order to provide an instant reaction capability. The Navy has ordered 28 *Roland II* SAM systems to protect its base facilities against low-level air attack.

Land defense of Jutland and Schleswig-Holstein is directed in wartime from a joint allied headquarters at Rendsburg on the Kiel Canal in Germany, known as LANDJUT. This unique command has available to it NATO's only fully amalgamated corps consisting of the Danish Jutland Division, headquartered at Fredericia, and the powerful FRG 6th Armoured Infantry Division, with headquarters at Neumunster. It also is allocated command of a special brigade-size German territorial formation, known as Home Defense Group 13. The latter is the only territorial unit in the FRG which is assigned as a front-line (as opposed to a rear-area) combat unit, this being due to the local geography. Home Defense Group 13 is based at Eutin.

LANDJUT's wartime deployment positions are "as far forward as possible," so the Danish Jutland Division has not only to mobilize before reaching full strength, but it also may have to move anything from 100 to 200 km into Germany before it engages the enemy. The two German formations will therefore almost certainly be alone to start with and will probably deploy under national command initially. Open sources state that the 6th Armoured Infantry Division consists basically of a tank brigade (which is being equipped with *Leopard 2s),* a mechanized infantry brigade (with *Marder* infantry combat vehicles) and the LANDJUT Air Defense Regiment (with one battalion of *Gepard* twin-35 mm flakpanzers, one battalion of *Roland II* mobile SAMs and one battalion of Bofors 40 mm L70 cannon). If NATO reinforcements arrive in time, it would normally be further strengthened by a US or British brigade which, in its last major exercise (*Bold Guard,* in September 1978) was the 6th Field Force of the UK Mobile Force. 6th Field Force includes a *Chieftain* armoured regiment (battalion), a reconnaissance vehicle regiment (battalion) with *Scorpions/Scimitars,* an engineer battaion, 2–3 infantry battalions (one airborne), a close support artillery battalion with 105 mm towed Light Guns, a *Rapier* air defense battery and a guided weapons battery with a troop of *Swingfire* missile-armed *Striker* vehicles and a troop of *Blowpipe* man-portable SAMs. Home Defense Group 13 is a strong hybrid brigade at present, consisting of motorised infantry with *Milan* and anti-tank missiles, a large number of heavy mortars in tracked carriers and an astonishing total of 64 M48 battle tanks. The infantry are currently being mechanized with M113 APCs and more M48s will be added as they are released from regular units on introduction of the *Leopard 2.* It is assumed that the M48s will carry new 105 mm main guns, firing depleted uranium APFSDS projectiles.

Air defense of BALTAP is somewhat complex to describe since, in peacetime, it is not only a national responsibility but—in Schleswig-Holstein—it is also under full NATO command, not from AFNORTH, but from Allied Air Forces Central Europe (AAFCE). Schleswig-Holstein up to the Danish border falls in the north German operational area of the joint Second Allied Tactical Air Force (2 ATAF), headquartered at Rheindahlen. Thus, the 8 German Air Force *Hawk* SAM batteries in Schleswig-Holstein, plus the NADGE Control and Reporting Centre (CRC) at Brekendorf and the USAF 407L mobile air defense radars in the area are all linked primarily to the NADGE Sector Operations Centre 1 (SOC 1) at Brockzetl, near Wittmund, which can call up any of the 9 peacetime air defense fighter squadrons (2 FRG, 2 British, 2 Netherlands, 2 Belgian and 1 USAF) in 2 ATAF area, as well as the NATO SAM batteries. In the normal peacetime readiness state, however, one of the two British *Phantom* squadrons would respond in the first instance.

Danish air defense radar operators are also linked in to the NADGE chain, so they too can at any time call up fighter assistance from 2 ATAF (which would be heavily reinforced in war), if the Danish air defense forces should require it. An AAFCE spokesman at Ramstein also pointed out to the *IDR* that internal airspace 'boundaries' within NATO are virtually a thing of the past, now that AAFCE has been set up, and that allied aircraft are tending to 'wander' more and more.

Co-ordination of the Danish and German forces in wartime is not haphazard, but is performed by a unified NATO command structure under the Commander, Allied Forces Baltic Approaches (COMBALTAP), who is always a Dane. He has four principal subordinate commanders: Commander Allied Land Forces Jutland (COMLANDJUT, alternately a Danish and a German general with a chief-of-staff from the other nation), whose headquarters, as mentioned above, are at Rendsburg; Commander Allied Land Forces Zealand (COMLANDZEALAND), a Dane responsible for the two brigades on Zealand and the reduced brigade on Bornholm; Commander, Naval Forces Baltic Approaches (COMNAVBALTAP), who commands all Danish and German naval forces plus the German Naval Air Arm from headquarters at Karup in Denmark; and Commander, Allied Air Forces Baltic Approaches (COMAIRBALTAP), who is also at Karup, responsible for all Danish Air Force units and those of the Luftwaffe and other air forces which may be allocated. The posts of COMNAVBALTAP and COMAIRBALTAP alternate between Danish and German generals under the same arrangement as COMLANDJUT.

The Command Control, Communications and Intelligence (C^3I) links within AFNORTH are fairly good at present, but are outdated and are currently the subject of a detailed modernization study. This should result in real-time satellite communications throughout the area within five years, and secure speech shortly thereafter. It appears that prime contractor is likely to be Hughes Aircraft, which is currently funded for the study.

(to be concluded in the January–March 1980 issue.)

Transfer of Command of National Forces under the NATO Alert System

Country	Peace	Military Vigilance	Simple Alert	Reinforced Alert	General Alert
Norway	Air Defense	Air Defense	Air Defense	All	All
Denmark				All*	All*
FRG			All	All	All

*May occur at Reinforced or General Alert.

The Soviet Draft: Cornerstone of USSR Nuclear Strategy

by CPT Robert S. Beumer

Introduction

Since the Vietnam War, the United States has opted for an all-volunteer standing army. This policy has been criticized within and outside the Department of Defense. Recently the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested stand-by selective service registration because of problems encountered in recruiting adequate numbers of military personnel.

While American society has debated this defense issue, the Soviet Union has consistently followed a policy of compulsory military service. Any American who has wondered how the United States could provide a national army might wonder how successful the Soviets have been with their policy of compulsory military service.

In this article, the timely issue of Soviet compulsory military service will be explored for: (1) its ability to provide massive numbers of trained personnel necessary for any confrontation between superpowers; (2) costs accrued by the Soviet society as a result of compulsory military service; (3) the training and ability of a draft army in a technologically sophisticated environment; and, (4) societal attitudes towards the draft army.

There are obvious differences between the US and the USSR so I will not suggest that one policy or another is correct but I will attempt to look beyond numbers of men listed in the order-of-battle in order to define the real threat posed by the Soviet Union's draft army.

The USSR's Law of Universal Military Service of 1967 provides for universal military conscription of all males 18 years old. Conscripts serve two years in all services except the Soviet Navy, where the period of service is three years.

The Soviets have traditionally accepted the possibility of nuclear war in their military writings. As one of their own spokesmen has said, "The Soviet military doctrine requires that the armed forces, the country, the whole Soviet people be prepared for the eventuality of a nuclear-rocket war."

Individuals pursuing higher education may be required to serve only one year, or may be exempted altogether. Individuals with physical impairments or improper social and political attitudes may also be exempted. No provision is made for conscientious objectors; exemptions are granted because universal conscription produces manpower in excess of service needs and not to accommodate individuals. (Individuals not inducted into the active army still play important roles in the Soviet defense and will be discussed later.[1])

Manpower: USSR vs. US

Current estimates fix the manpower strength of Soviet forces at 4.4 million men excluding some 400,000 border guards and security forces.[2] This gives the Soviet Union a decided numerical advantage over the United States, which maintains approximately 2.1 million men and women on active duty.

This numerical advantage is even more pronounced when the US and USSR systems are examined in light of their potential for providing military manpower. US forces can be expanded only when Congress increases manpower ceilings *and* allocates adequate funds in the defense budget to attract manpower from the civilian sector. This is a very expensive undertaking especially since past efforts to provide the military compensation equivalent to that in the civilian sector have not eliminated significant recruiting problems. Efforts to draft adequate manpower in the event of a national emergency would be equally difficult since no one is preregistered and no functioning body exists to identify, notify and absorb draftees into the US military.

By contrast, the Soviet system can alter the size of the Soviet military by simply altering the percentage of the 18-year-olds it calls to active duty. The following table shows the number of such soldiers available to the Soviet Union as soon as national decision-makers decide they are needed and issue appropriate orders to regional "commissariats."[3]

Strategic Reserves

The advantage of compulsory service are readily recognized in that it allows the USSR to generate significantly more manpower while allowing rapid mobilization of all available manpower in a national emergency. One should also examine its impact on the national strategic reserves.

Combat reserves in the US are numbered in the tens to hundreds of thousands while reserves in the USSR are numbered in the millions.[4] All active military personnel are discharged automatically into the Soviet strategic reserve upon completion of active service. Personnel remain in the reserves until the age of 50, receiving refresher training, examinations to test proficiency and periodic recalls to active duty.[5] Conscripts discharged into the reserve each year far exceed the number leaving

Millions of 18-year-olds Available for Conscription Each Year (Male Conscripts Only)



Graph derived from demographic data contained in ***US News and World Report,*** August 30, 1976, and **The Soviet Soldier,** page 6, and **The Future of Soviet Military Power,** page 84. Assumes one-half of births male.

the reserve at age 50. This is a major Soviet strategic advantage because it rapidly expands the reserves through the discharge of some 1.8 million active-duty servicemen annually.

A Nuclear Perspective

These millions of men are an integral part of the Soviet Union's national strategy. The Soviets have tradtionally accepted the possibility of nuclear war in their military writings: "The Soviet military doctrine requires that the armed forces, the country, the whole Soviet people be prepared for the eventuality of a nuclear-rocket war."[6]

Although this is Soviet doctrine, Americans have been slow to recognize its practical application in the Soviet military build-up, modern civil-defense emphasis, the psychological preparation of the Soviet population for war, and the massing of strategic reserves. The Soviets intend to protect vital installations through an extensive civil-defense program, and suffer whatever losses are inflicted in a nuclear exchange with enough surviving active and reserve forces to mount a national war effort. One Soviet strategist has said, "Widespread use of mass-destruction means will cause severe losses, so the country will need a large quantity of military-trained reserves to replenish active armies and create new formations."[7] In 1967 when the period of active duty was reduced from three years to two years, Marshal Sokolovskiy wrote, "The shorter the period of service in the army, the greater the number of men with military training discharged each year into the reserve."[8] This suggests a Soviet willingness to endure war, and emphasizes the importance of their reserves to national strategy.

Soviet reservists are kept in various states of readiness, depending upon unit of assignment and age of the reservist. Reservists are periodically recalled by commissariats for examinations or refresher training. In large-scale exercises such as the Dnieper Maneuvers of 1967 or the Geseat Maneuvers of 1974, reserve units were recalled to active duty to provide the necessary logistical support.[9]

In many cases, these reserve logistical units perform the same tasks in the military that they do in civilian life—construction, truck transportation, laying oil pipelines, etc. Refresher training provides the entire population with wartime information considered necessary by military strategists, including details on enemy weapons (especially anti-tank) and equipment. Such information is given high priority to ensure reservists and individual citizens are prepared to face the unexpected.[10]

Military-technical activities such as motorcycle, radio, aircraft, parachute, small-arms and water-sports competitions are considered important state matters since they train sportsmen "who form a wonderful reserve."[11] The impact of reserve training on Soviet life is underscored by the fact that phrases like "mobilizing the reserves" and "working a good watch" have become common Soviet expressions.[12]

Another aspect of Soviet war preparation is the training provided to those individuals exempted from military service. Since no nation's peacetime army (even the Soviet's) can fully absorb all the eligible men of a given age, a network of civilian institutions to train mechanics, radio operators and telegraph operations has been established.[13] These trained personnel, while not a part of the actual reserves, do much to offset the limitations of the often-criticized Soviet logistics system. These personnel are not just "on paper," but are used in large-scale exercises and will be deployed in case of war.

In the theatre-level Geseat Maneuvers of 1974, reserves and trained civilians with their equipment were drawn from the national economy. They laid pipelines, provided automotive transport, performed communications functions and other support roles; the transition from civilian to soldier took from a few hours to several days.[14]

Conscription enables the USSR to assemble active duty military forces more than twice the size of their US counterpart. The Soviet Union can rapidly and efficiently mobilize additional Soviet youth for a massive standing army. Soviet strategic reserves outnumber US reserves by powers of ten, and civilians exempted from military service are trained for military logistics functions. But what are the costs of such manpower?

The Costs

We have seen that conscription enables the USSR to assemble military forces more than twice the size of US forces; that the Soviet system can rapidly and efficiently mobilize additional Soviet youth to assemble a massive standing army; that Soviet strategic reserves outnumber US reserves by powers of ten; that civilians exempted from service are trained and capable for military logistics functions; and finally that these masses of manpower fit the Soviet doctrine of fighting and winning a nuclear war. Reason tells us the use of so much manpower for military purposes must be expensive, if not in wages, then in hidden costs to the Soviet economy and society. What are these costs?

To US economists and taxpayers, the Soviet universal military service with its negligible pay (the equivalent in rubles of between $5.50 and $15.00 per month) for conscripts is economically attractive. Spartan living conditions further reduce costs.[15] Calculating the expense at $15 per man per month and using estimated figures for Soviet gross national product (GNP) and military force make-up, we can calculate the approximate costs and benefits of this conscript force.

The Soviet GNP in 1976 was $856 billion while the US GNP for the same year was 1,707 billion.[16] Recently revised CIA estimates put Soviet defense spending at approximately 13 percent of GNP. (Estimates vary greatly and range as high as 40 percent.) The US spends 5.1 percent of its GNP on defense.[17] Of this defense budget the US spends over 55 percent on manpower costs.[18] Soviet manpower costs are difficult to calculate since the Soviet military is composed of both conscripts and professional officers and NCOs.

Before US estimates of Soviet forces were revised upward in 1976–1977, conscripts were estimated at 2.68 million men or 70 percent, while career officers, NCOs and warrant officers composed 30 percent (1.1 million).[19] Using the same ratio of conscripts to careerists for a 4.4 million man force, we calculate USSR forces composed of 3.08 million conscripts and 1.32 million professionals. The cost of the conscript force can be calculated at $15 per man per month. Professionals are well-paid and receive approximately one-third more than they would in the Soviet civilian economy (from 140 rubles monthly, $490 to $500, for a senior lieutenant to 2000 rubles monthly, $7,000 to $8,000, for a marshal[20]). The total manpower costs of the Soviet Union are approximately 25 percent of the defense budget or $27.82 billion.[21] The table below consolidates these calculations for easy reference based upon 1976 GNP and expressed in dollars.

GNP	Defense Budget	Manpower Costs	Manpower Provided	Defense Budget Less Manpower Costs
US				
$1,707 Billion	**$88.76 Billion**	**$36.83 Billion**	**2.1 Million Careerists**	**$51.93 Billion**
USSR				
			3.08 Million Conscripts	
$856 Billion	**$111.3 Billion**	**$27.82 Billion**		**$83.98 Billion**
			1.32 Million Careerists	

Examination of this data (though estimates and assumptions must necessarily be included), reveals some interesting facts. First, the USSR spends more than the US on defense, even though its economy is roughly half the size.[22] Secondly, the USSR can provide twice the US manpower at roughly 75% of the cost. Lastly, the USSR has decidedly more defense dollars to spend on equipment, expensive programs and war stocks, as well as research and development. The Soviet build-up of self-propelled artillery, tanks, air-defense equipment, and missiles should not come as a surprise when one considers how much more of their defense dollar can be spent on modernization of weapons and equipment.

Production Costs Elsewhere

Economists would be quick to point out that the above analysis is not complete. In a totalitarian state, the government can conscript labor, pay it an artificially low wage and make it appear very inexpensive. Such a system has hidden costs, however, the most obvious of which is the loss of production this labor could provide elsewhere in the economy. This cost is in fact one of the Soviet Union's concerns today.

The Soviets have long understood the economic growth that results from mobilization of the labor force in more productive sectors of the economy. Shortly after the revolution, Soviet leaders moved labor from the non-productive agricultural sector to industry. During World War II, the Soviets included women in the industrial sector. To the Soviets' dismay, excess labor that can be used to boost the economy is fast disappearing. There are no longer any large groups of non-productive labor to be tapped. To compound this dilemma, birth rates have fallen. (Due in large measure to the fact that Soviet women working full-time do not want the added responsibility of raising a family and to economic constraints).[23] With this shortage of labor, the Soviet Union's standing army is becoming increasingly expensive to the society as a whole.

The Soviet Union has done several things to offset the hidden cost of its armed forces. One is the use of Soviet troops for tasks that would be accomplished by the civilian sector or National Guard in the American economy. Soviet troops were instrumental in clearing and rebuilding Tashkent after the earthquake in 1965 and helped build the international terminal at Moscow's Sheremetyevo Airport and apartments and office buildings on Kalinin Street. Soviet forces assist in the operation and construction of Soviet railroads.[24] Periodically, Soviet forces are ordered into the country to assist in the harvest. Such actions show that although the defense forces of the Soviet Union are an enormous drain on the economy, they do contribute to the nation's economic well-being.

Another step the Soviets have taken to lower the cost of their military manpower is the reduction of active duty requirements. Prior to 1967, military personnel spent three

years on active duty (four years in the Soviet Navy). Recognizing the impending labor shortage, the Soviets reduced active duty requirements to two years (three years in the Navy). They also made provision in the draft law to take only eighteen-year-old males. Since they've not entered the labor force, costs due to disruption and retraining are reduced.[25]

By American Standards ...

Although the Soviets have taken steps to offset their manpower costs, the effect of removing so many young men from the labor force is enormous. The cost would be prohibitive by American standards. It must be remembered, however, that the Soviet frame of reference differs greatly from our own. the Soviet Union is a "superpower" only in the area of military power.[26] It will do whatever is necessary to maintain this status. While most nations base defense expenditures on what is needed and affordable, the Soviet Union plans the desired defense posture and gears the rest of the economy to produce the necessary resources.[27] This difference cannot be overemphasized. In the Soviet Union's power economy, success is measured by the ability to retain internal political control and project power abroad, not the standard of living of the Soviet people.[28] As Leonid Brezhnev has said, "We shall answer any attempts by any party to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union by making the necessary increase in our own military might."[29]

The Quality of the Soviet Soldier

We have examined the Soviet Union's decisive strategic advantage in military manpower, especially in reserve forces, and the Soviet's determination to retain this superiority regardless of cost. Another question which must be answered concerns the quality of the Soviet soldier. Can a two-year conscript compare favorably to the American career soldier?

When addressing this question, it is important to remember the makeup of the Soviet forces. Thirty percent of the forces are officers and non-commissioned officers whose schooling and training are rigorous and demanding, and whose only shortcoming is a lack of combat experience. It should be pointed out that the Soviet Army vigorously recruits conscripts for the officer and NCO ranks. It has established a special rank of ensigns to be filled by conscript recruits. Ensigns have no US counterpart, being somewhere between a super-NCO and officer grade. Ensigns often serve as platoon commanders. Other conscript recruits attend officer or non-commissioned officer academies and remain on active duty in these grades.[30] The existence of this professional cadre must be kept in mind as we change our focus to the ability of the draftees themselves.

Soviet youth begin training in grade school in military skills such as civil defense, military patriotic assemblies, marching and physical training which culminates in military exercises controlled by military officers but conducted by young people. "ZARNITSA," or "Summer Lightning," is one such exercise held for Soviet youth from the age of 10 to 15. In Vladivostock, these exercises have included full-scale amphibious assaults and the repulsing of amphibious landings.[35]

The Soviet conscript begins as a highly motivated patriot. "Service in the armed forces of the Socialist countries is the honorable duty of all citizens. Here there is no class selection. All citizens have the same rights, and the same duties to protect their country."[31] This is not empty rhetoric. Western visitors to the Soviet Union have found cultural life saturated with the war theme. This native patriotism is augmented by the romance of an adventurous life, the opportunity to travel, and the adverse effects of a poor service record.[32] All of these factors combine to produce a highly motivated conscript. Nonetheless, a question remains as to his ability to absorb the technical complexities of the modern battlefield in two short years.

The Soviet Union has recognized this problem and implemented extensive pre-induction training to correct it. Military training of Soviet youth is a practice begun in Lenin's day which received added emphasis during the 1960s.[33] Soviet law currently holds leaders of educational institutions, factories, and collective farms responsible for preliminary military training.[34] Soviet youth begin training in grade school in civil defense, military patriotic assemblies, marching and physical training. This training culminates in military exercises controlled by professional military officers, but conducted by young people. ***"Zarnitsa,"*** or "Summer Lightning," is one such exercise held for children ages 10 to 15. These nationwide exercises include military discipline, guard duty, military regulations and maneuvers. In Vladivostock they have included full-scale amphibious assaults and the repulsing of amphibious landings.[35] By the time Soviet students reach high school, they have received the equivalent of US basic training.[36] Additionally, students are encouraged to join social clubs sponsoring skills needed by the military. The same Soviet organization responsible for mandatory pre-induction training manages these social clubs and teaches aviation, parachute jumping, marksmanship, motor vehicle operation, bulldozer operation, skin diving, and radio and telegraph operation.[37] This pre-induction training is so extensive that the Soviet conscript is sent directly to his unit upon induction into the active service. Though there are indications that the Soviet Army has some problems for the varying states of training of conscripts, there is no evidence that this training is deficient or that conscripts are unprepared to advance their technical training upon entering active duty.

Soviet Training

The Soviet Union bases active duty training on two psychological principles. First, tasks must be learned by repetition and drill because other learning processes break down under the strain of battle conditions. Second, human beings have unlimited potential and are always capable of some additional increment of effort.[38] Soviet training is intensive, repetitious and so demanding, it is often so difficult to distinguish from combat missions.

There are documented instances of easy grading on combat tests, and cheating and inaccuracies in reporting combat readiness that indicate the Soviet Army is plagued by training problems similar to those of the US Army.[39] Some units probably fall short of rigorous Soviet standards but all units are subject to intensive scrutiny by higher headquarters and examples of inadequate training appear to be exceptions to the rule. The great majority of Soviet conscripts are apparently drilled into proficiency by repetitive, difficult training.

Many conscripts find military life and military training more rigorous and demanding than they had anticipated, and lose some of the military-patriotic zeal cultivated during their pre-induction training.[40] Marshal Grechko admitted as much when he wrote that modern combat has become much more complicated, and "... if one trains people according to the old manner, this means that one is inefficient."[41] Flagging enthusiasm does not lessen the performance of the Soviet conscript to any marked degree.

Soviet conscripts enter active duty much better prepared than his American counterpart due to pre-induction training and training in military skills taught by youth "clubs." Intensive, repetitive training while on active duty insures the conscripts retain a working ability in those technical skills associated with their jobs. While such training occasionally falls short of the official, harsh standards, it equals or surpasses US training. Training stresses the reality of war, including nuclear war, to psychologically "harden" the soldier to a greater degree than found in the US Army. Motivation, though tempered by the reality of military life, is based on mandatory service and not financial reward. The attitude of US soldiers, by contrast, has been described as enduring warfare with little, if any, moral commitment toward the higher purposes of the conflict.[42] The Soviet conscript's acceptance of his fate may constitute an advantage over the American soldier who volunteered for peacetime service and is psychologically unprepared for war. Only actual hostilities can determine the advantages and disadvantages of Soviet training methods but we can conclude that the Soviet conscripts are more than adequately trained to perform their duties in a high-intensity, technically-complex war.

Another aspect of universal military service to be examined is its impact on the total Soviet population. the infusion of 1.8 million men into the civilian population each year, each man the subject of intense training and military indoctrination, has a great impact on the attitude of the nation as a whole.

Soviet steadfastness in the face of nuclear war is further developed through the Soviet national civil defense program. The USSR has the largest and most comprehensive war-survival program in the world today. This program includes mandatory participation by all citizens (20 hours per year). With a few days' warning, the Soviets could evacuate a majority of urban residents.

National Opinion and the Draft

Molding national opinion is a high priority for national leaders and a by-product of universal military conscription. Marshal V.D. Sokolovskiy has paid, "The moral-political preparation of the population is of decisive importance under present-day conditions, since the use of weapons of mass destruction in war imposes exceptionally high, previously unheard-of demands on the political morale of the population."[43] The Soviets anticipate war—a nuclear rocket war. If prepared for this eventuality, they believe they can easily opt for lower levels of conflict such as blitzkrieg warfare or protracted conventional war.[44] To prepare the populace they utilize every governmental and public organization available.[45] The Armed Forces are a prime vehicle for this task. As a captive audience, the military receives especially strong political propaganda. It is a Soviet commander's responsibility to ensure every soldier is guided by a continuous political influence.[46] Brezhnev himself has cited the Soviet forces for their influence in preparing the Soviet citizenry for the sacrifices of war: "One has to dwell on the immense role played by the Soviet Army. Young men enter the military family without any life experiences. But when they leave the army they have already passed through the school of self-restraint and discipline."[47]

There are indications that the overwhelming propaganda the Soviet soldier receives has a negative effect, leaving the soldier cynical and resenting the amount of time spent being lectured.[48] This attitude, however, seems to change when the Soviet soldier returns to civilian life. There was a strong element of patriotism in the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Most Soviet citizens took pride in this demonstration of national power, like Englishmen during the 19th century. Soviets who remember World War II also subordinate their memories of destruction to their national pride. As one Soviet has said, "The best time of our lives was the war, because at that time we all felt closer to our government that at any other time in our lives. It was not their war, but our war. It was our country we were defending, our war effort."[49] The Soviets indirectly cultivate the psychological steadfastness of the civilian population through universal military conscription.

This steadfastness in the face of nuclear war is further developed through the national civil defense program. The Soviet Union has the largest and most comprehensive war-survival program in the world today.[50] It includes mandatory participation by all citizens (twenty hours per year).[51] The program is a continuation of military war-survival training and includes shelters for critical political, administrative and command elements and essential work forces. With a few days' warning, the Soviets could evacuate a majority of urban residents.[52] Extensive civil-defense preparations give the Soviet Union a fair-to-good chance of surviving nuclear war. Preparations do reduce the population's inherent fear of nuclear war, making nuclear warfare appear a rational alternative. The idea that the Soviet Union can fight and win a nuclear war is introduced in pre-induction training, through the individual's military service, and reinforced through the national civil defense program for life.

Another aspect of universal military conscription which deserves mention is its effect on the people in power. The power of Soviet military men and men who have left the

military for high-ranking party and government positions ensures a continuing militarism. Convinced of the military's preeminence, such men are dedicated to the Soviet Union's existence as a military-industrial complex.[53] It has been said that Soviet militarism at the highest political levels alone would be a formidable barrier to genuine *detente*.[54]

The effects of universal military service cannot be overstated and are in evidence throughout Soviet society. Patriotic fervor, a belief that the nation can fight, survive and win a nuclear war, and a staunchly pro-military attitude in the highest echelons of Soviet power are part of the Soviet perspective.

Conclusion

I have examined Soviet universal military conscription from several angles.

One overall conclusion can be drawn. Universal military conscription is meant to involve the maximum number of people in preparing for the next war. It is not intended to deter war but rather to use military might to advance Soviet political goals, pressure Western powers or, in the ultimate expression of national will, to fight and win any war, including nuclear war. In Brezhnev's words, "The USSR military posture must provide the Soviet Union a preponderance of military might in the correlation of world forces to facilitate Soviet advances without war but they must be ready to wage war, including nuclear war."[55] Universal military conscription is a cornerstone of this war-fighting ability. Marshal Sokolovskiy has said, "... armed conflict will be waged by mass armed forces. It will be necessary to involve many millions of people. Therefore, the attitude of the mass populace toward war has a decisive effect on the outcome ... war may drag on and this demands protracted and all-out exertion. We must get the human and materiel resources ready."[56] This is the real purpose of Soviet conscription. It provides more than massive numbers of fighting men. It provides huge reserves to replace losses. Its low manpower costs allows the purchase of any materiels that could be required in war. It infuses a militant spirit throughout the population, a spirit that supports war and promotes individual effort to win such a war.

Universal military conscription may or may not be appropriate for the United States. It most certainly is appropriate for Soviet political goals and international intentions. It presents formidable dangers to the United States if future conflicts follow Soviet expectations.

The USSR military posture must provide the Soviet Union a preponderance of military might in the correlation of world forces to facilitate Soviet advances without war but they must be ready to wage war, including nuclear war.

Leonid Brezhnev

Footnotes

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Vehicle Recognition Quiz Answers

Recognition Quiz on page 48.

1. Marder—West German
   - Small turret placed centrally on hull
   - Gun mounted on turret
   - Long hull with inward sloping sides, domed cupola at rear
   - 6 road wheels with support rollers
2. BTR 60P-Soviet
   - May have small turret
   - MG towards front
   - Large boat-like hull with sharp square nose
   - Wheeled-4 large wheels each side
3. M60—United States
   - High rear deck
   - Tortoise shell shaped turret
   - 6 road wheels with 3 support rollers
   - Prominent cupola
4. BMD—Soviet
   - Same turret and armament as BMP
   - Driver's hatch centered below main gun
   - 5 road wheels, 4 support rollers
   - Found with airborne units
5. Scorpion—British
   - Small turret towards rear of hull
   - Short gun tube, no bore evacuator
   - Long front slope
   - 5 road wheels, no support rollers
6. Leopard—West German
   - Large rounded flat turret
   - Bore evacuator 2/3 from muzzle
   - Long sloping sided hull with horizontal exhaust louvers at rear
   - 7 road wheels with support rollers
7. M109 SP—United States
   - Distinctive short gun tube with double baffle muzzle brake
   - 7 evenly spaced road wheels with low front sprocket and idler wheel
   - Large boxy turret mounted rear of center
8. HS 30—West German
   - Small turret well forward on right
   - Long thin gun
   - Low silhouette with sloped edges
   - 5 road wheels with support rollers
9. BRDM—Soviet
   - No turret
   - Armament may vary from pintle mounted MG to antitank missiles
   - Long sloping hood and raised troop compartment
   - Four wheel
10. SAU 122—Soviet
    - PT-76 type chassis with 7 road wheels
    - Turret location is rear of center
    - IR searchlight top left of turret
    - Double baffle muzzle brake and bore evacuator
11. S Tank—Swedish
    - No turret
    - Bore evacuator near mantle
    - Low hull
    - 4 road wheels hydro-pneumatic with support rollers
12. Saladin—British
    - Box shaped turret set well forward
    - Short gun tube
    - Squat angular hull
    - Wheeled-3 on each side
13. JP Kanone—West German
    - No turret
    - Bore evacuator and muzzle brake at muzzle
    - Low flat-topped silhouette with step between fighting compartment and rear deck
    - 5 road wheels with support rollers
14. BTR 152—Soviet
    - An armor plated truck with 6 wheels
    - Command, "U" version has raised, covered top and antennae
    - Wide bumper with winch and rounded mud guards over front wheels
    - 3 firing ports on each side
15. PT 76—Soviet
    - Cone shaped turret set well forward
    - Short gun with evacuator at center, muzzle brake at end
    - Wide long and square hull
    - Narrow back, 6 road wheels, no support rollers

Intelligence Subcourses

The Army Correspondence Program is now offering additional intelligence subcourses. Developed by the US Army Intelligence Center and School, the subcourses are as follows:

- ITO 509—Coordinate Employment of Radar Team—3 credit hours. Subcourse relates to the duties of a 17K, Skill Level 2, Ground Surveillance Radar Crewman.
- ITO 519—Logistical Support Coordination—1 credit hour. Relates to duties of the 17K platoon sergeant in a Ground Surveillance Company of the Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence Battalion.
- ITO 760—CI Investigative Functions—12 credit hours. Concerns the duties of the 97B Counterintelligence Specialist.

(continued from page 15)
lights and coffee pots going. Both gasoline lanterns and battery-powered lanterns have been used and proved satisfactory. Other noise-reducing techniques such as placing neon bulbs on field phones, disabling telephone ringers and using half headsets for communications operations, become more meaningful once major noise sources have been eliminated.

One of the greatest advantages of dispersing emitters is the fact that there will be a larger number of radio vehicles available to reconstruct command/control communications following the initial artillery-air attack. For initial operations during the period in which the GP medium is being established, operations will be as usual in the track extension complex. Following the "transfer of control" to the GP medium, canvas may be rolled up, pre-cut wiring harnesses extended, and vehicles dispersed to a greater degree when the complex is in the principal operation location.

The Obstacles:

The potential obstacles which require the attention of the commander in order to implement the remoted CP concept are few, but must be recognized. Most have been encountered by the writer and involved readjusting some "mindsets" and/or "doctrinal" responsibilities within the unit. The one which requires command attention outside the brigade is in obtaining 26-pair cable, an item which is critical to the rapid installation and remoting of some 40 telephone and radio sets down from "signal hill" to the CP.

Depending on the type unit, the brigade TOE provides for approximately four sections of 26-pair cable to be used with the brigade switchboards and communications center. To effectively remote all of the circuitry over the distances described, in an acceptable time, 16–18 additional cable lengths are required. Within the division signal battalion, there is a substantial amount of cable which may not be required in support of signal battalion-installed communications systems. Additionally, there is 26-pair cable which is employed full time in support of systems of much lower priority than the systems at the brigade command post. As the principal staff officer charged with electronic counter countermeasures for the division, it is imperative that the division signal officer, in an interim measure, pending MTOE modification, consider providing sufficient 26-pair cable to the brigades to permit the proposed upgrade of command/control survivability. In a separate mechanized brigade, this was accomplished through a lateral transfer of 26-pair cable from the forward signal support platoon organic to the support battalion of the brigade, to the brigade headquarters signal platoon. Although this was accomplished in a separate brigade, implementation in a divisional brigade is feasible. Cable assets exist in the forward signal support platoons of "B" Company in a division signal battalion which are not fully employed and which may be reallocated to the brigade signal platoons on a temporary basis with no resulting degradation to standard communications support.

... the greatest threat to command post survivability is, by far, the electronic and infrared signatures presented by the vehicle and radio complex.

Brigade command/staff operations in a facility other than the familiar tracked vehicle complex is a concept which must be developed. The expanded CP distances and resultant increased support and coordination requirements were addressed in practice in the field. To effectively control and manage the systems, either the brigade signal officer or chief signal NCO must be given room in the TOC to accommodate a field table, a pair of junction boxes, and three to four field phones. To this position, referred to as "remote control," the staff directs all communications problems. Remote control can implement frequency changes, reestablish remote radio and telephone circuits, reroute traffic and, in general, accomplish a multitude of the other communications tasks which most commanders never demand of their communications staff officers.

To attend to normal maintenance and vehicle support operations on signal hill, one additional track driver per vehicle is required.

By pooling track drivers and placing them under the supervision of the signal platoon sergeant, continuous track operation resulted. The attachment of additional track drivers will permit the simultaneous activities of signal hill operation/maintenance and CP radio telephone operator support. Wheeled vehicle operation/refueling may be performed by the signal platoon personnel without any augmentation while wheeled vehicle maintenance was performed by assigned drivers from the liaison/staff sections. The most significant problem which was faced when the drivers were removed from their vehicles on signal hill and working for the respective staff section in the command post, was vehicle evacuation from signal hill and personnel evacuation from signal hill and from the command post. To correct this, signal personnel on signal hill were licensed/trained to drive any wheeled vehicle, standby troop transport was prepositioned at the CP, and rendezvous points were established.

The quartering party must be augmented by maintenance or support personnel to assist in setting up the CP tent in advance of the arrival of the cable teams. This will cut down on installation times as pre-cut harnesses are simply dropped into place and telephones/remote lines are connected in a standard fashion. While this appears to be a minor problem, it is one of the areas which require some adjustment in thinking by both the headquarters company commander and the operations sergeant major. One tradeoff of particular importance to the commander which must be noted is the location of the hard copy message means (communications center and radio teletype). Under the remoted command post concept, both the hard copy means are displaced from the immediate vicinity of the CP. This requires an additional four or five minutes of message handling time in exchange for a reduction in electronic and infrared signatures of the CP. As an alternative to this approach, if the immediacy of hard copy message means is required, teletype circuits may also be remoted into the CP by placing a page printer/tape distribution position (about the size of a regular typewriter) within the CP and by adding a power source outside.

Probably the greatest obstacle a commander may encounter in establishing the remoted command post concept will be that of his own staff. During the first few setups in the

training phases, it is in the words of one NCO *"just that tough!"* Once the decision had been made to try the concept, a series of "reasons why it can't be done" will surface. Old doctrine staffers will be overly anxious to drop radio problems on the signal platoon. The signal platoon will feel it is inheriting poorly maintained equipment, etc., and "finger pointing" starts.

The exchanges of and changes in responsibility may be difficult to sell to the staff officer or noncommissioned officer who had done it "by the book" for a long time; however, one successful setup will convince these professionals of the merits.

The point is that action can and must be taken now to protect the commander and his staff from the signatures presented by the track/liaison vehicle radio complex of the existing assets. The concept described in broad terms thus far has worked well and can be implemented/improved upon under your command.

Hidden College Credits

by Brenda-Lee Karasik

Many soldiers are taking college classes to earn a degree. They may also be taking tests for college credit. These are the only methods for earning college credits—aren't they?

No, not really. Many soldiers may already have hidden college credits from service schools they attended. Soldiers may also have hidden credits from their military occupational specialty (MOS).

The American Council on Education (ACE) has evaluated service school courses as well as MOSs and has recommended credit for most of these. Potential credits are converted into actual college credits when a college or university accepts them and puts them on a transcript.

Not all schools will accept ACE credit recommendations, however. Check with your selected college to determine its policy.

Your Army education center has ACE credit evaluation guides for your use. Also, the counseling staff will be glad to check the evaluations for you. Just have your course completion certificate or a copy of your DA Form 2-1, Personnel Qualification Record, with you. Or, write down the course title, the dates you attended, the number of weeks, and the location of each course completed.

For example, a soldier who completed the Telelphone Installation and Repair Course between November 1953 and December 1968 could receive three semester hours in electricity and two in communications for electronic programs when applied to an associate degree.

Most enlisted and warrant officer MOSs have also been evaluated. For example, a soldier holding the MOS Administration Specialist, 71L40, who has taken and passed an MOS test between November 1973 and August 1977 could receive 22 semester hours toward an associate degree.

To request credits from your college, fill out your part of DD Form 295, Application for the Evaluation of Educational Experience During Military Service. Have your personnel office complete and sign their part. Then take the completed form to your education center for forwarding directly to the college.

It's easy to find out what the ACE recommendation is and how to gain credit for your military experience by calling or visiting your installation education center. It's well worth the time to check.

Reprinted from *DA Scene*.

336th Activation

A new military intelligence unit recently introduced to the XVIII Airborne Corps team brings both sophisticated hardware and well-trained soldiers to the task of supporting an ever-ready Corps.

"The Army is almost hand-selecting all members of the 336th," said Colonel O.B. Seaton at the recent activation ceremony for the 336th Military Intelligence Company (Control and Processing). "A lot is expected of this unit. You'll be working with each other and with many new systems."

The new company is assigned to the 525th Military Intelligence Group, commanded by COL Seaton, and will use its personnel to support the entire XVIII Airborne Corps with a variety of capabilities. The unit will also be able to deploy with the Corps and operate in a field environment.

The 336th's First Sergeant, James V. Stephenson, explained that the unit will be gathering and analyzing a variety of electronic intelligence for local commanders. The unit's list of responsibilities is a long one and, in the end, commanders will be furnished with timely and usable pieces of electronic intelligence.

"We have a lot of good people working for us," said CPT Keith Alexander, commander of the 336th MI Co. "And that really makes a difference. There's no doubt that we'll be able to accomplish our mission."

SP5 Bill Branley

New Maintenance Training Course

by Robert St. James

A new maintenance training course for the 33S Career Management Field has been developed by USAISD. Sometimes misnomered as Basic Combat Training (BCT) or Bacon, Lettuce and Tomato (BLT), the new course is, in reality, a Basic Technical Course—BTC. Since the old ASA school has come under TRADOC it has not had a true 33S Basic Technical Course to prepare specialists for the grade of E6. The new BTC will provide resident training at the 33S30 skill level and is scheduled to begin in the 2nd quarter of FY 80.

This course will provide the soldier with the fundamentals of NCO administration and management as well as the principles of advanced electronic maintenance. The BTC will consist largely of hands-on training in state-of-the-art systems and equipment, and will be directed towards the critical tasks delineated in the 33S Soldier's Manual and Commander's Manual. For this reason, graduates should find themselves much better prepared for their SQTs in the future.

It is hoped the 18-week course will become an integral part of the career of the Electronic Warfare/Intercept Systems Repairman, and will serve the needs of the soldier as well as his commander and the intelligence community.

Training Hotline Established

The Directorate of Training Developments, US Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, AZ, has established a **Training Hotline** which can receive telephone queries regarding USAICS, Fort Huachuca, actions, programs, and products from anywhere in the world 24-hours a day.

- Does the **Commanders Manual** fulfill the purpose for which it was intended?
- Does your unit **ARTEP** contain all critical tasks actually performed and identify all performance objectives required of your unit?
- Does the **Soldiers Manual** for your **MOSC** contain all the tasks you are required to perform?
- In your opinion was your **Skill Qualification Test** valid, and did it contain only the material that pertains to your MOSC?
- Are sufficient **TEC** materials available to allow you to study and/or train your **MOSC** skills?
- Does the **OPFOR** program meet your unit's needs and are sufficient **OPFOR** materials available for your training?

If the answer to any of these questions is **No,** then call the **Training Hotline.** You can help yourself, your unit, and the Army improve our training posture, individually and collectively. Feel free to call the **Training Hotline** and give us your recommendations for intelligence training improvement, or your training problems. The key to developing effective, valid training materials lies in field units where constructive feedback and criticism from users are generated.

To use the **Training Hotline,** dial **Autovon 879-3609** or **Commercial (602) 538-3609.** Your message will be recorded automatically, so be sure to give your name, unit, telephone number, and clearly state your message. Please limit your call to three minutes. Compose your message beforehand to insure it contains all the necessary facts. Your recorded message will be acted upon either the same day or the first duty day following your call. You will be provided a response, either preliminary or complete, within five duty days.

Users are invited and encouraged to take the initiative in improving intelligence training products and methods. Use the new **Training Hotline,** call the responsible USAICS element direct, or write: Commander, US Army Intelligence Center and School, ATTN: ATSI-TD, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613.

Intelligence Training Aids

One request in our 1979 Annual Readership Survey was that we expand our "Intelligence Training Literature" department to include intelligence training aids available through Training Aids Support Offices (TASOs) world-wide. With this issue, we will inaugurate just such a program.

Intelligence Training Aids will profile the various training aids available or in development for use by intelligence personnel. This quarter, we will profile the Army Vehicle Recognition cards (GTA 17-2-8, cards 1–48, February 1977) in our Recognition Quiz on page 48.

We will also profile the Soviet Weapons Whiz Wheel (GTA 30-3-15, September 1975) and Intelligence Documents for Field Training (GTA 30-3-17, November 1976).

Check your local TASO for the training aids available to help you become a true intelligence professional.

CEWI Battalion

ARTEP 34-165 (formerly ARTEP 30-165), "Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence Battalion (CEWI Bn), Division," originally scheduled for final DA print in fourth quarter 1979 has been slipped to fourth quarter 1980 awaiting final approval of FM 34-10, "CEWI Battalion." It is anticipated that the ARTEP will be produced as four separate publications, one for each company of the CEWI Battalion.

Officer Evaluation Reporting System

Up-to-date information on the new Officer Evaluation Reporting System (OERS) is now available through a correspondence subcourse developed by the US Army Administration Center. The subcourse is designed to familiarize officers with the Army's officer performance counseling/coaching and evaluation reporting system.

The subcourse is worth 8 credit hours and is composed of three modules, a resource package and an examination. The title of the subcourse is AG 015, The Officer Evaluation Reporting System (OERS).

Organizational Effectiveness

Another correspondence subcourse has been developed by the Organizational Effectiveness Training Center, Fort Ord, California.

The subcourse, which is designed for those individuals who wish to enhance leadership and supervisory skills, is OEO-003, Conducting Effective Meetings and is worth 3 credit hours.

Mohawk Aviators

The 2BF19 OV-1D (Mohawk) Aviator Combat Surveillance Qualification Course is currently being revised. If you have any ideas which would improve Mohawk aviator training at USAICS, contact the Collective Training Division on the **Training Hotline, AUTOVON 879-3609** or **Commercial (602) 538-3609.**

Soviet Weapons Whiz Wheel

(GTA 30-3-15, September 1975)

What is the maximum effective range of the T62 medium tank? What type warhead does it fire and what is its maximum effective rate of fire per minute? Its graphic symbol?

The answers to these questions can all be found on the Soviet Weapons Whiz Wheel available to you through your local TASO. The same information is available for 35 other Soviet weapons systems. Shouldn't you know the answers when they could fit in the palm of your hand?

EWI

In Intelligence Training Literature (April–June 1979 issue, page 60), Intelligence Electronic Warfare (IEW) was referenced in conjunction with FM 34-1 and FM 34-2, IEW is now EWI or Electronic Warfare Intelligence. FM 34-1 and FM 34-2 will reflect this change when published.

Intelligence Documents for Field Training

(GTA 30-3-17 November 1976)

This packet contains four sample documents: an enlisted identity card, an officer identity card, a Komsomol Party Card and an Opposing Force battalion breakthrough overlay.

Vehicle Recognition Quiz

Fifteen vehicles await you below in head-on and profile views. They represent equipment found in NATO and Warsaw Pact inventories. Can you identify them? If you are stumped, find yourself a set of Vehicle Recognition Cards (GTA 17-2-8, Cards 1–48, February 1977) and review them, then take the quiz. Answers will be found on page 44 of this issue.



(continued from page 3)
trained to accept more responsibility and to lead. Training must prepare them to teach their soldiers to be professionals. Their example and job knowledge will be the tools necessary to train subordinates. We, in turn, must recognize our responsibility to train our NCO's to accomplish these tasks.

2) Officers. Our officers must be trained to think and act "all-source intelligence," to improve their troops' MOS proficiency and basic soldier skills, and mold their personnel into effective intelligence-producing units. Our officers must understand the importance of properly trained soldiers. One major reason the Army is losing quality personnel is a daily routine in training which results in boredom and a lack of job satisfaction. The intelligence officer must produce training in an all-source environment that is innovative, challenging and meaningful.

This is not an easy task for intelligence personnel in a peacetime environment.

To quote the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Meyer, "Readiness to go to war is the purpose of the peacetime Army." This is our challenge for the 80s. Military Intelligence personnel must stand ready to meet this challenge. I know that we can; I am sure we will.

Professional Reader

The Bomber In World War II, by Alfred Price, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, NY, 1979, 150 pages, $10.95.

With a great deal of technical information, Alfred Price has developed an excellent work in **The Bomber in World War II.** The book is must reading for all World War II buffs. **The Bomber in World War II** incorporates so many facts about bomber design and usage that the reader might feel he or she is sitting in the cockpit of one of these aircraft.

Price divides his book into three parts. The first part deals with the evolution of the twin engine bomber with considerable discussion of the evolution of bombers throughout the war, as well as bomber defense, target acquisition and bomb sights.

In the second section, Price presents to the reader what he feels were the six best multi-engine bombers used in World War II. To make his determinations, Price delves into the specifications, workings and good and bad points of various bombers attached to the German, British and American air wings and data issued to fighter pilots concerning the vulnerabilities of each plane.

In the third part of the book, Price studies bomber offensive and defensive tactics along with theory and illustrations of bomber formations. Price concludes his book by describing the age of the 'new bomber' that began near the end of World War II. Price illustrates the fact that airpower is highly effective for it is swift, wide-ranging and flexible due to such 'new bombers' as the American B-29 and the Arado 234 jet engine German bomber.

The Bomber in World War II is very informative and contains numerous photographs and illustrations. With his experience as an air crew officer in the British Royal Air Force, Price provides the reader with a book that is both fascinating and informative.

2LT John Schmidtbauer
Co G, USAICS

Battles of the Bible: A Modern Military Evaluation of the Old Testament, by Chaim Herzog and Mordechai Gichon, Random House, NY, 1978, 247 pages, $17.50.

Battles of the Bible reconstructs biblical military history from the invasion of Canaan by the Israelites under Joshua's command through the conquests of the kingdom by David and Solomon and the division of the lands into Judah and Israel to the successful rebellion of the Maccabees. The authors have attempted to apply modern military thought to biblical accounts of these battles.

The authors present the long history of warring empires and clashing guerrilla forces that are still found in today's conflicts and have been repeated in the recent past in the Middle East.

Illustrations of biblical life, detailed maps and ground and aerial photographs and a well-written text make *Battles of the Bible* very interesting background reading for students of the Middle East today. Technology has changed but the peoples and their attitudes have not. Israel is still fighting the same battles she fought in history for a homeland.

The Third World War, August 1985, by General Sir John Hackett and Other Top-Ranking NATO Generals and Advisors, MacMillan Publishing Company, Inc., New York; 1978; $12.95; 368 pages.

Though **The Third World War** is fiction, its theme is very real and possible—a military confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact nations.

Sir John presents the world situation in 1984, setting the stage for the conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

The reader may disagree with Sir John's fictional assessment of the world at that time, but don't let the first two or three chapters of the book discourage you. The author uses modern day tactics and weapons to fight this war. And this is the real strength of the book.

In short, the book discusses issues we read and write about in our service magazines. Some of the topics and items are: FM 100-5; weapons systems—XM-1, IFV, F-111, F-15, F-16 and many more; airpower; seapower; civil defense; use of chemical and nuclear weapons, electronic counter and counter-countermeasures; the Soviet "daring thrust;" sponge tactics; restructuring—heavy or light divisions; plus much more.

This novel will spark your imagination about the world today and the future applications of military power. With the change in government in Iran, unrest in many parts of Africa, and a Pope from Poland—maybe Sir John knows something we don't?

MAJ John M. Rooney
Resource Analyst,
RMO, USAICS

The Challenge of MI *(continued from page 10)*

that last extra piece in the puzzle or that finishing touch to a professional product. We must understand that we will never know all that we would want to know. There is no piece of combat intelligence which, if accurate and timely enough, can't or shouldn't be shot at first and analyzed second. This is why I have a particular aversion to the concept of combat information as being something different from tactical intelligence. Combat information is simply the top priority task of any good tactical intelligence effort. We know that and we must prove that we can instill a sense of urgency in ourselves and in our troops.

Our mission alone is a challenge to test your leadership and one that should keep your cup of job satisfaction running over. But add to the mission, the environment in which you are privileged to serve, an environment of change which at your level means turmoil, in which you thus far have spent your careers and in which you will continue to see for at least the next five years: new multi-discipline methods of operation born in the Vietnam War, new organizations (CEWI and INSCOM), new doctrine, new equipment, and the most pressing problem of our whole Army, especially for MI—manning the force.

I will discuss this #1 Army and MI problem—manning the force both from the enlisted side, which is the most serious problem, and from the officer side.

In MI the enlisted personnel problem is the most serious. It revolves around recruiting and retention. Not only must we secure and retain the necessary manpower but we must hold to our standards as well. The activation of CEWI units will exacerbate the manning problems but we cannot reduce our wartime requirements. Neither can we relax our overall qualitative standards. However, we must look at standards realistically and eliminate those which are outmoded or rooted in the mystique of MI or its varius subcultures. Encumbrances which are no longer needed must be removed. Moreover, our efforts must extend to the MI Reserve Components which are absolutely essential to meeting our wartime requirements. Every time a soldier, officer or enlisted, leaves the active roster we must do everything possible to add their names to the rolls of an MI Reserve unit.

Improving retention will require substantial extra effort by MI leadership. The quality of our people and the marketable skills we provide them force us to compete with the civilian marketplace to an unprecedented degree. MILPERCEN and USAREC can provide help with such things as bonuses and eliminating outmoded policies but retention in the final analysis is our problem—a leadership problem. Our first and most important task is to provide our soldiers with challenging work which will help to promote job satisfaction. Simultaneously, we must instill pride based on the importance of our profession and each individual's contribution to that mission. We must stress the fact that we are soldiers first, but intelligence professionals second to none. You must lead by example, demonstrate self-sacrifice—not self-service—and place responsibility and trust in your troops. Allow them to learn by mistakes; they won't disappoint you often. They are the finest people in the Army. While a few MI units are doing a fine job at retention, we all must do better if we are going to continue to be able to perform our mission.

Manning the officer corps requires us to look forward, not backwards, with a sense of what is best for the Army and for MI. Army Intelligence is bigger than MI alone. We need second specialty officers, especially from the combat arms, as we have had in pre-OPMS days in such officers as Weyand, Stilwell, Dupuy, Peers. Not only do they make a special contribution to the MI mission but, as they go on to assume leadership positions in their primary specialty, they take with them an appreciation and understanding of our business. There also is a critical role in Army Intelligence for our civilians and for the supporting skills from other branches that serve in MI units as S1s, S4s, JAGs ...

Conversely, we need MI officers serving in non-MI secondary specialities if we are going to have our needs recognized by the Army as it makes policy, assigns people, develops equipment, trains or goes to war.

I know the frustrations in the field from digesting our second specialty force as the Army transitions into OPMS—with the personnel system getting ahead of the training system, and all too often ahead of our mindsets. But OPMS is a fact of life and the way of the future. It is not the demise of MI or of any other branch. It is what the Chief of Staff called an administrative detail—a useful system of personnel management. Don't be like the old horse cavalry. Accept the challenge and opportunty of change. In fact, don't just accept it. Learn to thrive on it. As I pointed out earlier, change is not only a fact of our lives but has been the fact of the lives of all forward looking men and women for the past 200 years.

In closing, let me try to capture the essence of our leadership challenge for the '80s with a statement that should be the creed for every MI soldier.

I am a soldier first,
But an intelligence professional second to none.
With pride in my heritage, but focused on the future.
Performing the first task of an Army:
To find, know and never lose the enemy.
With a sense of urgency and of tenacity,
Professional and physical fitness,
And above all:
Integrity—for in Truth lies Victory.
Always at silent war while ready for shooting war:
The silent warrior of the Army team.

Military Intelligence
April–June 1980
Strategic Level Intelligence Interface

Articles dealing with this theme should be submitted to MI Magazine by 15 March 1980. In addition to topics suggested in our July–September 1979 issue (p. 45), articles defining and discussing the role of strategic intelligence in the 1980s would be appreciated.

Editor

MI in the 80s (continued from page 11)

System.

The operational capabilities of the US intelligence community and its Army components are technically sophisticated, large, complex, expensive and capable of providing enhanced support to Army decision-makers. The intelligence officer must learn to orchestrate the system and to translate/articulate the decision-maker's requirements on the system.

The Command and Control System of the US Army is equipped with intelligence staff officers at each level. Traditionally, these staff officers have been unduly burdened with the added responsibilities of operational management of the intelligence and/or security components of subordinate units or dedicated intelligence and/or security units. This fact has constrained the intelligence staff officer in his ability to become the commander's advisor and agent in the use of intelligence responsive to that decision-maker's needs for intelligence pertinent to the current and future time frames. Instead of being able to provide those intelligence estimates on divergent scenarios (time and event probable), required to reduce the ambiguity of command decisions, far too often the intelligence staff officer is called on to expend his resources in the resolution of current resource and operational management issues. When the current Army staff organization was devised, the G2 was the only staff officer who retained operating responsibilities. Over time, the G2 was divested of collection operation responsibilities. IOSS' intent was to achieve the logical extension of this action, the divestiture of intelligence, counterintelligence and production operational responsibilities. FM 101-5 dated 1972 still casts the intelligence staff officer with operational responsibilities in intelligence, counterintelligence and production; Army Doctrine "on the books," yet extinct since IOSS.

The time has come for Army commanders to use their intelligence staff officers as the consumers and taskers of the US intelligence system and to rely on established intelligence organization commanders to resolve the resource and operational management issues which arise as those elements plan and execute support to the Army command and control structure.

Standardized intelligence support to Army commanders at Corps and below. Because corps and division are relatively fixed organizations with reasonably predictable intelligence requirements, intelligence organizations supporting them can be standardized and assigned to those organizations. These intelligence organizations should be as self-sufficient as their parent non-MI unit. To the extent that these units are not totally self-sustaining, however, they will have to rely on intelligence support from above. Thus the division will be partially dependent on the corps and the corps partially dependent on Echelons Above the Corps (EAC) for support. The dependence of these units on EAC intelligence support is nowhere more evident than in the case of corps and divisions that are likely to be projected on contingency missions to areas far beyond the capabilities of their organic intelligence collectors. They will also normally be dependent upon EAC intelligence organizations to furnish them with technical support (i.e., intelligence to support intelligence activities).

Flexible support to Echelons Above the Corps (EAC). Unlike corps and divisions, organizations at EAC come in many different shapes and sizes and operate under a variety of radically different missions. Operational decision-making at these levels occurs in both peace and war. Decision-makers at EAC operate in a complex and uncertain environment. Decisions made today will impact on events many years in the future and the costs of failure are staggering. Intelligence resources to provide the sophisticated support required at EAC are expensive and therefore relatively more scarce than those found at corps and divisions. For this reason competition for EAC intelligence support is intense. In order to provide for an equitable distribution of intelligence support, these resources must be centrally managed to the maximum possible extent at INSCOM and allocated by the Chief of Staff of the Army.

Conclusion

IOSS has given us a completely new set of organizational tools; however, we are in many cases attempting to use these new tools in the same way we used the old ones. For IOSS to be completely successful, the organizational renaissance must be followed by a doctrinal renaissance to forge the new IOSS organizations into a true intelligence support system. The challenge of the 1980s is to develop this new doctrine and all of us have an opportunity to participate in this team effort. **Seize it!**

MI in the 80s
(continued from page 12)

But we must be prepared to do the job tomorrow if required. We must determine how to best use what resources we have and fight on. I submit that any leader who can't or won't do that has no place in our Army. And, it is not enough just to accept that philosophy ourselves. We must transmit this to our people down to the last individual.

I would like to emphasize one last key ingredient for the 80s—people. People are our most important product and must be treated as such. Our greatest assets are intelligence personnel who are motivated, alert and who will contribute ideas on more effective ways of accomplishing the intelligence mission. A *good* manager can promote this feeling of personal involvement in a unit's success. As we rapidly approach the 80s let's honestly make people our most important product. It's easier to retain than recruit or retrain.

In summary, we have a difficult challenge ahead of us in the 1980's. We probably will never have all of the equipment and people that we think we should have. However, we have a great amount of equipment and we have some very fine skilled people. So, let's do the best we can with what we have and get on with our job which is providing the best possible intelligence to our Army and nation.

Footnotes

1. LTC William E. Harmon, "CEWI Battalion Update," *Military Intelligence* (Apr–Jun 78), p. 41.

A Language Maintenance Course for FORSCOM Linguists

By WO1 Thomas J. Hofer

The most serious problem that commanders of FORSCOM linguists face today is the erosion of language proficiency. Unlike other Army skills, language proficiency deteriorates rapidly without constant reinforcement and use. After 2–3 years of disuse, proficiency drops at such an alarming rate that the linguist becomes unable to function in his military specialty.

The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, FORSCOM is aware of the severity of the problem and recently took strong measures to remedy this deficiency.

As a stopgap solution, a concerted effort has been made to raise overall proficiency of FORSCOM linguists through the development of a training program co-sponsored by Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) Non-Resident Instruction Division and the Office of the DCSI, FORSCOM. This project, which acquired the acronym FLAMRIC (FORSCOM Language Maintenance/Refresher and Improvement Course), brought together linguists from Fort Bragg, NC, Fort Hood, TX, Fort Lewis, WA, Fort Ord, CA, and Fort Richardson, AK.

Their mission was to review existing Defense Language Institute foreign language materials currently in use in the Resident Basic, Intermediate and Advanced Courses; and, by editing and recompiling, produce a language refresher program suitable for Russian, German, Korean and Chinese-Mandarin linguists stationed in FORSCOM Military Intelligence units.

The conference participants consisted of 26 warrant officers and non-commissioned officers, all subject matter experts in the fields of interrogation and voice intercept collection.

There was no doubt that a need existed for the development of a unified program. A wealth of DLI-produced language material was available to linguists through the DLIFLC Non-Resident Instruction Division. Since this material, consisting of readers, exercise books, grammars and aural comprehension texts, was geared to the resident student, it was necessary to adapt it so that it would fit the requirements of a Non-Resident Foreign Language Program. These requirements were:

1) Exportable to the field.
2) Self-paced so that linguists of varying proficiencies could start at different points in the course.
3) Organized systematically so that a linguist who has suffered loss of proficiency since graduation from Defense Language Institute can proceed according to a definite plan whereby to regain proficiency and, having restored it to a level achieved at graduation, improve his language skills beyond DLI course objectives.

The conference participants were allowed three weeks to complete their tasks. The first requirement was to sift through the existing material and tentatively select those texts which would be useful for Non-Resident linguists. Then, each of the four language sections developed an outline for the course which followed the general pattern of: a Basic Level—designed to review grammar and vocabulary as well as basic structural patterns; an Intermediate Level—intensive grammar review, verb study, and development of aural comprehension and speaking skills; an Advanced Level—integrating previously learned material with advanced military and civilian readings which would lead to a fully qualified linguist capable of performing his duties in his target language.

The conference was unique in that it fused MOS expertise and experience with professional instruction guidance provided by Mr. Ted Horn, Army Desk Officer, DLIFIC Non-Resident Instruction Division. However, there would have been no conference without the impetus and guidance generated by the ODCSI, FORSCOM and the special interest which Commander, FORSCOM took in this project. They demonstrated their interest to Army linguists by providing the funding for the conference and assembling the participants at Fort Ord, CA. Furthermore, by allowing the conference the latitude to develop a language refresher program under the aegis of FORSCOM with supervision by DLIFLC, they displayed a great deal of confidence in the professional capabilities of the linguists who attended.

The Russian team

(continued on page 54)

Military Intelligence Branch

Officer Career Development

MI Company Grade

LTC Wayne L. Worthington
Chief, MI Branch

MAJ William R. Braddock
Professional Development Officer

MAJ Allen F. Rossow
Captains' Assignments

MAJ C. Thomas Houser
Lieutenants' Assignments

MI Representatives (Field Grade/Warrant Officers)

LTC (P) Richard J. Powers
Colonels' Assignments

LTC Jasper R. Harris
Lieutenant Colonels' Assignments

MAJ James A. Bartlett
Majors' Assignments

MAJ Alexander M. Okimoto
Majors' Professional Development

CW4 Roger D. Bostick
Warrant Officers' Assignments

(continued from page 52)

The section leaders of the four language groups were: WO1 Bruce Kipp, HOC, 504th MI Group, Fort Hood, TX (Russian), CW2 Gene Dorrough, Co A, 519th MI Bn, Fort Bragg, NC (German), WO1 Suzanne Eatman, 601st ASA Co, Fort Ord, CA (Chinese-Mandarin) and WO1 Claude McFarland, 7th MI Co, Fort Ord, CA (Korean).

Under the leadership of these officers, the language sections produced a refresher program which will serve as a prototype for other FORSCOM languages.

During September 1979, Czech, Polish and Arabic linguists will assemble to undertake the same work that the June FLAMRIC conference accomplished.

After the field test edition of FLAMRIC has been in use for a year, there will be a follow-up conference to analyze user comments and incorporate their suggestions in order to produce a final field version.

The strong commitment to language improvement will go a long way to remedy the ills of declining language proficiency among FORSCOM linguists. This program will need the support of both major and unit commanders to make it effective. The conference participants were unanimous in their recommendation that a minimum of ten hours weekly be set aside in the unit training schedule in order to guarantee its full implementation.

The challenge of maintaining language proficiency while being assigned to a CONUS MI tactical unit where there are few opportunities to practice language skills acquired through long hours of study is being met through FLAMRIC. With the adoption of this program, FORSCOM linguists will have taken a great stride towards full competency both linguistically and militarily.

The Korean team

The Chinese-Mandarin team

The FLAMRIC manager goes over some points with the team.

Military Intelligence Branch
Combat Support Career Division
US Army Military Personnel Center

The personnel shown below are DA Branch personnel responsible for your career management. They can assist you in professional development and assignment matters.

Enlisted Professional Development

Ms. Helena Newsome
Chief, Assignment Section

LTC Sharpe McCullough
Branch Chief

SGM R. V. Blanton
Branch SGM

Military Intelligence
Career Management Field 96
Professional Development/Assignment Teams

MSG David Barr
Senior Career Advisor

CMF 96

Mrs. Esther Robinson
Chief, Assignment Team

SFC Ray Reinhold
Career Advisor

MOS 96B
MOS 96C
MOS 96D

Ms. Pam Fields
Assignment Manager

SFC Dick Kern
Career Advisor

MOS 97B
MOS 97C

SSG Lee Rivas
Assignment Manager

Mr. Jesse Woodson
Career Advisor

MOS 17K
MOS 17M
MOS 96H

Mrs. Edna McGinnis
Assignment Manager

Mrs. Jimmie Ross
Applicant Manager

MOS 97B and GREAT SKILLS

You may contact your CMF 96 professional development or assignment manager by writing to: Department of the Army, US Army Military Personnel Center, ATTN: DAPC-EPL-M, 2461 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, VA 22331, or by calling Autovon 221-9363/9364/9365.

You may contact your CMF 98 professional development or assignment manager by calling Autovon 221-0076/0254/0413. CMF 33 professional development or assignment managers may be reached at Autovon 221-0329/0413. Or write to MILPERCEN at the address listed above.

Photographs by Ms. Helene C. Stikkel, USAAVC, Pentagon.

Electronic Warfare/Cryptologic Operations and Intercept Equipment Repair Career Management Fields 98 & 33 Professional Development/Assignment Teams

MSG Arthur Lutz
Senior Career Advisor

MSG Kenneth Beckett
Assignment Team Supervisor

CMF 98/33

MSG Tom Focht
Career Advisor

SSG(P) Eduardo Porras
Assignment Manager

MOS 05G
MOS 98J
MOS 98Z

SFC Carl Roble
Career Advisor

SSG Wayne Little
Assignment Manager

MOS 05D
MOS 05H

SFC George Ray
Career Advisor

SSG(P) David Olander
Assignment Manager

MOS 98G

SFC Philip Stiffler
Career Advisor

SSG George Schramm
Assignment Manager

MOS 05K

SFC Orville Groves
Career Advisor

MOS 98C

MOS 33S
SFC(P) Charles Rickman
Career Advisor

SSG William Baker
Assignment Manager

Enlisted Evaluation Reports

Senior Enlisted Evaluation Reports (SEER) are extremely important items in each soldier's Official Military Personnel File and Career Management Individual File. Most soldiers and their raters/indorsers are aware of the importance of the numerical point score of an SEER when a soldier is competing for promotion; however, raters and soldiers alike seem to overlook the importance of the narrative portion—specifically, the relationship between PART II A and PART II K of the SEER. In executing these portions of the SEER, the following discussion should be considered.

As an example, consider an evaluation report written for an E7 MOS 97B40 soldier. Block J will reflect the duty position corresponding to the authorized pay grade in which the individual is assigned. In this example, assume the E7 is assigned to an E7 position within his unit. Referring to FM 30-97B, Soldier's Manual, the duty title of such a soldier's position should be either Senior Counterintelligence Agent or Operations Sergeant. The brief description of duties (PART II A) should reflect actual duties performed but **must** correspond with the duties required for the soldier's skill level (or a higher skill level) as described in AR 611-201. One of the key duties which must be performed and evaluated at skill level 4 is supervision. The description of duties performed must reflect that the E7 supervises lower grade personnel or supervises operations, investigations, etc. If by the nature of the soldier's assignment he is not in a position to supervise, every effort should be made by the rater to afford the soldier the opportunity to supervise; i.e., assignment as NCOIC of a team in support of field exercises, NCOIC of a surveillance team, or temporary duty as unit motor sergeant, unit supply sergeant, or operations sergeant in the absence of the incumbent. PART II K should then evaluate the soldier's performance as a supervisor.

If the soldier is an outstanding supervisor, state that fact simply and directly. If the soldier displays the potential to be a good supervisor, but requires additional training, reflect the training he requires in PART II J and indicate in block K that he does display leadership potential. The key to the SEER is that PARTS II A and II K must complement each other. Within the intelligence community, soldiers and their raters tend to forget that military intelligence personnel, above all else, are soldiers first and foremost and must be evaluated both as NCOs and as military intelligence specialists.

DAVID L. BARR
MSG
MI Branch, DA MILPERCEN

First 26K Graduating Class

by Mr. Gene Whitney

On 14 September 1979, the Systems Maintenance Division, Department of Imagery Intelligence (DII), US Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, Arizona, graduated the first class of nine students trained on newly developed Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE). These students received training on the following ASE systems: AN/ALQ-147 Countermeasures Set; AN/APR-39(V1) Detecting Set; Radar Signal; AN/ALR-46 Countermeasures Receiving Set; XM-130 Dispenser, General Purpose, Aircraft (Flare and Chaff Dispenser). Upon graduation, these students were assigned a secondary MOS of 26K and then proceeded on to utilization assignments in Germany and Korea.

Kneeling, SSG Bopp, Instructor; Front Row: PFC Pocher, SP4 Presley, SP4 Tumblison, SP5 Smith. Middle Row: SP5 McAlpine, SP5 Shoemaker, SP5 Morris. Back Row: SP5 Coen, SP5 Jones.

DII DOT photograph SP4 Robert Long

1979 Readership Survey

Thanks to all who completed our 1979 Readership Survey. As this article goes to press, we have received more than 600 responses, a 1.5 percent increase over last year's survey.

Last year, I wrote "this article is your article, your evaluation of us." This is as true in 1979 as it was in 1978. In addition to your quantitative responses (which are indexed against last year's responses when applicable), we are again publishing a representative sample of your recommendations for future issues of *Military Intelligence*.

I am pleased to note that 47 percent of our respondents found *Military Intelligence* "Better than most" other military publications in 1979. This is a 9 percent increase over last year. At the same time, 3 percent found us "inferior to most," (a 6 percent decrease in this category).

We are already working to implement your recommendations in this and future issues of *Military Intelligence*. At this time, however, we hope that you will carefully consider the recommendations printed below. You might find ideas for articles you could write and submit to *Military Intelligence*. Again, **you** are the experts who can provide the articles recommended in this survey. Your support in these areas will make us a still better magazine in 1980. Thank you very much for your support.

Editor

Never forget that the Army is a team—we do not excel in a vacuum ... MI for MI's sake is a useless exercise.

Reader Response

1979 Readership Survey

	1979	1978
1. Present Military Status:		
Active Duty	59%	72%
USAR	26%	21%
National Guard	3%	4%
Other	12%	1%
O7–O10	1%	
O4–O6	21%	
WO–O3	34%	
E6–E9	13%	
E1–E5	5%	
Civilian	4%	
No Response	22%	
Army	58%	
Navy	1%	
Marine Corps	5%	
Air Force	3%	
Other Services (Foreign)	1%	
No Response	32%	
2. Do you normally read:		
Office/Unit Copy	56%	53%
Dayroom Copy	1%	1%
Library Copy	2%	1%
Personal Subscription Copy	41%	45%
3. Are the articles and materials in MI Magazine of personal interest to you?		
Yes	99%	98%
No	1%	2%
4. Please rate the contents of MI Magazine:		
Professionally useful	78%	74%
Nice to know	21%	26%
Of no particular value	1%	
5. I would like to see more emphasis on:		
History	9%	8%
Intelligence Training	20%	16%
Tactical Intelligence	18%	17%
Strategic Intelligence	13%	12%
Combat Developments	9%	9%
Career Management Information	10%	9%
Foreign Armed Forces and Equipment	16%	18%

1979 Readership Survey

	1979	1978
Intelligence Center and School	5%	4%
6. The regular departments which interest me most are:		
As I See It	8%	15%
From the Commander	5%	—
Officer Notes	15%	24%
Enlisted Notes	7%	12%
USAICS/USAISD Notes	11%	12%
Professional Reader	13%	26%
Feedback	7%	11%
Mohawk Report	2%	—
Reserve Notes	11%	—
Intelligence Training Literature	20%	—
7. Does the front cover of MI Magazine attract your attention?		
Yes	74%	81%
Sometimes	13%	—
No	13%	19%

8. Propose a theme for a future issue:
Themes proposed were incorporated in our 1980 themes in the July–September 1979 issue.
Editor

9. How would you compare MI Magazine to other military publications?		
Better than most	47%	38%
As good as most	49%	53%
Inferior to most	3%	9%

10. On what date (roughly) did this issue arrive at your unit/home address?
See "late publication" comment under Distribution in the Readership Survey Responses.
Editor

11. In what condition did the magazine arrive?	
Excellent	76%
Good	21%
Fair	3%
Unacceptable	1%

12. This issue has been printed with a ragged right margin. Do you find it easier to read than the

justified column?

Yes	59%
No difference	14%
No	27%

13. What is your one recommendation for improving MI Magazine?
See the following section.

Professional Development

More articles dealing with counterintelligence and counterintelligence specialists.

Aim more articles toward career development.

Provide more information on management and MOS shortages, turnabout time by MOS, future trends and problems encountered in bringing new collection systems into Europe.

Provide more coverage of 98 and 33 CMF soldiers in both tactical and strategic roles. This would expand interest in your magazine and aid in retention of these critical Army skills.

Add a short quiz to each issue to keep MI personnel abreast of the latest developments in military intelligence.

Present information on the SQT that will help supervisors assist their personnel in preparation.

Discuss the trends and developments in MI careers as perceived by MI branch managers, G2s and, if possible, members of promotion boards.

Enlisted Notes should include projected vacancies and schools.

Make more assignment information available to MI personnel.

Present suggestions for enlisted personnel to help them prepare for the SQT.

What about MI warrant officers and some input from Army attaches??

Print more articles on professional development for both NCOs and officers.

Distribution

Suggest the publication months be closer to the actual month of issue.

A number of complaints have been received concerning "late publication," primarily from APO, NY. Our Readership Survey asked the approximate date that the magazine was received. Reader responses indicated that delivery to APO addresses takes from 8–10 weeks. We are inquiring into solutions to this problem.

Editor

I subscribed to MI Magazine on two occasions and both times received only one of the four yearly copies. Others have had the same experience. Circulation must improve.

Our distribution list is very carefully monitored and continually updated. Copies are often lost in the mail or "borrowed" along distribution channels. While we cannot be responsible for such losses, we will gladly replace copies that do not arrive if we are notified of subscription difficulties.

Editor

Send complimentary issues to ROTC elements and other appropriate units with a good professional cover letter for opportunity to subscribe.

Distribute to all MI officers and enlisted personnel.

Send copies to combat arms units.

Our circulation would not allow for free distribution to all MI personnel or for blanket mailings to ROTC and combat arms units. We do, however, honor all requests from ROTC and combat arms units as supplies allow.

Editor

Tri-Service

Incorporate items pertaining to other services' intelligence units.

More interservice intelligence (i.e. USMC MAGIS system).

Training

Provide a regular article reviewing a training exercise (CAMMS, Reforger, Brave Shield, etc.) from an MI perspective. Give the nuts-and-bolts solutions to problem areas if solutions were discovered; articles giving to others the benefit of the authors' experiences.

At least one article per issue should focus on some skill everyone can use. Often the skill could be semi-technical in nature.

Provide an intelligence training section with quizzes to follow. Publish information for lieutenants so they can know how to become more professionally rounded.

I'd like more information on new intelligence literature to include books on the open market and GTAs.

MI Reserve

Make the magazine more useful to the Army reservist. More emphasis on means for reservists to maintain their proficiency.

More about MI-USAR affairs, training and progress.

Place more emphasis on MI doctrine and issues as they relate to the USAR.

MI Units

I would like to see more background given on MI personnel/organizations and their training capabilities.

More comprehensive coverage of what's happening at major MI installations.

With each issue, spotlight one MI unit.

More articles to discuss how intelligence units perform in the field.

Provide more information on MI jobs throughout the world.

Heavies and Controversy

Interview Corps G2s on today's challenges and those we will face tomorrow with solid recommendations for solutions.

More controversy to stimulate arguments.

Cut down on "guiding thoughts" from heavies.

Address some of the tough issues facing the Army as a whole, not just MI problems. Retention, doing more with less, turbulence, quality of life for enlisted personnel and inflation are just a few of the issues that are impacting on the Army ... and MI.

More ...

More on current MI operations, ASA and CI/HUMINT.

More emphasis on current events as they pertain to the intelligence community and the intelligence effort.

Personalize the magazine more. Include events/activities of MI units. Have an MI-Europe page, an MI-Mideast page, etc. Describe activities and projects on going at USAICS/USAISD.

More articles by senior NCOs dealing with equipment and problems and solutions encountered in the field.

More emphasis on international relations.

More enlisted-oriented intel training.

Tell us periodically what each directorate at USAICS is responsible for and what it is doing.

More first-person articles; personal experiences pertaining to MI.

More articles on the role of enlisted personnel in the intelligence field.

More pages of Feedback.

Pay more attention to problems such as improper TOE, equipment and training.

More on people and assignments.

More humorous anecdotes and quotes from history to fill in and to break the grim professional pace a bit.

More articles on basic MI techniques in order to give some training to officers and EMs from other branches.

More articles devoted to various overseas areas, peoples, cultures and the US strategic position in world situations.

More on SALT II and in-depth discussions on the NATO alliance.

More pictures.

More information aimed at brigade and battalion level.

More emphasis on the human element in MI.

More cartoons and humor.

More technical articles written in a relaxed tone.

Less ...

... on ground breakings and promotions.

Limit the amount of branch information and increase practical knowledge and general information.

Less space devoted to the "goings-on" at USAICS and USAISD.

Less history and more today.

Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact

More articles on the potential threat.

Analytical articles describing the development of Soviet tactical trends and weaponry.

More emphasis on Soviet equipment.

Up-to-date info on world happenings of interest to the US.

Add a regular department on uniforms and insignia, weapons systems and equipment of foreign armed forces, including a recognition quiz.

Officer/Enlisted Information

More articles on how the military intelligence officer/EM can better perform his or her duties.

"How-to" articles on field operations of various G2 staffs and specialist teams.

Concentrate more on need-to-know information for battalion and brigade size units.

Perhaps an S2 problem corner dealing with garrison and field ideas, problems and solutions.

More input from tactical MI officers on peacetime tactical training/development methods.

We need more articles focused at the Infantry/Field Artillery battalion level on how to train troops to counter the threat.

More emphasis on strategic (as well as tactical) intelligence and how it relates to MI personnel (and vice-versa).

Share training ideas used by MI/EW units to combine tactical and technical skills.

Bimonthly

Publish on a bimonthly basis.

Increase frequency to monthly or bimonthly.

Make the magazine larger.

Bimonthly publication is one of our goals at MI Magazine, but it will require greater input from the field.

Editor

Miscellaneous

Why not do some actual reporting? Is Fort Hood really the pits for MI people? What is field station duty like?

More articles like Karber's super three-part series (Oct.–Dec. 77—Apr.–June 78). Possible theme: Can We Get There From Here, on our ability to reinforce Europe for the big battle. Look at NATOs North and South flanks.

Open the magazine up to EMs.

MI Magazine has never been "closed" to EMs (or to reservists for that matter). Our content is dictated by submissions from our audience and these have been written predominantly by active duty officers. We want to hear from EMs. We want to hear from reservists. Are they reading?

Editor

Introduce a bibliography section to cover civilian and military literature.

Reprint high quality articles from other publications.

Annually list USAICS/USAISD MI courses to include convening dates, service quotas and special courses programmed.

Address some philosophical questions affecting MI personnel.

Place more emphasis on tomorrow in the areas of R and D and equipment capabilities (friendly and hostile).

Kudos

In the past few years, I feel the magazine has improved tremendously. I find it right up there with *Infantry* and other branch and professional publications.

I like what I see.

Excellent job.

Continue the good work.

Continue to make MI Magazine one of the best training publications around.

But not so fast ...

Articles are too lengthy.

Articles should be less biased.

MI Magazine is too impersonal and too specialist-oriented.

More professional writing/editing.

Get down to the unit level and see what MI types **really** do.

Unclassified Defense Intelligence Agency Publications on Soviet Bloc Forces

The Defense Intelligence Agency has made available over 30 unclassified publications pertaining to the doctrine, organization, training and equipment of Soviet Bloc ground forces to the Army National Guard. These publications are an excellent source of information for ARNG commanders and for intelligence and operations personnel who need to be aware of potential opposing force strengths and weaknesses.

To establish a pinpoint account, battalions or separate companies must indicate their requirements on block 337 of DA Form 12-9A. Requests for a particular publication should be submitted on DA Form 4569 to the State Publication Officer for forwarding to the AG Publication Center. Specific publications should be requested on the DA Form 4569 by the DD number.

Also available are 35mm slides on Warsaw Pact ground combat equipment and air combat equipment. Requests for these no-cost visual aids should be made directly to DIA, ATTN: DB-1B5 (Mr. Charlie Adams), Washington, DC 20301.

An all-inclusive source document for unclassified intelligence training materials, DIA Manual 59-3, *DIA Reference Library*, can be obtained by submitting DD Form 1142 (Interagency Document Request) to DIA, ATTN: RDS-3A, Washington, DC 20301.

These publications should be useful in upgrading the quality of ARNG unit intelligence training and operations security.

Points of contact for these publications are:

National Guard Bureau

(1) Organization and Training Division.
Major William Bache, AUTOVON 227-5217/5327

(2) Office of Administrative Services.
Mr. Phil Anderson, AUTOVON 227-5792

DIA, DB-1B5.
Mr. Charlie Adams, AUTOVON 222-2054

CARL L. ACREE
Colonel, GS
Chief, Army Organization & Training Division

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



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